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The Accounting Historians Journal is an international jour-
nal that addresses the development of accounting thought and
practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting
history, including but not limited to research that provides an
historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the re-
search, indicating the extent and manner in which they intend
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques,
including those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or
analyzed and the rationale used in selection of those source
materials. Authors should provide the reader information as to
how these source materials may be accessed.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of
accounting thought or practice should include a discussion of
the rationale for use of that framework in the manuscript.
5. In performing all analyses, authors should be sensitive to
and take adequate account of the social, political, and eco-
nomic contexts of the time period examined and of other en-
vironmental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign
causation to particular factors, we encourage authors to ad-
dress and evaluate the probable influences related to the prob-
lem or issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of re-
sults, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpreta-
tions and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study
for future research.
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WILLIAM D. SAMSON
(1947 - 2005)
Readers will be sad to learn of the sudden death of William
D. Samson on 15th September 2005. William D. Samson (Bill)
was the Roddy-Garner Professor of Accounting, Culverhouse
School of Accountancy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. He
was a former President of the Academy of Accounting Histori-
ans and Editor of the Accounting Historians Journal.
Bill’s death occurred shortly before the December issue of
AHJ was due to be sent to press. However, time has permitted
the inclusion of a moving memorial from two of his closest
friends and colleagues, Dale L. Flesher and Gary John Previts.
A full tribute to Bill Samson’s contribution to accounting his-
tory and the Academy of Accounting Historians will appear in
the June 2006 number of AHJ. To that end Richard K.
Fleischman, the incoming Editor, invites vignettes of Bill’s life
and work. Contributions should be sent by email attachment to
fleischman@jcu.edu.
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William Donald Samson
Memorial to an Accounting Historian,
Scholar and Friend
DALE L. FLESHER AND GARY JOHN PREVITS
Uniqueness is an attribute of greatness. Bill Samson was
unique. No other accounting historian has had his likeness and
his story told on the front page of The Wall Street Journal. Bill
was the subject of such attention on July 16, 1997. But he would
be the first to point out that being a ‘poster child’ for accounting
history was not what pleased him the most. Rather, his life with
Joan, their collection of pets, and perhaps the Harley which he
drove with all the abandon of a ‘rebel with a cause’, were the
center of the spirited person we grew to know so well. Indeed
living was something Bill well did, beyond his writings and
classroom teaching.
A 1969 graduate of Virginia Military Institute, Bill served as
a platoon leader and infantry officer in Vietnam, 1970-71 with
the 25th (Tropic Lightning) Division. In many ways the thought
of a lightning bolt depicts Bill’s furious energy about account-
abilities for our profession’s reputation and ethics, as well as the
disposition he invested in writing about a topic about which he
was interested. Bill’s fury occasionally lent to outrage, which
almost always, as a former colleague put it, was “brief and with-
out malice”. Nevertheless it was a memorable experience for
those in its path.
It was our mutual respect for Paul Garner which brought
the three of us closer together. The occasion was an Academy of
Accounting Historians conference dedicated to Paul’s memory.
This event provided the impetus for us to explore early railroad
annual reports. We also had many opportunities to work with
Bill through the Academy. He held several offices in the Acad-
emy including terms as Editor of the Accounting Historians
Journal (1990-1994), Secretary, and, of course, as President in
2002. Prior to that, Bill also spent many years in the service of
the Academy and in recent years he has been the administrative
guru of operations in Tuscaloosa, working closely with the
Academy’s administrator, Kathy Rice.
Bill’s research and writing is, of course, where we had the
greatest opportunity to work with him and to get to know him.
Bill was a private person, but not secretively so. He enjoyed a
good laugh and a practical joke, and could be ‘counted on’ to
11
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carry his own weight on a project and then some. He tended, as
most hard working professors, to feel the strain of conflicting
commitments, and to let his coauthors know if he felt too much
of an immediate task had landed on his plate, when in fact it
could be more equitably divided.
He had a joy of writing, which exceeded almost any bounds,
and a major challenge in dealing with his prolific style was to
edit it. He was not one who would tell you “OK cut away, no
pride of authorship”. Bill was very proud of his writing. He was,
in short, an excellent story teller and case writer, and contrib-
uted greatly to our joint efforts on the accounting history of
railroads such as the Baltimore and Ohio, the Mobile and Ohio
and the Illinois Central. The ‘grunt work’ – data dredging and
analysis – was left to us. Our role included mining the materials,
panning for a discovery and, following long meetings or brief
telephone chats, integrating these raw materials with Bill’s
drafting. Bill would weave golden phrases into the pages of
drafts. He read great quantities of materials to supplement the
primary sources that had been unearthed and used these to sup-
port or frame the contributions of our common work. But the
full details and the stories of all of this are for another, longer,
exposition.
Our contribution to your legacy, Bill, will be to continue the
work that we began together and that remains unfinished so as
to contribute to our colleagueship in the future as in the past.
Yet, however much we try we will never be as colorful as Bill –
wearing one of the ersatz neckties he discovered in some out of
the way haberdashery, or donning his blue and white striped
engineers cap at the start of a session reporting on one of our
railroad papers. Neither will we ever be quite as interesting to
our overseas colleagues. On completing a presentation in
France, Bill was asked politely by one of our French colleagues,
“What English dialect are you speaking?” Bill could talk “South-
ern” with the best!
Bill Samson – scholar, colleague, Academy leader and friend
– Farewell. We will not only miss you, but we will struggle to
find a way to fill the void, which in the final analysis, cannot be
filled. For as we have noted, your uniqueness extended beyond
the feature mentioned in The Wall Street Journal and reached
into the minds and hearts of your family, colleagues and friends.
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Malcolm Anderson
John Richard Edwards
and
Roy A. Chandler
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
CONSTRUCTING THE ‘WELL
QUALIFIED’ CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Abstract: Fundamental to the pursuit of the professional project by
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW), in the early years of its existence, was the construction of
the “well qualified” chartered accountant. This involved the introduc-
tion of onerous examinations, lengthy vocational training and signifi-
cant financial hurdles, which together confined membership to the
wealthier sections of society. Prior studies concentrate on the external
implications of the ICAEW’s policies, and have accepted, though left
unexamined, the significance of entry hurdles in achieving exclusion-
ary closure. The major focus of this paper is to examine how the
ICAEW differentiated its membership from outsiders on the grounds
of education and training and how the fledgling Institute employed
credentials to distinguish the “chartered accountant” brand from non-
chartered accountants. In further contrast to prior studies, we exam-
ine the internal tensions generated as a result of the precise shaping
of the ICAEW’s definition of the “well qualified” chartered accoun-
tant.
INTRODUCTION
Whereas their counterparts in Scotland organized them-
selves into local societies from the 1850s, accountants in En-
gland and Wales made slower institutional progress. In 1870,
accounting societies were formed in Liverpool and London,
soon followed by Manchester (1871) and Sheffield (1877). The
Acknowledgments: Financial support for this research has been provided
by the Centre for Business Performance of the Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants in England and Wales. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful com-
ments of two anonymous referees, Stephen P. Walker and participants at the
Accounting, Business and Financial History Conference, Cardiff, 2003.
Submitted September 2003
Revised September 2004
Accepted December 2004
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founding of a national body in 1872, the Society of Accountants
in England (SAE), provided the stimulus for the 1870 London
Institute to also open its doors to provincial members. In 1880,
members from these five bodies successfully petitioned for a
Royal Charter to create the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales (ICAEW). In the absence of legal protec-
tion, the ICAEW, like its predecessors, was unable to claim ex-
clusive use of the title “accountant” to help its members procure
work in an arena where the dubious practices of many “soi-
disant” accountants was claimed to have brought the profession
into disrepute [Walker, 2004a, p. 85]. The fledgling Institute
therefore sought to construct a definition of chartered accoun-
tants as being: “a class of persons well qualified to be employed in
the responsible and difficult duties often devolving on public ac-
countants” [ICAEW, 1882, p. 5, emphasis added]. Of fundamen-
tal importance in the creation of this “well qualified” practitio-
ner were two prerequisites. First, the stipulation that members
should undergo a lengthy period of supervised vocational train-
ing underpinned by rigorous written examinations; and, second,
the prohibition of a diverse array of non-accounting services, so
as to create, and be perceived as, a body of specialist practitio-
ners.
This paper examines in detail, the first of these innovations,
which, together, created the “chartered accountant” brand im-
age. We show how the ICAEW constructed a definition of the
“well qualified” chartered accountant, by differentiating its
membership from outsiders on the grounds of education, train-
ing and credentialism. Although this branding of the chartered
accountant strove to fulfill an external or exclusionary “closure”
function, this study, for the first time, illustrates the tensions
that were created within the ICAEW as a consequence of the
formulation of the definition of the chartered accountant in the
period 1880-1900.
The paper is structured as follows. To place the study into
an appropriate theoretical context, we draw on the relevant so-
ciological literature of exclusionary closure and credentialism.
The second section provides an historical context for the paper
by examining the exclusionary tactics employed by the ICAEW’s
five predecessor bodies in the 1870s. We then undertake a de-
tailed examination of how the ICAEW defined the “well quali-
fied” chartered accountant and consider the hurdles thereby cre-
ated. The fourth section considers a series of internal tensions
that arose as a result of the precise framing of this definition.
The fifth section demonstrates how the ICAEW sought to shape
15
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the public image of the chartered accountant – the highly quali-
fied, well-trained, specialist practitioner – through promoting
the “A.C.A.” (Associate of the Chartered Accountants), “F.C.A.”
(Fellow of the Chartered Accountants) and “chartered accoun-
tant” credentials. The paper closes with a range of concluding
comments.
EXCLUSIONARY CLOSURE AND CREDENTIALISM
The professionalization literature abounds with details of
the formation of bodies across a wide range of professions.
Whilst we do not subscribe to a literature that appears to equate
the commencement of the professionalization process with the
formation of a professional body [Kedslie, 1990a; Kirkham and
Loft, 1992], we do believe that organizational formation is an
important “signal of movement” towards occupational ascen-
dancy by marking the commencement of a formal professional
project [Carnegie and Edwards, 2001]. Whether inspired by al-
truism [Millerson, 1964], self-interest [Johnson, 1972], political
motives [Willmott, 1986] or a combination of these factors [Lee,
1995], the importance of the professional body, in shaping their
members into an educated and highly trained mould, has not
been a subject of disagreement.
Organizational collectives or “qualifying associations”
[Millerson, 1964], face the task of “producing the producers,
that is, ensuring that all future entrants have passed through an
appropriate system of selection, training and socialization, and
turned out in a standardized professional mould” [Macdonald,
1995, p. 189]. For Larson, this moulding is critical:
Unlike craft or industrial labor, however, most pro-
fessions produce intangible goods: their product, in
other words, is only formally alienable and is inextrica-
bly bound to the person and the personality of the pro-
ducer. It follows, therefore, that the producers them-
selves have to be produced if their products or
commodities are to be given a distinctive form. In other
words, the professionals must be adequately trained
and socialized so as to provide recognizably distinct
services for exchange on the professional market [1977,
p. 14, emphasis in original].
Larson has also spoken of the “difficult and complex task of
guaranteeing to the public’s satisfaction the competence and
probity of the producers” [ibid., p. 58]. In this section, we draw
on the process of exclusionary closure to theorize the devices
16
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employed by the ICAEW to produce competent producers
wholly equipped to satisfy the needs of the market for profes-
sional public accountancy services, and in the process exclude
those deemed incompetent. Associated with this production or
certification role is the necessity for professionals both to differ-
entiate themselves from others and to highlight their qualifica-
tions. We therefore consider the concept of credentialism and,
later in the paper, address the ways in which the ICAEW pro-
moted the “A.C.A.”, “F.C.A.” and “chartered accountant” desig-
nations. We illustrate the exclusionary tactics and credentials
employed by professional bodies by drawing extensively from
previous studies of the Scottish accounting societies (formed in
the 1853 to 1866 period).
The Weberian concept of closure, encapsulated within the
“professionalization project”, has been developed to explain the
means by which interest groups strive to “translate one order of
scarce resources – special knowledge and skills – into another –
social and economic rewards” [Larson, 1977, p. xvii; see also
Giddens, 1973; Parkin, 1979; Child and Fulk, 1982; Murphy,
1988]. According to Kirkham and Loft, “a ‘professionalisation
project’ . . . involves linking specialist knowledge and skills with
power in the form of a market monopoly. Professionalisation is
a process by which producers of special services seek to consti-
tute and control a market for their expertise” [1992, p. 3]. For
Macdonald [1985, p. 113], “[t]he essence of closure is the defini-
tion of membership at a particular point in time, and the setting
of criteria for deciding who may join subsequently.” These crite-
ria, whether relating to control of entry, training or qualifica-
tions, are designed to restrict access to social and economic
opportunities. For Kirkham and Loft [1992, p. 3], the establish-
ment of “tough training and examination requirements” consti-
tutes “one of the important tactical means of professional clo-
sure . . . to restrict access to occupational positions”. Similarly,
Lee [1995] notes that professionals:
are perceived as organizing to gain market control of an
occupational service by means of monopolistic exclu-
sion of individuals deemed unworthy or unqualified to
provide it (Larson, 1977). Professionals create explicit
mechanisms to operationalize this strategy, including
entry prerequisites, institutionalized programmes of
academic education and work-related training and ex-
perience. Unless an individual satisfies these criteria,
professional membership is impossible and certain ser-
vice opportunities denied [p. 49].
17
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This study seeks to redress the dearth of detailed research into
what Macdonald terms, “the inevitable dilemma facing an occu-
pation” [1995, p. 192]. He contends that “if too many are in-
cluded as eligible, it may downgrade the whole membership,
while if the line is drawn too narrowly, those left out may be of
sufficient ability to form a rival body” [ibid.]. We examine how
the ICAEW sought to operationalize a professional project, by
looking inwardly at the decisions it took as part of a closure
strategy based upon the skills, education and experience it
deemed necessary to competently practice public accountancy.
In doing so, we reveal, in harmony with previous studies [Chua
and Poullaos, 1998; Walker and Shackleton, 1998] some of the
complexities of implementing such strategies. This paper builds
upon a number of general works [Stacey, 1954; Willmott, 1986;
Macdonald, 1995] that have accepted, though left unexamined,
the significance of entry hurdles in achieving exclusionary clo-
sure.
The process by which collectives seek to maximize rewards
by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited
circle of eligibles has been referred to as exclusionary closure.
Macdonald [1995, p. 131], drawing on the work of others, de-
fines this as: “the exercise of power by an occupational associa-
tion in a downwards direction and is primarily concerned with
the definition of the membership in such a way as to exclude
those whom the professional body and its elite regard as
‘ineligibles’ (Parkin, 1979: 450) or ‘outsiders’ (Weber, 1978:
342)”.
This closure process entails singling out certain social or
physical attributes as a justifiable basis for exclusion. As Chua
and Poullaos note, this may be based upon “on one or several
dimensions: class (property ownership), credentials, race, sex,
religion, language, etc.” [1993, p. 692]. Generally speaking,
Macdonald states that a group will “agree on definitions of
membership for those already practising the occupational skills
and frame these in a manner that is acceptable to the state; and
it will also define the criteria to define future entrants to the
professional body” [1995, p. 131]. The former is termed a
“grandfather” clause [ibid.]. The manner in which the ICAEW
satisfied the vested interests of those already in practice in 1880
was, as we will demonstrate later in the paper, to create a whole
series of tensions in the post-Charter period as the markedly
differential treatment of founders and non-founders became ap-
parent.
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In the context of the organized Scottish accounting profes-
sion, Walker [1996] has highlighted how the societies intro-
duced a range of “socio-cultural filtering” devices to prevent the
profession from being tarnished by dishonorable behavior:
As claims to credibility and probity of the practitioner
rested on membership of the professional organisation,
the emphasis was placed by the association on the im-
position of admission stipulations which would prevent
the intrusion of those considered capable of malfea-
sance. Conditions of entry, qualification procedures
and certification ensured that only those deemed com-
petent and reputable were allowed through to offer ser-
vices to the public [p. 14, emphasis added].
Lee asserts that the entry, education, examination and train-
ing requirements of the Scottish bodies “had the dual effect of
explicitly revealing professional accountancy as a learned occu-
pation with high standards, and also restricting the number of
institutionalized members” [1995, p. 51]. These multifarious fil-
tering devices traversed an extended period. The initial phase of
screening “started with entry by invitation to a select few with
an appropriate background and experience” [Lee, 1991, p. 198].
This “appropriate background” related to those who were “gen-
erally in the same social class as the small groups of organizers”
[Kedslie, 1990b, p. 15].
In common with other professions, indenture, or articled
service, was already a feature of the accountancy occupational
group in mid-19th century Scotland. The newly established or-
ganizations immediately adopted it. Apprenticeship fulfilled an
important moulding function, “in fostering close connections
and loyalties between practitioners. It comprised a medium for
occupational socialization and the inculcation of professional
ethos” [Walker, 1996, p. 15]. These training arrangements,
which involved a mandatory indenture fee of 100 guineas in
Edinburgh (25 in Aberdeen), were soon augmented by educa-
tional provision. The financial requirements of this professional
training provided a significant hurdle to entry [Kedslie, 1990a;
Lee, 1991; Walker, 1996]. For Lee:
Several things above all others evidence deliberate bar-
riers to entry – the high financial cost of entry to mem-
bership and the length of training prior to entry; and
the rapid stiffening of educational and examination
standards designed to provide chartered accountants
with a knowledge which was directly relevant to their
involvement in practice [1991, p. 198].
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Walker has shown how the stipulation of “substantial ap-
prenticeship and entrance fees”, the payment of which was
deemed to provide “evidence of vocational commitment, pecuni-
ary independence and gentility”, restricted entry to the
Edinburgh Society to “gentleman of professional standing”
[1996, p. 14]. For Kedslie, these barriers meant that “the new
profession was scarcely open to young men other than those
from a professional or socially-privileged background” [1990a,
p. 185]. Having insisted upon high entry standards and then
having socialized recruits through a lengthy period of vocational
training, professional bodies needed to satisfy themselves that
recruits were technically competent. The examination of candi-
dates was swiftly instituted in Scotland, with the Edinburgh and
Glasgow societies holding oral examinations from 1855; though
it was not until 1864 and 1885 respectively, that written exami-
nations were established [Kedslie, 1990a]. The available evi-
dence suggests, however, that exceptions were made to these
arrangements [Stewart, 1974; Kedslie, 1990a].
To help prevent “the entry of the individual considered
likely to bring the vocation into disrepute”, the Edinburgh Soci-
ety underpinned this certification role with a range of further
filtering devices [Walker, 1996, p. 15]. These measures included
the admittance of members at annual meetings (“where they
would be visible to established professionals”), a robust nomina-
tion, seconding and approval system, as well as placing a restric-
tion on the geographic area in which members could practice
[ibid.]. Moreover, from 1860, the Edinburgh Society also sought
to control the post-qualification activities of members by requir-
ing potential entrants:
To sign a declaration that ‘his exclusive object in
Business is to follow the profession of an Accountant as
defined in the Society’s Charter’. This condition of
membership ensured that the CA was restricted to con-
temporary prescriptions of ‘professional’ practice and
was informally constrained by the standards of conduct
associated with that status. The [Edinburgh Society]
member was thereby distinguished from the non-cre-
dentialed and potentially unscrupulous ‘accountant’
who owed allegiance to no professional organisation
[ibid.].
Having identified a range of attributes as the basis for exclu-
sion, professional bodies then faced the task of differentiating
their members, the “insiders”, from those excluded, the “outsid-
ers”. The process of “exclusionary closure” is reinforced through
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“credentialism”. Another concept fashioned by Weber, a creden-
tial, is defined by Roslender [1992, p. 23] as “some formal mea-
sure of competence such as a professional qualification which is
accepted as being the basis for performing certain sorts of
work”. For Parkin, credentialism represents “the inflated use of
educational certificates as a means of monitoring entry to key
positions in the division of labour” and serves as an effective
exclusionary closure device in “protecting the learned profes-
sions from the hazards of the marketplace” [1979, pp. 54, 56].
Webb and Webb [1917] addressed, early on, the use of creden-
tials by professionals as a means of differentiation. They noted
how professionals “ring themselves round with diplomas, de-
grees and certificates, and to insist, in season and out of season,
that all persons not possessing these particular hall-marks are
incapable of performing the service” [p. 37].
Washington [2001, p. 14], in defining a credential as “a
badge of achievement and proof of knowledge and confidence”,
argues that it is something which “enhances a professional’s
image both in the professional’s eyes and that of the public”.
Freidson [1994, pp. 159-163], although sceptical about some cre-
dentials, nevertheless argues that they do serve to bridge an
informational asymmetry between expert supplier and unwitting
consumer. He acknowledges that from the consumer’s perspec-
tive, “credentialism may be seen as a necessary device for nar-
rowing the range of choice and therefore simplifying the intrin-
sically problematic process of choosing a particular kind of
specialist in a world where there are many kinds” [p. 159]. In
this paper, we define credentials as the symbols associated with
the possession of the professional qualification of the ICAEW. In
England and Wales, the relevant credentials were the designa-
tion “chartered accountant” and the distinguishing “A.C.A.” and
“F.C.A.” letters.
In Scotland, the accounting societies swiftly urged members
to adopt the title “chartered accountant” and to utilize the “C.A.”
designatory letters [Kedslie, 1990a]. The “C.A.” designation,
originally a mere symbol of belonging to a society of accoun-
tants incorporated by a royal charter, was transformed “follow-
ing the institution of increasingly sophisticated systems of pro-
fessional education” [ibid.], into a “guarantee to the public of
professional efficiency and good standing and conduct” [Privy
Council, 1890, Appendix, pp. 76-77; quoted in Walker, 1991, p.
262]. Whilst the “mere use of a peculiar professional credential
was, by itself, insufficient to gain market control”, the “prime
source of the monopoly constructed by the Scottish chartered
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accountants was to increase the currency of the notations by
ensuring their recognition as a mark of professional and aca-
demic superiority over unorganized and unqualified accoun-
tants” [Walker, 1991, p. 262]. The lengths to which the various
bodies were willing to go in defending the letters from outsiders
highlighted the importance of the credential to the Scots, in
spite of the fact that the term “C.A.” was an “anomaly”, given
that it was the societies, and not their members, who had re-
ceived royal charters [quoted in The Accountant, 13 February
1892, p. 141].
The distinctive “C.A.” credential became a significant battle-
ground in the late-19th and early-20th centuries when, in turn,
the Scottish Institute of Accountants and the Corporation of
Accountants Ltd., sought to adopt the same designation for their
members [Kedslie, 1990a; Walker, 1991]. As Walker notes, in
their defense:
the chartered bodies contended that so great was the
divergence in the standard of professional education re-
ceived by CAs and non-CAs, that to permit the lesser
qualified to gain use of the identical CA notation would
induce a host of deleterious consequences. The general
standard of attainment among accountants would be
lowered and efficiency thereby reduced, the public
would be confused and damaged if they erroneously
employed ‘CAs’ who had not received instruction under
the regulations of the three established societies and
overall, the impact would be to ‘bring down the charac-
ter of the profession and of the name C.A.’ [1991, p.
271].
The adoption of such a functionalist or service-orientation
stance, in conjunction with their superior resources, important
linkages to the legal profession and a favorable contemporary
political environment, enabled the chartered bodies to rebuff the
encroaching bodies and defend their “C.A.” monopoly [Walker,
1991]. Although their entry hurdles proved insufficient to stem
competition, the supplemental use of credentialism by the char-
tered societies was “rapidly recognized among their clientele -
the legal, commercial and manufacturing communities”
[Walker, 1991, p. 261], and constituted “a professional mark of
high pecuniary value” [quoted in Walker, 1991, p. 275].
ICAEW PREDECESSOR BODIES
Before analyzing how the ICAEW attempted to achieve
closure in 1880 by the framing of its definition of the “well
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qualified” chartered accountant, it is helpful to analyze the way
in which the Institute’s five predecessor bodies each sought to
turn out producers within its own “standardized professional
mould” in the previous decade [Macdonald, 1995, p. 189]. This
contextualization, Howitt [1966] and Walker [2004a, 2004b]
apart, has largely been neglected in the literature. The corollary
of this, we argue, has been the creation of the false impression
that the year 1880 marked a near-seismic shift in the
professionalization of accounting in England and Wales with, as
we noted earlier, a number of authors dating the profession
from this point.
The predecessor bodies of the ICAEW generally demanded
that candidates should overcome a series of entry hurdles. They
should possess experience (whether in articled service or other-
wise), pass an examination, be recommended by a number of
existing practitioners and/or be elected by ballot at a meeting of
the membership. The first of the English accounting societies,
the Incorporated Society of Liverpool Accountants, was unique
in that it did not hold examinations. Membership was open to
“any Accountant in Liverpool”, subject to candidates finding a
proposer and seconder, and receiving at least three-quarters of
votes at a ballot of the membership [Incorporated Society of
Liverpool Accountants, 1870].
The elite Institute of Accountants (in London, 1870-1872),
which supplied 20 of the 45 members of the ICAEW’s first Coun-
cil [Parker, 1980a], demanded that entrants should have served
at least five years (four years for those having been in partner-
ship with a member of an accounting society) as either a clerk to
a member of a society of accountants, or as a professional ac-
countant. The stipulation that applications should be accompa-
nied by a written recommendation from at least three fellows
(for fellowship) and one fellow (associateship) was seen as being
of “fundamental importance as the only real security they [the
Council] can have for the professional competency and status of
candidates” [Institute of Accountants, MS28404, p. 31]. The ini-
tial rules also stipulated that articled service, coupled with ex-
aminations,1 was to become the sole route to entry from 1st July
1 The rules of the Institute did enable Fellows to recommend one of their
clerks for admission as an Associate (without examination) up to July 1871
[Institute of Accountants, MS28407, p. 3]. The Institute’s examination arrange-
ments were later adopted, almost without alteration, by the Manchester and
Sheffield societies. The Minute Book of the Manchester Institute reveals that
almost immediately after its formation, the examiners obtained information
from the Glasgow and London Institutes as to “the nature and extent of the
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1876, though this date was subsequently put back two years
[Institute of Accountants, MS28407]. Articled clerks were also
required to “undergo such examinations in their knowledge of
book-keeping and accounts, of mercantile and bankruptcy law,
of the duties of auditors, and of the practical working of liquida-
tions and bankruptcies, as the Council shall from time to time
direct” [Institute of Accountants, MS28407, p. 3]. Examinations
appear to have been viva voce throughout the 1870s [Institute of
Accountants, MS28408/2, pp. 237-238]. An analysis of unpub-
lished material indicates that entry without rigorous examina-
tion was, however, common [Institute of Accountants,
MS28407, MS28408]. In 1879, for example, the Institute’s Secre-
tary acknowledged that the examination “is dispensed with in
many cases” [Institute of Accountants, MS28408/3, p. 343].
The SAE, the largest of the ICAEW’s predecessor bodies at
the time of merger, demanded somewhat shorter qualifying
levels of experience, with as little as two years articled service
required for graduates of leading universities [Society of Ac-
countants in England, 1875, pp. 10-11]. Moreover, the range of
environments in which the experience could be gained was
broader than solely public practice. Accountants employed by
corporations or public bodies for three years, for example, were
also eligible to join [ibid.]. Nevertheless, applications for mem-
bership had to be accompanied by a written recommendation
from two associates [ibid., pp. 10-12]. As with the Institute, suc-
cess in examinations fairly soon became the sole route to entry:
“no candidate shall be eligible for admission as an associate
after the 1st day of January, 1878, until he shall have passed an
examination as to his proficiency to the satisfaction of the Ex-
aminers of the Society” [ibid., p. 11].2 Rule 57 of the Society
stated that the examinations would incorporate “subjects usu-
ally occurring in the practice of the profession of a Public Ac-
countant” [ibid., p. 22]. Held over one day, the examinations
comprised three elements: Education (English composition,
Arithmetic, Latin and French, Euclid and Algebra); Accountancy
(Book-keeping, including companies’, commercial and partner-
ship accounts; Audits; Chancery – official liquidations, receiver-
examinations which candidates have to undergo before admission to those Insti-
tutes” [20 March 1871, p. 11]. It is curious that the Sheffield Institute should
follow the guidelines of the Institute of Accountants when 16 of its 21 founder
members were, or had previously been, members of the SAE (including two
Council members).
2 Whether this date was stated in the Society’s founding rules and regulations
is unclear, due to the absence of surviving records.
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ships and managerships. Bankruptcy, liquidations and composi-
tion; Estate accounts and Executorships); and Responsibility of
Fiduciary Agents (Under the Joint-Stock Companies Acts, Bank-
ruptcy Act, Law of Trustees, Law of Partnerships) [The Accoun-
tant, 30 March 1878, p. 5].
The rules for admission to associateship of the Manchester
and Sheffield Institutes were almost identical. Candidates had to
be 21 years of age, have served five years as clerk to a profes-
sional accountant, pass an examination, be recommended by
either two fellows (Manchester) or Council (Sheffield) and be
approved by two-thirds of Council members (Manchester) or all
members (Sheffield) [Manchester Institute of Accountants,
1871, p. 4; Sheffield Institute of Accountants, 1877, p. 4]. In
Manchester, the oral examination, instituted from the outset,
was due to give way to a written test of competence in 1876
[Manchester Institute of Accountants, Minute Book, p. 188]. The
available evidence suggests, however, that from the mid-1870s
associates were admitted following a ballot, with no mention of
examinations in the Minute Book [ibid., pp. 153-154, 223, 226,
260, 270, 271]. The Sheffield Institute appears to have relied on
the oral examination throughout its short life. Hoe, for example,
states that at the first general meeting it was noted that four
“Associate Members had been admitted after satisfactorily pass-
ing an examination conducted by the President – Alfred Allott –
and the Vice-President – W.H. Watson” [1977, p. 9]. The rules of
both bodies also provided for the admission of Associates by
recommendation [Manchester Institute of Accountants, 1871, p.
5; Sheffield Institute of Accountants, 1877, pp. 4, 5].
Whilst the initial admission rules at the SAE provided for
articled service, at the Institute of Accountants and the provin-
cial societies at Manchester and Sheffield, after an initial period
when non-articled clerkship was permitted, articled clerkship
soon became a compulsory requirement. Given the intangible
nature of their work, so “inextricably bound to the person and
the personality of the producer” [Larson, 1977, p. 14], three of
the English societies, following the Scots, provided for the use of
distinguishing letters or credentials by members. In Manchester,
members were permitted to append “F.M.I.A.” (Fellow) or
“A.M.I.A.” (Associate) to their names [Manchester Institute of
Accountants, 1871, p. 6]. The national SAE provided for the use
of “F.S.A.E.” (Fellow), “A.S.A.E.” (Associate), “Hon. M.S.A.E.”
(honorary member) or “Stud. S.A.E.” (Student) [Society of Ac-
countants in England, 1875, p. 11]. The Sheffield Institute be-
stowed the letters “F.S.I.A.” and “A.S.I.A.” on its fellows and
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associates respectively [Sheffield Institute of Accountants, 1877,
pp. 5-6].
In summary, by 1880 articled service and credentialism was
common and the trend towards the examination of candidates
to test competence was gathering pace, though was still far from
comprehensive.
CONSTRUCTING THE ‘WELL QUALIFIED’
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT
The petition for the ICAEW’s Royal Charter acknowledged
the role of its predecessor bodies in “the elevation of the profes-
sion of public accountants as a whole”, but asserted that more
could be achieved collectively:3
It would greatly promote the objects for which the
said societies have been instituted and would also be
for the public benefit if the members thereof were in-
corporated as one body as besides other advantages
such incorporation would be a public recognition of the
importance of the profession and would tend to gradu-
ally raise its character and thus to secure for the com-
munity the existence of a class of persons well qualified
to be employed in the responsible and difficult duties
often devolving on public accountants [ICAEW, 1882, p.
5, emphasis added].
In order to produce this “well qualified” practitioner, two
alternative prerequisites were stipulated: “long actual experience
in the profession or service for a long time in the capacity of a
Public Accountant’s Clerk or else the passing of appropriate ex-
aminations under the supervision of the Corporation” [ibid.].
The introduction of examinations, “of such a character as to test
the knowledge of candidates not only in bookkeeping and ac-
counts but also in the principles of mercantile law and in the
law and practice of bankruptcy and of the winding-up of compa-
nies”, would, it was asserted, “have an educational effect of a
highly beneficial kind” [ibid., p. 6].
The Charter also prescribed the method of training and, in
stipulating a five-year articled term, the ICAEW followed the
“favourite period” settled by solicitors and architects before
3 Support for this argument comes from The Accountant. It referred to the
activities of untrained and incompetent persons described as accountants in the
1870s as being “the thorn in the side of all respectable accountants” [21 Decem-
ber 1878, p. 3].
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them, as well as the Scottish bodies and the elitist Institute of
Accountants [Reader, 1966, p. 118]. As Reader has noted,
“[w]hen governing bodies came to fix the length of time required
for articles, or whatever term they employed, they were not in-
clined to underestimate the abstruseness of their craft, nor to
over-estimate their pupils’ ability to unravel it” [ibid.].
A further hurdle to entry involved the ICAEW’s entrance
fees. For new members, these were levied at rates of ten guineas
(for associates) and 20 guineas (fellows), with members of the
predecessor bodies being required to pay half those sums
[ICAEW, 1882, p. 17]. In addition, an annual subscription rang-
ing from one to five guineas was payable, with the charge being
dependent upon membership status and locale [ibid.].4
To signal to the public that they were employing a compe-
tent practitioner, accountable for his actions, the Charter speci-
fied that members were eligible to use the following credentials
after their names: “A.C.A.” (for associates, “representing the
words Associate of the Chartered Accountants”) or “F.C.A.” (for
fellows, “Fellow of the Chartered Accountants”) [ibid., pp. 17-
18]. Whilst the Charter did not specifically state that members
should describe themselves as “chartered accountants”, legal ad-
vice taken by Council in 1881 confirmed that this was permis-
sible [ICAEW, MS28459/1, p. 12]. The later bye-laws (effective
from 21st March 1882), however, did prohibit members acting in
partnership with non-ICAEW members from appending either
the designatory letters or the description “chartered accoun-
tants” to the name of the firm [ICAEW, 1882, p. 44].
In the remainder of this section, we examine in detail the
ICAEW’s specification of the education and training require-
ments within its overall definition of the “well qualified” special-
ist chartered accountant, and consider the concomitant finan-
cial hurdles thereby created.
Examinations: Although examinations were not a new phenom-
enon in English accounting societies, the approach embraced by
the ICAEW was far more rigorous than hitherto had been the
4 An indication of the magnitude of these sums is provided by historical price
indices which equate £1 in 1880 to approximately £50 today [The Economist, 13
July 1974, p. 62; Accountancy], though a more realistic multiplier based on the
starting salary of a newly-qualified accountant, would be much greater, in the
region of 240-400 for those employed in London. This multiplier is based on the
typical starting salary of a chartered accountant in the late-19th century of
around £100 [Edwards, Anderson and Matthews, 1997], and the findings of the
2003 salary survey by Accounting Appointments [www.accountingappointments.
co.uk/candidates/salarysurveys.asp].
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case. Indeed, the adoption of the three-tier (preliminary, inter-
mediate and final) system was in accordance with the desires of
the leader column of The Accountant, which argued that “in
order to secure public confidence there must be a basis of as-
sured competency” [26 April 1879, p. 4]. It called for a system
based around that of the established and well-respected Incor-
porated Law Society [ibid.]. Moreover, given the esteem in
which the Edinburgh Society was generally held, it appears to
have been no coincidence that the ICAEW’s model of testing
bore strong similarities to that adopted north of the border.
The Council of the ICAEW appointed an Examination Com-
mittee in April 1882, and three months later the first of the
Institute’s biannual examinations were held at preliminary and
final levels. The first Intermediate Examination was held in June
1883. Although described as a means “to test his [the aspiring
chartered accountant] general education”, the Preliminary Ex-
amination clearly served a status-oriented exclusionary function
[ICAEW, 1882 p. 51]. In the words of W.G. Howgrave, the
Institute’s Secretary:
the object of a Preliminary Examination is simply to
test whether a person desirous of entering a profession
has received such an education as will render him a fit
member of the profession after going through the nec-
essary technical training, and it is therefore necessarily
confined to such educational subjects as may be consid-
ered to be the basis of culture [The Accountant, 11
January 1896, p. 29]. Similarly, for ‘M’, a correspondent
in The Accountant:
[I]ts chief object is to keep the profession select. If
. . . anyone who had been in a Chartered Accountant’s
office for a short period of years could present himself
for the Intermediate Examination, the profession would
soon become very inconveniently crowded with a lot of
uneducated men, which would necessarily lower its sta-
tus with the public [16 January 1892, p. 54].
Howgrave’s terminology is consistent with Carr-Saunders
and Wilson’s conviction [1933, p. 7] that a student, aspiring to
professional status, should be able to “show that he is a ‘gentle-
man of respectability’ and has received a general education up
to school certificate standard”. As Webb and Webb noted, the
institution of examinations by professional bodies generally,
served to “exclude from membership, whether or not this is
deliberately intended, candidates coming from the 80% or 90%
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of the population not getting secondary schooling in youth”
[1917, p. 31]. Also, as we reveal later in the paper, the financial
requirements of articled clerkship demanded that potential en-
trants came from a wealthy family.
The subjects examined in the ‘preliminary’, wholly in writ-
ing, were: writing from dictation; writing a short English com-
position; arithmetic; Algebra, to include quadratic equations (in-
clusive); euclid (the first four books); geography; history of
England; Latin, elementary; and in any two of the following
subjects, one of which must be a language: Latin; Greek, an-
cient; French; German; Physics; Chemistry; Animal Physiology;
Electricity, Magnetism, Light and Heat; Geology; Higher Math-
ematics [ICAEW, 1882, p. 50].
The ICAEW clearly placed great importance on the role of
the Preliminary Examination, which was sat prior to commenc-
ing articles.5 First, unlike the very brief examinations of the pre-
decessor bodies, it was prepared, twice yearly, to devote a sig-
nificant period of time (three days) to its entry-level examination
alone. Second, by instituting a written rather than a viva voce
examination, the Institute committed itself to an onerous mark-
ing function. Third, despite criticisms of its scope, the ICAEW
maintained, and through the introduction of further optional
subjects, enhanced the “basis of culture” rationale of the exami-
nation. Fourth, an examination of the ‘preliminary’ pass rates
(Table 1) confirms that it was “something more than a formal-
ity” [The Accountant, 19 February 1898, p. 209; see also, The
Author, 1886, pp. 24-25; The Accountant, 29 September 1894, p.
847, 21 December 1895, p. 1032]. On average, across the period
1882-1900, 65.0% of candidates were successful in the examina-
tion. Pass rates, however, varied greatly, from a low of 38.5% in
July 1882, to a high of 80% (June 1900). Grouped together pass
rates were as follows: 1882-1885 – 60.9%; 1886-1890 – 59.8%;
1891-1895 – 58.9%; and 1896-1900 – 71.2%. The trend of pass
rates in the late-1880s and early-1890s was falling, and thereaf-
ter, rates increased markedly beyond those established in the
early-1880s.
5 Graduates of any UK university or those having passed a range of other
university and schools’ moderation examinations were exempt from the ‘prelimi-
nary’ and were required to serve articles for a reduced period of three years [The
Author, 1886, p. 25]. In 1893, an addition to Bye-Law 76 stated that “any person,
not being under thirty years of age, who at the date of his application shall have
been for ten years continuously in service as a clerk to a Chartered Accountant,
shall be exempted from the Preliminary Examination” [The Accountant, 27 May
1893, p. 500].
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Successful candidates then embarked upon five years’
articled service. Halfway through this vocational period of ser-
vice the Intermediate Examination provided the first formal test
of professional competence (those who commenced articles
prior to the Charter gained exemption). In not less than two
years (one year for graduates) after successfully completing the
‘intermediate’, the Final Examination had to be passed. Both
examinations were conducted partly in writing and partly viva
voce, until the latter element was discontinued between 1889
(intermediate level) and 1892 (final). The professional examina-
tions tested candidates in book-keeping and accounts; auditing;
the adjustment of partnership and executorship accounts; the
rights and duties of liquidators, trustees, and receivers; the prin-
ciples of the law of bankruptcy; the principles of the law relating
to joint stock companies; the principles of mercantile law; and
the principles of the law of arbitration and awards [ICAEW,
1882, p. 53]. Following a recommendation from the Examina-
tion Committee [ICAEW, MS28428/1, p. 72], Council resolved
that after the June 1884 sitting the examination of candidates at
intermediate level would be confined to the first four subjects
listed above [ICAEW, MS28411/1, p. 317].
The Institute clearly wished to demonstrate to the market
place that the chartered accountants who graduated through its
system of education and vocational training were specialist
practitioners with tested competence and lengthy experience in
the core areas of accounting as well as being well grounded in
legal principles. Moreover, through its annual reporting and the
speeches made by its principal office-holders, the ICAEW dem-
onstrated the importance it attached to its professional exami-
nations. Although ostensibly directed to members, they reached
a wider audience through, for example, publication in The Ac-
countant. Throughout the period to 1900, the examination pass
rates and prize winners featured prominently in the Council’s
report to the general meeting [ICAEW, MS28410/1]. Similarly,
presidential addresses were frequently used to publicize the im-
portance of the examinations. In his address to the first ICAEW
autumnal meeting, Frederick Whinney argued that the twin re-
quirements of articled clerkship and examinations would ensure
that “members of the Institute will in course of time become
more and more fitted for the discharge of the responsible duties
devolving upon them” [The Accountant, 23 October 1886, p.
596].
Six years later, in addressing the general meeting of the
ICAEW, President Thomas Welton lauded the “security we have
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taken, in the way of articles and examinations, for the proper
training of the next generation of accountants” [The Accountant,
7 May 1892, p. 382, emphasis added]. This, he argued, would
“certainly be more and more appreciated by the public” [ibid.].
The pivotal role of the ICAEW’s examinations as part of its strat-
egy to establish its own credibility, as well as that of its mem-
bers to outsiders, was addressed by President John George
Griffiths at the dinner held to celebrate the Diamond Jubilee of
Queen Victoria. Before a host of distinguished guests, Griffiths
asserted that the ICAEW was “very careful” in respect of its
examinations and by rejecting “a great many candidates”, the
Institute had “borne in mind [its] . . . duty to improve . . . the
status of our profession” [The Accountant, 24 July 1897, p. 732].
A detailed analysis of the examination statistics, discussed
by Griffiths, reveals that pass rates at the professional stages
were higher than at the ‘preliminary’, though only marginally so
in the case of the Final Examination. Intermediate Examination
pass rates averaged 74.3% across the period 1883-1900, with
82.3% being recorded initially (1883-1885), before falling off to
79.1% (1886-1890), 76.1% (1891-1895) and 70.2% (1896-1900).
This progressive fall was not, however, discernible at the final
stage, where pass rates were far more volatile. In the ‘final’,
82.1% of candidates were successful in June 1889, yet two years
later, just 43.1% satisfied the examiners. Grouped together pass
rates were 64.2% (1882-1885), 68.9% (1886-1890), 70.4% (1891-
1895) and 63.8% (1896-1900) and averaged 66.6% over the
whole period.6
After passing the Final Examination, candidates applied for
admission to the Institute by completing a printed form, and
submitting a certificate from the accountant with whom the
applicant had trained, stating that fact, and that the applicant
was “a fit and proper person” for admission [ibid., p. 45]. Bye-
6 Pass rates at the Examination equivalent to Final averaged 59.9% over the
period 1883-1900. This examination, “in all respects…the same…as the Final
Examination”, provided an entry route for non-articled candidates already serv-
ing in the profession on 21st March 1882 (the date of commencement of the first
bye-laws) [ICAEW, 1882, pp. 55-56, 1891, pp. 64-65, 1902, p. 2]. Whilst section
12 stated that five years from the introduction of the bye-laws, “service shall
mean service under articles”, section 14 of the Charter did provide Council with
“dispensation in certain cases with literal compliance with the Charter” [ICAEW,
1882, pp. 14-15]. The upsurge in the numbers taking the examination equivalent
to the final from 1891 coincided with a modification to the bye-laws. This for-
malized the non-articled route for those in practice or service prior to March
1882 and who had served continuously for five years in practice or service up to
the time of their application [ICAEW, MS28410, p. 128].
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law 33 did, however, empower the Council to “refuse to admit or
elect to any degree of Membership, any person whom they shall
not consider to be a fit and proper person to be so admitted or
elected”, though we have found no evidence that this resulted in
anyone being excluded in the period to 1900 [ibid., p. 40].
We now turn our attention to the vocational aspect of the
ICAEW’s definition of the “well qualified” chartered accountant.
Articles: Whilst the ICAEW’s examinations formally tested the
understanding of a body of knowledge, the period of articled
clerkship provided trainees with the opportunity to apply their
knowledge and also to develop skills in areas that the education
process was not intended to address. The importance placed
upon articled service by the founders of the ICAEW would ap-
pear to have been entirely logical. As we have seen, learning by
doing, either with or without articles, was the standard method
of preparation for a career as a public accountant prior to 1880
(and is the method which would have applied in the case of the
founders themselves). In terms of their definition of the “well
qualified” practitioner, the ICAEW’s prescription of a lengthy
period of articled service would ensure that on completion,
chartered accountants possessed a sound practical training in
the main elements of public accountancy, and, as we discussed
earlier, would be “turned out in a standardized professional
mould” [Macdonald, 1995, p.189].
Provided that a candidate had surmounted the Preliminary
Examination hurdle and was not less than 16 years of age, the
ICAEW initially required entrants to serve five years’ (three for
graduates) articled clerkship with an Institute member. Aside
from socializing members and inculcating a “professional ethos”
[Walker, 1996, p. 15], articles served an important filtering func-
tion, as discussed earlier [Kedslie, 1990b; Lee, 1991, 1995]. The
requirement that aspirant chartered accountants should find an
ICAEW member willing to supervise them over a lengthy period,
and in their own office, provided a further hurdle in ensuring
that recruits came from what Kedslie termed, an “appropriate
background” [1990b, p. 15]. The logic of adopting this method
was, according to one contemporary, that “the examining bodies
satisfy themselves that candidates for membership have been
properly trained in the duties of their profession”, and that “in
the main, service under articles affords a guarantee of training
which can be obtained in no other way” [The Accountant, 9
October 1897, p. 939]. It was presumably in order to maintain
the quality of training that the Institute decreed that no member
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could have more than two articled clerks at any one time, other
than in exceptional circumstances.7 In order to try to create a
specialized practitioner and, it can be suggested, to avoid asso-
ciation with businesses that threatened their status, articled
clerks, like their qualified brethren, could not engage in any
other business or occupation during the period of service (ex-
cept with permission of Council) [ICAEW, 1882, p. 46].
A model set of Articles of Clerkship, as settled by the Insti-
tute,8 provides an indication of the level of commitment re-
quired of both clerk and principal:
you, the Articled Clerk, on your side covenant with your
Principal that you will faithfully and diligently serve
him and your Employers as his and their Clerk, and will
readily and cheerfully obey and execute his and their
lawful and reasonable commands, and will faithfully
serve your Principal and your Employers at all times
during your term of Articles as a Clerk ought to do in all
things whatsoever, the Principal, on his side, covenants
that he will accept you as his Articled Clerk during the
term agreed upon, and shall and will throughout the
said term, to the best of his ability and power, afford
you such reasonable opportunities and work as may be
required to enable you to acquire the art, science, and
knowledge of a Professional Accountant; and if you
serve him well and faithfully he will, at the expiration of
your term, give you the certificate required by Bye-Law
55 of the Institute for the purpose of your being admit-
ted as a Chartered Accountant [The Accountant, 30 No-
vember 1895, p. 976].
In return for providing an environment for the articled clerk
to learn the profession of public accountancy and, it can be
argued, to help ensure recruitment of the right kind of person by
denying access to those without the necessary financial support,
7 The restriction may also have served to control the supply of chartered ac-
countants to the market [Walker, 1988; Kedslie, 1990a] or to prevent principals
using multiple indenture premiums as a cash generating mechanism.
8 There is no evidence to suggest that adoption of the model articles was
compulsory. Nevertheless, the prescription per se would appear to be important
to the ICAEW in its attempt to raise awareness of the “well qualified” chartered
accountant. It is acknowledged that variations around this model would inevita-
bly have occurred [see Walker, 1988, pp. 129-131, for examples in Edinburgh],
though unlike its counterparts in Edinburgh and Aberdeen the ICAEW did not
stipulate a mandatory indenture fee. For a colorful insight into some earlier
examples of indentures in England [see Howitt, 1966, p. 237, and Moore and
Smalley, 1992, n.p.].
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it would appear that a premium was usually payable. The exclu-
sionary nature of articled clerkship was reinforced by the “gen-
eral rule to allow no remuneration to an articled clerk during his
term; but sometimes arrangements for a small progressive sal-
ary are made, commencing probably at £10 for the first year,
and rising by yearly increments of the same amount” [The Au-
thor, 1886, p. 28].9
The premium, according to a later editorial in The Accoun-
tants’ Magazine, “brings a good type of young man, in the same
way as the law of supply and demand brings an economic price
for goods of other kinds” [June 1942; quoted in Parker, 1980b,
n.p.]. The amount of premiums paid:
varies considerably according to the circumstances of
each particular case, and the professional standing and
repute of the firm. There are many Accountants, with
but moderate qualifications and limited practices, who
are, no doubt, open to take articled clerks at premiums
varying from fifty to eighty guineas. In large well
known firms the premium would probably be at least
one hundred, and might possibly reach two hundred
guineas [The Author, 1886, p. 27].
These amounts are broadly corroborated by information
disclosed in the correspondence section of The Accountant [25
March 1893, pp. 268-269; 1 April 1893, pp. 295-297; 6 May 1893,
p. 417; 3 June 1893, p. 519; 14 April 1894, p. 339]. More general
assessments of premiums payable were: “from 150 to 400 guin-
eas” [The Accountant, 20 September 1890, p. 499]; “from 100
guineas to 300 guineas” [The Accountant, 27 February 1892, p.
185]; and “ranging from one hundred to three hundred guineas”
[The Accountant, 22 April 1899, p. 455].
Financial Probity as a Hurdle: The length of articled service, the
usual requirement for a premium to be paid, the general
absence of a salary, and educational requirements (particularly
9 The Institute’s form of articles leaves a blank space for the amount of pre-
mium, “but it is noticeable that the form contains no provision for salary” [The
Author, 1893, p. 24]. The salary of £10 per annum in the first year rising by
increments of £10 annually would sum to £150 and could, based on available
information, have represented the return of the initial premium to the articled
clerk. In Edinburgh, Walker notes that “it seems likely that apprentices did
receive a salary though the provisions and the amount varied among firms”
[1988, p. 133]. He cites examples of two firms where a salary was paid to
apprentices constituting the return of their indenture fee with interest over 5
years [ibid.].
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the ‘preliminary’, necessitating a secondary schooling), con-
spired to restrict entry to the ICAEW to the well-off and the
well-educated. It can be argued that such requirements were
instituted to enable the profession to gain legitimacy in the eyes
of the public by suggesting that its members were of similar
backgrounds to those entering the established “gentlemanly”
professions of the church, medicine and law. In the words of
Francis William Pixley (ICAEW President, 1903-1904), “[t]hose
who have been articled to our members since the date of the
Charter come from the same class as do those who are now at
Woolwich, Sandhurst, and the Inns of Court. They have been
educated at the same class of schools” [quoted in Kitchen and
Parker, 1980, p. 26]. Further, it can be argued that these entry
requirements worked in harmony with the ICAEW’s disciplinary
apparatus to demonstrate that the governing body demanded
financial probity amongst its members. The nature of the public
accountant’s work clearly placed him in a position of trust when
dealing with clients’ financial affairs. For the public to trust
their agent, they needed to be confident that the latter was be-
yond reproach. Whilst this could never be guaranteed, one
means of minimizing the temptation of misappropriating a
client’s funds would be to ensure that the agent was himself
financially sound. An indication of the wealth needed to become
a chartered accountant is provided in the Pall Mall Gazette of
1890:
It is unadvisable and altogether imprudent to be-
come a chartered accountant unless one had a capital
of at least £2,000 or £3,000, or influential friends in
business circles. The two combined is desirable, but the
latter the more important. A good practice or a partner-
ship may be obtained by either, but, without either,
neither [quoted in The Accountant, 20 September 1890,
p. 500].10
The probity of its members was of such importance to the
Council of the ICAEW that they incorporated a series of finan-
cial wrongdoings (bankruptcy; conviction for felony, misde-
meanor or fraud; making an assignment with creditors; and the
non-payment of fees) in the list of offences that would trigger
disciplinary action [ICAEW, 1882, pp. 19-20]. Although it is dif-
ficult to demonstrate the extent to which the above ideals were
achieved, the body took a firm stance with regard to those who
10 These sums would translate approximately to £120,000 and £180,000 today
[The Economist, 13 July 1974, p. 62; Accountancy].
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became embroiled in financial difficulties [Chandler et al., work-
ing paper]. It can be argued that such decisiveness in following
closely the disciplinary provisions of the Charter conveyed a
strong signal to other chartered accountants and also to the
business community. To the former, the message was clearly
that if they desired to retain their membership, they had to
manage their own finances properly. To the latter, both by their
actions against wrongdoers and the subsequent publication of
their exclusion in The Accountant, the ICAEW demonstrated
that its members were accountable for their actions, including
their own financial management. The leading article of The Ac-
countant strongly approved of such a stance, noting “It would be
fatal to the existence of the Institute if members were allowed to
take advantage of membership to do acts that would inevitably
insure their expulsion, and then for the Council to allow them to
resign. The proper thing to do is expel them, and to publish the
fact” [17 November 1883, pp. 2-3].
TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
‘WELL QUALIFIED’ CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT
Having specified how the ICAEW constructed its definition
of the “well qualified” chartered accountant we now turn our
attention to a series of tensions that were created as a result of
the precise framing of this definition. First, critical contempo-
rary comment of the subjects covered by the examinations is
reviewed. Second, we address the variation in the standard of
the examinations. Third, we consider tensions created as a re-
sult of entry without examination. Finally, we examine problems
arising between principals and clerks through the failure of
articled clerkship to deliver a broad vocational training.
The Scope of the Chartered Accountant’s Examined Knowledge:
The definition of the sphere of knowledge deemed necessary to
be “well qualified to be employed in the responsible and difficult
duties often devolving on public accountants”, at all levels,
proved controversial [ICAEW, 1882, p. 5]. ‘A Student’, in a letter
to The Accountant, for example, noted that “the subjects we stu-
dents are expected to be prepared in quite frightens me….what
have practical people like accountants to do with the Latin clas-
sics, and of what use to them are Mechanics, Elementary Chem-
istry, Physiology and Geology?” [22 July 1882, p. 5]. ‘A
Sympathiser’ referred to the “extreme difficulty, and, often,
sheer inutility, of some of the [Preliminary Examination] ques-
37
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2005
29Anderson, Edwards and Chandler: “Well Qualified” Chartered Accountant
tions set”, arguing that “several of the antiquated subjects
[should] be done away with” [The Accountant, 21 December
1895, p. 1032]. ‘A Student’ further questioned the composition of
the papers on professional subjects, noting:
I would further ask whether the examination of can-
didates on subjects such as the powers and duties of an
arbitrator, and the laws of executors and administra-
tors, does not make it look like a preparation for the
legal profession.…Certainly the subjects selected convey
to my mind the idea of a cross between a “Varsity man”
and a lawyer [ibid., 22 July 1882, p. 5].
Many other correspondents objected to the emphasis on law
within the examination structure [The Accountant, 15 July 1882,
p. 5; 7 October 1882, p. 5; 16 September 1882, p. 5]. Criticism of
the examinations was not restricted to the ranks of the articled
clerk, whose complaints might be dismissed on the grounds that
they had a direct vested interest in making them easier. Robert
Whitehill, for example, writing following his success in the Final
Examination, concluded that “the examiners expect the accoun-
tants of the future to be better informed on these subjects [mer-
cantile law and the law of arbitration and awards] than most
lawyers are found to be at the present time” [The Accountant, 19
August 1882, p. 5]. Similarly, Harold V. Aldred (later convicted
for his part in the fall of an audit client, Dumbell’s Bank), ar-
gued that “it is Bookkeeping and Accounts which should be the
first and foremost study of a student of accountancy, and I fear
that there has always been a tendency on the part of the Council
to lead the student into the study of intricate points of law at the
sacrifice of practical questions in accountancy” [The Accountant,
8 November 1890, p. 616].
Criticism of the ICAEW’s examinations was not confined to
making them either easier or limiting their scope. For ‘C.W.’, the
relative lack of mathematical and actuarial content was a source
of regret. His justification for their inclusion was that, “[t]here is
no study more calculated to improve the reasoning powers and
induce habits of exact thought than mathematics, and this study
should be especially invaluable to a Chartered Accountant” [The
Accountant, 25 October 1890, p. 582]. He then argued that,
“[t]here can be no doubt that the Scotch practice of uniting the
accountant and actuary has done much to give our brethren
across the border the prestige which they enjoy” [ibid.].11
11 ‘C.W.’ clearly refers to the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow
and the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh, both of which incorporated the
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Assessing the Standard of Competence the ‘Well Qualified’ Char-
tered Accountant Should Possess: A second significant issue was
the standard required to pass examinations designed to ensure
that those holding themselves out to the public as expert char-
tered accountants were indeed fully qualified to discharge their
duties. Some of the difficulties in testing written competence
were addressed by Edwin Waterhouse, the President of Char-
tered Accountants’ Student Societies in both London and Bir-
mingham and a member of the ICAEW Examinations Commit-
tee [Edwards, 1986]. He remarked how he “found the selection
of suitable questions, and the classification of the merits of the
candidate’s answers, a most responsible and difficult task”
[Jones, 1988, p. 125]. The setting of relevant questions remained
a somewhat intractable problem across the period [The Accoun-
tant, 19 August 1882, p. 5, 16 September 1882, p. 5, 1 December
1883, pp. 3-4, 14 December 1895, p. 1008, 21 May 1898, p. 527,
27 January 1900, pp. 101-102].
The ICAEW’s pass standard remained undefined officially,
but W.T. Butterfield (an associate of both the ICAEW and Insti-
tute of Actuaries), revealed that:
It is commonly understood that the minimum
marks for a pass are, in accountancy subjects, 50 per
cent., and in legal subjects 33 per cent., but the whole
marks received must reach at least 50 per cent. of the
marks obtainable. Further, if a candidate aggregates 66
per cent. he is understood to have qualified for
honours, and if he secures about 80 per cent. he may
get a prize. From this it will be seen, that the Examina-
tion Committee attaches greater importance to profi-
ciency in practical matters than to skill in answering
legal conundrums [The Accountant, 22 December 1900,
p. 1174].
Butterfield’s comments received a degree of official cor-
roboration from the ICAEW President, J.J. Saffery, as well as
from two separate pieces of information disclosed in unpub-
lished pages of the ICAEW’s Book of Circulars [MS28432, n.p.].
Saffery notes that, “[w]ith regard to the standard of proficiency
considered desirable for attainment in legal subjects by our stu-
necessity for accountants to be skilled in actuarial work into their Royal Charter
petitions. However, as Lee [2000, pp. 27-29] demonstrates, whilst Edinburgh
accountants were heavily engaged in insurance managerships, the title of the
Glasgow society was pure spin, with 88% of its founders having no manager,
director or audit connection to insurance companies.
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dents, it should be borne in mind that this is fixed on lines
necessary for knowledge and for guidance, but not for practice,
in the common acceptation of the word” [The Accountant, 11
October 1890, p. 534, emphasis in original]. The Book of
Circulars discloses that, for the inaugural Preliminary Examina-
tion, an overall pass mark of around 40% was operative, given
that the lowest scoring successful candidate attained an average
mark of 41.9%. Second, a memorandum dated 14 June 1888,
headed “for the information of the Members of the Examination
Committee only”, wholly corroborates Butterfield’s comments in
relation to the pass, merit and prize standards in the profes-
sional examinations.
Contemporary comment on the standard of the examina-
tions was such as to indicate that entry to the Institute placed
great demands upon students. At the third AGM, Vice-President
Frederick Whinney offered no apology for the alleged stiffness
of the examination papers, and stated candidates who wished to
become members of the Institute would be “obliged to fit them-
selves for entrance rather more than those who have been with
us for some time” [The Accountant, 10 May 1884, p. 11]. For
‘Articled Clerk’, “If we are to judge from the books given, the
students will have a very great deal of work to do”, [The Accoun-
tant, 15 July 1882, p. 5]. The Author [1893, p. 47] described
surmounting the Institute’s examinations as “the greatest ordeal
of his [the articled clerk’s] life”, and noted that he should “de-
vote at least three hours a day to the mastery of his subjects for
at least the last four or five months preceding his examination, if
he covets any further distinction than a mere pass”. For ‘A.C.A.’,
“it is generally admitted it is no easy matter to pass through the
critical stage of qualification for the Institute” [The Accountant,
28 November 1896, p. 976]. G. Walter Knox, ICAEW President
in 1897, commented that, “[s]ome people say that our examina-
tions are too hard; others say that they are not sufficiently se-
vere; so that I fancy we are somewhere upon the right lines”
[The Accountant, 8 May 1897, p. 479].
The need to ascertain a benchmark level of competence that
accountants must possess in order to be “well qualified” was
addressed by a leading article in The Accountant in the following
terms:
it is highly important that, as far as possible, a fixed
standard should be observed upon which only a pass
will be granted, irrespective of the necessary casual
variation in the severity of the various papers; but a
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fortiori should there be some fixed standard in connec-
tion with those candidates who are placed in the
Honours List, and still more so with regard to those
who are specially selected for the distinction of a prize
[The Accountant, 7 May 1898, p. 465].
While the pitching of the standard of knowledge considered
necessary to deem a candidate fit to become a member of the
Institute was problematic, so too was ensuring a degree of con-
sistency in the application of that standard over time. Citing
cases where without further study candidates could easily pass
the same paper they had failed six months earlier, a swingeing
leading article in The Accountant concluded:
It seems to us that this lack of continuity in the stan-
dard exacted from candidates is a greater blemish in
connection with the examinations than the fact that the
standard in some subjects is normally higher than that
in others which might be regarded as even more impor-
tant. Both, however, are faults which should, as far as
possible, be amended [30 April 1898, p. 438].
‘Disinterested’ supported such a stance by questioning
whether the “extraordinary differences in the results” (as re-
vealed in Table 1) were due to the candidates or, “more likely”,
to the examiners [The Accountant, 19 January 1895, p. 56]. “One
cannot but think that the difference is due to the mode adopted
by different examiners in awarding marks. If so, this should
surely be remedied” [ibid.]. We acknowledge that in both the
setting and marking of the examinations, there was no certainty
that the Institute was able to maintain consistency over time,
particularly in relation to the ‘preliminary’, in which the ICAEW
would have been reliant on non-accountants to undertake the
examinations.
The corollary of this variation in standards, if it existed, was
that the Institute was unable to guarantee the fitness of its mem-
bers (in terms of their complete knowledge of the syllabus) to
serve in the market place. The leader column of The Accountant
addressed this point in 1895. It noted that there was “room for
improvement” in the effectiveness of the examinations, and “de-
plored” the fact that “no doubt capable men still occasionally
fail, and – worse still – incapable men not infrequently get
through” [27 April 1895, p. 375]. This situation was seen to be
“inevitable so long as the written papers of candidates continue
to be the only criteria by which the examiners can judge”,
though there was little opposition to the abolition of the viva
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voce examination [ibid.]. Nevertheless, the ICAEW was clearly
sufficiently concerned about the administration of its examina-
tions in the late-1890s to undertake a review of existing arrange-
ments. ‘Scrutator’ neatly captured the difficulties it faced:
Where the examiners are frequently changed there is
sure to be great variation in the standard of questions
set; and I have known cases where I considered the
Intermediate questions set were more difficult than
those set at subsequent Final Examinations. But the
remedy is a difficult one to find, as, supposing an exam-
iner were appointed for a considerable period, his ques-
tions would very probably run in the same groove [The
Accountant, 29 December 1900, p. 1192].
In July 1899, the Council of the ICAEW approved the rec-
ommendations of the Examinations Committee, which carried
out the review. It established that the examiners for the profes-
sional examinations should be “continued in their office for a
period not exceeding three years” and that “the same examiner
be not necessarily appointed in a given subject for both the
Intermediate and Final Examinations” [ICAEW, MS28426/7,
n.p.]. The former measure would, it is assumed, have ensured
greater consistency than previously, when members of the Ex-
amination Committee served as examiners assisted by qualified
persons who held such office for one year, though were eligible
for re-appointment [Bye-Law 68, ICAEW, 1891, p. 55]. The latter
clause would address Scrutator’s concern over questions run-
ning “in the same groove”, but offered the potential to conflict
with the consistency objective.
Much of the above discussion clearly relates to perception
rather than fact. The reality may be that the standard of the
ICAEW’s examinations was appropriate and that there was con-
sistency in the application of that standard over time. However,
in striving to construct the chartered accountants’ image as the
embodiment of a collective of well-trained, suitably qualified,
competent practitioners specializing in the delivery of core ac-
counting services, such perceptions could have proved damag-
ing, particularly when penned by the lead writer in The Accoun-
tant.
Entry without Examination: Admission to the ICAEW without
examination, on the basis of prior affiliations (the founders of
the ICAEW) or previous experience had been provided for in
“grandfather clauses” in the Royal Charter [ICAEW, 1882, pp.
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11-12]. Indeed, in the 20 years to 1900, over one-half (1,843, or
52.6%) of the 3,501 individuals admitted to the ICAEW had not
passed an ICAEW examination [Table 2].12 Of this number, 600
(32.5%) were admitted on account of being members of one of
the predecessor bodies (598) or signatories to the Royal Charter
petition (2), while a further 1,129 (61.3%) joined under the origi-
nal transitional arrangements based on three (or five for fellow-
12 In the narrower period from 1882 (when the ICAEW began to hold qualify-
ing examinations) to 1900, 71.8% of all admissions were by examination. Entry
without examination had been virtually eliminated by 1900, with just fifteen
members admitted in this manner between 1901 and 1920.
TABLE 2
Examination v Without-Examination Entry
to the ICAEW, 1880-1900
Year Admissions having Admissions Total
passed Final without admissions*
Examination Examination*
No. % of all No. % of all
admissions admissions
1880 0 0.0 949 100.0 949
1881 0 0.0 242 100.0 242
1882 15 17.0 73 83.0 88
1883 35 31.8 75 68.2 110
1884 42 53.2 37 46.8 79
1885 48 56.5 37 43.5 85
1886 80 66.7 40 33.3 120
1887 132 73.7 47 26.3 179
1888 64 71.1 26 28.9 90
1889 57 69.5 25 30.5 82
1890 65 70.7 27 29.3 92
1891 63 69.2 28 30.8 91
1892 102 83.6 20 16.4 122
1893 105 70.9 43 29.1 148
1894 116 75.3 38 24.7 154
1895 104 81.9 23 18.1 127
1896 111 79.9 28 20.1 139
1897 117 76.5 36 23.5 153
1898 129 80.1 32 19.9 161
1899 156 94.0 10 6.0 166
1900 117 94.4 7 5.6 124
Total 1658 47.4 1843 52.6 3501
* Statistics include the 600 members who were admitted to the ICAEW as
founders, either on account of them being members of one of the five prede-
cessor bodies (598) or signatories to the petition for the Royal Charter (Guthrie
and Wade).
Sources: BPP, 1930, Appendix C, p. 23; Boys, 2004.
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ship) years practicing experience or five years service to a public
accountant [BPP, 1930, Appendix C, p. 23; Boys, 2004]. Having
set such rules to allow existing practitioners into the ICAEW
fold, the Institute backtracked on its examination closure strat-
egy in 1893 by introducing a new non-examination route. This
required evidence of ten years’ experience and the approval of
three-quarters of Council members and accounts for the remain-
ing 6.2% of non-examined entrants in the period to 1900 [Bye-
Law 35, ICAEW, MS28410/1, p. 153; BPP, 1930, Appendix C, p.
23]. What motivated such a change of policy which not only
threatened to undermine the status of the Institute, but also
created tension between those sitting three levels of examina-
tions over five years and those admitted on the grounds of expe-
rience alone?
In the absence of any general official explanations as to its
Bye-Law 35 admissions policy, our analysis suggests that the
ICAEW, in following the Glasgow and Aberdeen bodies (who
introduced a ten-year rule in 1890), clearly wished to add practi-
tioners of some standing to its number [Shackleton, 1995, p.
33]. Forty-nine (or 42.2%) of the 116 members so admitted in
the period to 1900 were already members of the Society of Ac-
countants and Auditors (SAA) [The Society of Accountants, vari-
ous years].13 Indeed, 13 had joined the Society in its year of
formation (1885), three of whom were founder Council mem-
bers (Sissons, Senior and Terry).14 The non-SAA cohort included
some accountants whose firms were known to hold listed com-
pany audits at the time [Burdett’s Official Intelligence; ICAEW,
List of Members]. The possession of sizeable audit clients was
clearly valued by the ICAEW, as evidenced by the Council
minute justifying the admission of W. Grisewood in 1899: “the
applicant has been in practice for eighteen years, has several
13 The ICAEW Council Minute Books include 116 members admitted between
1893 and 1900 via this route, yet those disclosed by the ICAEW to the ‘Goschen
Committee’ [BPP, 1930, p. 23] number 114. The unexplained divergence occurs
in 1896 when the former source records 18 admissions, with the latter counting
just 16.
14 This finding serves to challenge Garrett’s conclusion that whilst “some” Soci-
ety members joined the ICAEW, the “leading incorporated accountants, declined
and stood by the Society” [1961, p. 7]. Thirty-five of the 49 SAA members who
later joined the ICAEW had been members of the Society for at least five years
prior to joining the chartered body. The relationship between the ICAEW and
the Society (which grew four times as quickly as the ICAEW in the 1888-1902
period) is beyond the scope of this paper [Garrett, 1961; ICAEW, List of Mem-
bers].
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large audits and is highly spoken of and recommended by the
Liverpool members of the Committee and that prior to his com-
mencing practice he had five years experience in the accoun-
tancy department of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board”
[ICAEW, MS28411/4, p. 320].15 A further indicator of standing
among this group is that, unusually for the time, some were
principals in practices operating from more than one location
[Matthews et al., 1998].
Having constructed a definition that required the “well
qualified” chartered accountant to serve a lengthy period of ar-
ticles and pass a series of rigorous examinations, the issue of
members being admitted to the Institute without taking exami-
nations proved to be highly divisive.16 Numerous commentators
in The Accountant associated entry without examination to the
lowering the Institute’s status in the eyes of the public [5 Decem-
ber 1891, p. 852; 3 September 1892, pp. 665-666; 10 September
1892, p. 681; 29 April 1899, p. 469]. The leader column noted,
for example, that “Doubtless some members have been enrolled
under the Charter who will never add to the prestige or increase
the reputation of the profession” [The Accountant, 28 April 1883,
p. 3]. This was seen as “inevitable” given that “persons should be
admitted as members, not because they could satisfy the Coun-
cil as to their standing and qualifications, but by reason of their
being members of some previously existing society, or having
been a certain number of years in practice” [ibid.].
‘Examined’ highlighted the damage that could be caused to
the Institute’s reputation by reproducing a shoddy set of ac-
counts prepared by a member recently admitted under Bye-Law
35:
15 Aside from Grisewood, there are just two further cases where explanations
for admission are provided in the Council Minute Books. These relate to Robert
Clover and A.G. Sayers, both admitted in 1900. The former was admitted on the
basis of having been “in service and practice since 1876”; the latter, on the
grounds that he had “passed in the two book keeping and the auditing papers of
the Final Examination” [ICAEW, MS28411/4, p. 333].
16 This was particularly the case in the 1890s. Members probably felt that by
then sufficient time had elapsed since the Charter for candidates desirous of
joining the Institute to have been admitted. Moreover, the onset of attempts to
achieve state recognition in this decade (some of which would have allowed
other accountants to join the ICAEW on an equal footing without serving ar-
ticles or passing rigorous examinations) would also appear important. It is also
possible that awareness of the issue increased as a result of the introduction of
the ten-year rule. In the five years prior to 1893, annual admissions without
examination were marginally in excess of 25; in the five years from 1893, they
were over 33. More than half (52.5%) of all non-examined admissions in the
period 1893-1900 entered through the ten-year rule.
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If this is a sample of the work of persons admitted
in this manner, surely it will be detrimental to the repu-
tation and high standing attained by the Institute, apart
from the question of fairness to articled clerks and their
examinations? Ought there not to be at least one test of
a man’s qualifications before admitting him? Could not
the leaders of our profession take the matter up and
remedy a growing evil without further delay? [The Ac-
countant, 29 April 1899, p. 469].
Similar discontent was evident at the ICAEW’s 18th AGM,
when a motion to require Bye-Law 35 entrants to pass an ex-
amination and to restrict the number of such admissions to
three per annum was tabled [ICAEW, MS28410/1, p. 216]. Al-
though this motion was defeated, the fact that Sayers (see foot-
note 15) was required to pass three core Final Examination
papers in 1900 indicates that the Council clearly felt the issue
was of concern and that it needed to test the competence of
such applicants. This process was formalized when Bye-Law 35
was repealed in 1904 and replaced by Bye-Law 35A, which re-
quired persons with ten years continuous experience as a public
accountant to pass the Final Examination. This Bye-Law, in
turn, was soon revoked, with just 14 members admitted under
it in the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 [BPP, 1930, Appendix C, p.
23].
Criticism of members admitted without examination was
not, however, confined to Bye-Law 35 entrants. One contempo-
rary, ‘Fex’, spoke of “the incompetents taken in in 1880”, while
Charles Eves (admitted to the ICAEW in 1887) referred to the
“great number of very undesirable members who were necessar-
ily admitted” through the transitional experience-based “grand-
father clauses” [The Accountant, 19 December 1896, p. 1047; 23
January 1897, p. 101]. W.B. Peat, the Institute’s 18th President
(1906-08), was equally candid in his assessment of some of the
early entrants [Howitt, 1966, p. 257]. He referred to “a batch of
[96] nondescripts” who were elected on one day [22nd September
1880]. Of this number, “22 . . . were struck-off for improper con-
duct; mercifully 38 of them died . . . and a dozen or so resigned”
[The Accountant, 8 May 1909, p. 658]. Support for these and
numerous other contemporary comments that, when faced with
the “inevitable dilemma” of where to draw the line of exclusion
[Macdonald, 1995, p. 192], the Institute initially cast its net too
widely, can be found by examining the ICAEW’s disciplinary
records. Whereas 254 (or 12.1%), of the 2,098 members admit-
ted to the Institute in the period 1883 to 1899 (inclusive) were
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either suspended or excluded during their careers, for those ad-
mitted prior to 1883, the disciplinary rate was almost 50%
higher [ICAEW, MS28411/1-4; MS28465/1].17
Further evidence of concern that entry without examination
lowered the status of the profession is provided by the practice
of some chartered accountants who “advertised themselves as
such ‘by examination’” [The Accountant, 29 October 1892, p.
813]. Although described as “not very dignified” by a correspon-
dent ‘J.B.’, this practice, however widespread, would appear to
illustrate worries over the devaluation in the “chartered accoun-
tant” brand [The Accountant, 29 October 1892, p. 813]. Such
sentiments were clearly shared by the influential leader column
of The Accountant, which spoke of improvements being “ef-
fected in the membership by the dying-out of older and less
qualified members, and by the admission of new and thoroughly
qualified members” [18 March 1893, pp. 237-238, emphasis
added].
Tensions Arising as a Result of the Institution of Articled Service:
The accepted rationale for articled service was that it afforded
clerks a practical opportunity to learn the profession of public
accountancy. From the public, or user perspective, articled ser-
vice allied to rigorous examinations ensured that practitioners
were “well qualified”, both academically and practically, to sat-
isfy the needs of the market place. The correspondence section
of The Accountant indicates that for a number of clerks, the
wording of the Institute’s model articles was nothing more than
a sham. Whilst the model articles stated that the principal
would, among other things, “enable you to acquire the art, sci-
ence, and knowledge of a Professional Accountant”, the experi-
ences of a number of clerks appear to have been somewhat
different [The Accountant, 9 March 1895, pp. 224-225; 30 No-
vember 1895, p. 976; 12 February 1898, p. 179].
For ‘Justice’, “there are still many who merely take in
articled clerks to save the expense of having to pay wages to
others, and not only that, articled clerks have to pay a big pre-
mium for the privilege of being taken in (in both senses)” [The
Accountant, 22 January 1898, p. 99]. To remedy this “scandal-
ous” situation, Justice argued that the Council of the Institute
17 Two hundred and thirty (or 18%) of the 1,280 members admitted in 1880,
1881 and 1882 were disciplined during their careers [ICAEW, MS28411/1-4;
MS28465/1].
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“should lay down in a general way what rights an articled clerk
is to have . . . so that if he does not get them, he has a right of
action under his articles and the bye-laws against his principal
for breach of contract” [ibid.]. Quasi-official recognition of the
problem is provided by an editorial in The Accountant, which
acknowledged that “[t]he duty of a principal to his articled clerk
relative to teaching is somewhat hazy” [16 March 1895, p. 245].
However, along with a number of other writers [see, for ex-
ample, The Accountant, 16 March 1895, p. 248; 7 December
1895, p. 983; 14 May 1898 p. 491] it stressed that “an agreement
to teach a clerk his business does not imply an undertaking to
make him fit to pass the Institute examinations, nor does it
imply that the clerk is entitled to be taught the theoretical side
of his work by the principal” [16 March 1895, p. 245].
‘Justitia’ [The Accountant, 12 February 1898, pp. 178-179]
eloquently and forcibly expressed the full range of concerns of
articled clerks:
Never by any chance shall I see in this office any
bankruptcy or liquidation work and procedure, al-
though there is plenty going on. All that I do know has
to be picked up haphazard. The principals will do noth-
ing and the clerks, of course, are either too busy to
attend or will remind you that your premium was not
paid to them. I . . . only ask if it is right and proper that
these things should be. If you apprentice your son to a
watchmaker you would expect him to be turned out, at
the close of the apprenticeship, a competent workman
(I assume he has average capacity). But surely the same
principle applies in the articled clerk’s case? I think,
under the present conditions, it is nothing short of
barefaced swindling to take premiums from articled
clerks under the pretence of teaching them their profes-
sion.
The corollary of the above was that, provided the articled
clerk passed the Final Examinations and his principal agreed
that he would be a fit member of the Institute, he would be able
to hold himself out to the public as a “well qualified” chartered
accountant, even though the nature of his vocational training
meant that he had little or no experience in important areas of
the discipline. An indication that the above reflected concerns
that needed to be addressed would appear to be demonstrated
by the growth of both student societies and private tuition/
coaching, though of course this is impossible to prove, as the
best students may have used such provision either to reinforce
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or to further their knowledge.18 Indeed, both were recommended
by T. Savage Smith as mechanisms to assist students whose
principals specialized in just one area of accountancy [The Ac-
countant, 3 March 1894, p. 203].
PROMOTING THE ‘WELL QUALIFIED’
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT
In the previous two sections of the paper we have outlined
the comprehensive education and training program designed to
ensure that chartered accountants were “well qualified” to offer
core accounting services in the market place. Having so
equipped the chartered accountant, one of the ongoing difficul-
ties faced by the ICAEW, as had been the case with its predeces-
sors, was that of differentiating its own membership from other
“accountants” in the professional, commercial and public do-
mains.19 In 1884, for example, a leading article in The Accoun-
tant headed “‘Accountants’ and Accountants”, offered the follow-
ing comparison:
The effrontery with which gentlemen, at a loss to
know what business title to assume, take that of ac-
countant, is on a par with that of those ladies of easy
virtue, who when found brawling in the Haymarket in
the small hours of the morning, and subsequently hav-
ing an interview with the magistrate at Marlborough
Street, in response to the latter’s query as to their pro-
fession, or occupation, invariably reply ‘Please, your
worship I am an actress’ [29 March 1884, p. 6].20
18 By October 1883, following the lead of their counterparts in Birmingham,
students’ societies had sprung up in Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, London,
Sheffield, and Bristol [The Accountant, 20 October 1883, p. 12]. Their utility
appears to have been considerable from the outset [see, for example, disclosure
of prizes won by members in The Accountant, 6 January 1883, p. 4, 18 April
1891, p. 290]. Webster Jenkinson described the employment of a coach as “al-
most essential to the man who wants to get ‘placed’” [ibid., 28 April 1900, p.
398]. Formalized tuition began in 1884 when H. Foulks Lynch, “a solicitor of
twenty years experience in the preparation of pupils for law examinations”,
founded his correspondence college [Foulks Lynch & Co, 1955, pp. 9, 11].
19 As early as 17 July 1880, the leader column of The Accountant castigated
Richard Seyd, compiler of statistics on failures, for neglecting in his treatment
of “accountants” in financial trouble to differentiate between “accountants prop-
erly so called, and the numerous persons who assume the title without either
justification or anything like professional qualification” [p. 4]. Heeding this call,
from 1881, the compiler disclosed separately, failing “members of any institute
of accountants” [ibid., 9 July 1881 p. 12].
20 For cases of “accountants” in trouble where The Accountant is at pains to
point out that they are not “chartered accountants”, see, for example, 15 March
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Eight years later, The Accountant lamented that, “[h]ardly a
week goes by without some so-called ‘accountant’ being brought
before the magistrates to answer for some, more or less, dis-
graceful piece of misconduct; and, in consequence, an honour-
able profession runs the risk of being considered decidedly
‘mixed’ as regards the status of its members” [13 August 1892, p.
626].21
The magnitude of the ICAEW’s task in branding itself was
further demonstrated in 1896 with the publication of criminal
statistics which showed that after journalists, accountancy was
the profession with which the criminal was “most anxious to
claim connection” [quoted in The Accountant, 6 June 1896, p.
462].
In this section, we consider the implementation of a
credentialism strategy by the ICAEW, which, as discussed ear-
lier, is seen by Freidson to be a “necessary device” to provide the
consumer with the information to choose a specialist “in a
world where there are many kinds” [1994, p. 159]. We demon-
strate how the ICAEW used the “chartered accountant” creden-
tial to enhance its status and to provide “a ready means of dis-
tinguishing between real professional accountants, and
outsiders, who are so in name only” [The Accountant, 16 Octo-
ber 1880, pp. 4-5]. The ICAEW’s Charter application had argued
that differentiation, through incorporation, would result in
“public recognition of the importance of the profession and
would tend gradually to raise its character” [ICAEW, 1882, p. 5].
However, as time passed “the technical omission from the Char-
ter of 1880” to protect ICAEW members from those falsely de-
scribing themselves as “chartered accountants” or employing
letters to convey such an impression, became a more pressing
issue [The Accountant, 2 March 1895, p. 195].22 The 1890s, there-
1881, 29 March 1884, 5 July 1884, 13 March 1886, 19 May 1888, 5 July 1890, 30
June 1894, 19 October 1895, 21 December 1895, 25 April 1896, 6 June 1896, 6
March 1897, 8 May 1897, 2 December 1899.
21 The same weekly note was also highly critical of the Police in accepting the
statements of prisoners as to their occupation, as it was “likely to prejudice our
profession in the eyes of the undiscerning public” [The Accountant, 13 August
1892, p. 626].
22 The Manchester Institute had foreseen potential problems arising from the
exclusion of such penalties for misuse in January 1880 [Manchester Institute of
Accountants, Minute Book, p. 302]. The Institute of Accountants responded to
their concerns by stating that a penal clause could not be incorporated into the
Charter, but that the prevention of the fraudulent use of the letters could be
addressed by the new Council through a Bill [Institute of Accountants,
MS28408/3, p. 446; Manchester Institute of Accountants, Minute Book, p. 303].
50
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/13
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200542
fore, were marked by a series of attempts to obtain legislation to
protect the title of chartered accountants and their spheres of
work.
One of the initial difficulties faced by the Council of the
ICAEW was the task of persuading its members to describe
themselves as “chartered accountants”, so as to be distinguish-
able from other “accountants” or “public accountants”, and to
use the correct designatory letters. In 1884, for example, having
heard that “some members were using the [Scots] initials ‘C.A.’”
[ICAEW, MS28411/1, p. 365], Council sought legal advice to es-
tablish their powers “to induce members to confine themselves
to the use of the initials prescribed by the Charter” [ICAEW,
MS28459/1, p. 55]. Having recently made arrangements to issue
“a circular letter to their members requesting them only to use
the Initial letters referred to in Clause 17 of the Charter”
(ICAEW, MS28459/1, p. 191], the solicitors’ opinion was that it
would be “premature” to consider further action, which would
“require very grave consideration” [ICAEW, MS28459/1, p. 55].
It would appear that the circular was less than completely suc-
cessful as The Accountant of 31 July 1886 provided an angry
riposte to a member who described himself as “F.I.C.A.” [p.
449]. After castigating the member concerned, it stated that
“The letters ‘A.C.A.’ and ‘F.C.A.’ will, let us hope, some day count
for a little in the eyes of the commercial community; such varia-
tions as that mentioned will tend to bring them into contempt”
[ibid.; 9 May 1885, p. 4].
The ICAEW faced similar difficulties in ensuring that all of
its members described themselves as “chartered accountants”.
Some four and a half years following its formation, the Council
discussed three letters “as to the use of the term of Chartered
Accountant” [ICAEW, MS28411/1, p. 385]. The outcome was
that the Secretary “was directed to inform the writers that there
was no objection to the use of the term ‘Chartered Accountant’
by Associates” [ibid.]. Three years later, a weekly note in The
Accountant bemoaned the fact that even some eminent char-
tered accountants persisted in describing themselves as “public
accountants”, thereby failing to promote the “chartered accoun-
tant” credential:
The term ‘public accountant’ or ‘accountant’ is now
generally used by people who were either not suitable
for admission to the Institute seven years ago, or who
are not competent to pass the tests prescribed as one of
the tests of membership. It is to be greatly regretted
that some firms of chartered accountants, who ought to
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be the last to require the obvious moral of these facts to
be pointed out to them, persist in making themselves
look odd and singular by signing ‘public accountants,’
and exhibiting a marked distaste to acknowledge that
they belong to the Institute. The Great Eastern Railway
accounts are signed by ‘public accountants,’ and so are
many other similar accounts which come before a large
circle of business and professional men, though the
term ‘chartered accountant’ is really the legal descrip-
tion of the signatories. What seems the least under-
standable point about such oddity is that, if members of
the Institute generally, and the Council in particular,
mean what they say, they desire the general public, the
Courts, and the Legislature to exercise a discrimination
between chartered accountants and people who usually
describe themselves signing ‘public accountants,’ which
some of the most notable of themselves positively
refuse to do [17 September 1887, pp. 523-524].
The following year, Council implored members to describe
themselves as “chartered accountants”:
That with a view to educating public opinion in
favour of Chartered Accountants, it is very desirable that
wherever possible members of the Institute being ap-
pointed Auditors to Limited Liability Companies should
describe themselves in the prospectuses of such compa-
nies as ‘Chartered Accountants’ [ICAEW, MS28411/2,
pp. 287-288, emphasis added].
That a circular be issued to the members of the In-
stitute strongly urging upon them for the sake of unifor-
mity that in describing themselves as ‘Chartered Ac-
countants’ upon their letter paper and door plates they
should not add to that description any branches of the
business of accountants included in that term such as
auditors or arbitrators [ibid., p. 328, emphasis added].
The case of Mr. A.C.W. Rogers, who enquired whether he
could add the words “Income Tax Adjustment Agency” to his
sign in 1894, serves to illustrate how this stance was maintained.
The Report of the General Purposes Committee, to whom the
issue was referred, was unequivocal in stating that “the Council
disapprove generally of additions to the term ‘Chartered Accoun-
tant’ and especially to the employment of the word ‘Agency’”
[ICAEW, MS28426/6, pp. 7-8; see also ICAEW, MS28411/4, p.
102, 113].
The ICAEW’s leadership also faced a continual battle to up-
hold the integrity of their brand from an army of imitators. The
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problem was that this possibility had not been anticipated and
dealt with in the Charter, as revealed by Counsel John Rigby and
F. Whinney, appointed to look into the matter in 1890:
We are of opinion that the members of the Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales are not
invested under their Charter with any exclusive legal
right to style themselves Chartered Accountants or to
carry on business under that style so as to entitle the
Institute and its members to a legal remedy which
would enable them to restrain other persons in England
and Wales from assuming a similar designation even if
assumed dishonestly or fraudulently.
. . . the Institute will be without a remedy against the
dishonest assumption of the style of Chartered Accoun-
tant by persons not entitled to it unless special legisla-
tion can be obtained confirming the right to use the
name to members of bodies incorporated by Charter
and making it illegal for other persons to use the name
[ICAEW, MS28459/1, pp. 113-114].
The Institute implemented a number of piecemeal measures
to protect the standing of members. In May 1886, for example,
they instructed solicitors “to take such steps by obtaining an
injunction or otherwise as may appear desirable” against Mr.
H.S. Merrett, someone who had described himself as a “Char-
tered Accountant” [ICAEW, MS28459/1, p. 69].23 Four years
later, in similar circumstances, Council decided to write to per-
sons falsely describing themselves for an explanation. They were
informed “that if they do not undertake to abstain from describ-
ing themselves as Chartered Accountants an advertisement will
be put in the local papers stating the fact that they are not
members of this Institute” [ICAEW, MS28459/1, p. 121]. In
1896, Council successfully obtained an injunction against John
Stewart Morton (who had failed the Final Examination 13
times), preventing him from describing himself as “a chartered
accountant” [ICAEW, MS28410/1, p. 187; The Accountant, 17
October 1896, p. 833]. Similarly, on 1st June 1898, it was re-
ported that “an injunction had been obtained against Mr. T.
Laing, who represented himself as a Chartered Accountant”
[ICAEW, MS28411/4, p. 239]. Under a heading “Usurpation of
the Title ‘Chartered Accountant’ ”, The Accountant congratulated
23 Whilst Merrett was subsequently found to be a Scottish Chartered Accoun-
tant entitled to describe himself as such, the case nevertheless highlights the
resolve of Council.
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Council on the injunction and urged “that if some means could
be devised of publishing the facts of the case more widely they
might have a wholesome deterrent with regard to others” [18
June 1898, p. 623]. In May 1899, Council reported to the annual
meeting that, “injunctions have been granted against two per-
sons improperly representing themselves as Chartered Accoun-
tants, in both cases with costs” [ICAEW, MS28410/1, p. 221].
In 1891, the ICAEW (through Lord Herschell) introduced a
bill to the House of Lords proposing to make it a penal offence
for unauthorized persons to use either the description “char-
tered accountant” or the associated designatory letters [ICAEW,
MS28410/1, pp. 137-148]. Passed by the Lords, the bill failed to
get through the Commons in successive years [ibid., p. 139; The
Accountant, 28 July 1894, p. 670]. Thereafter, the Council pro-
moted a series of bills, either on its own or in conjunction with
other societies, designed to create a register of public accoun-
tants and, generally, also to restrict to chartered accountants the
right to perform the work of a public accountant [Macdonald,
1985]. The first of these attempts, in 1893, for example, stated
that it would be unlawful for any person not on the register,
“[t]o take or use any name, title, description, or addition by
letters or otherwise stating or implying that he is a Chartered
Accountant, or that he is in practice as a Public Accountant or
Public Auditor” [Section 19a, Chartered Accountants’ Bill,
quoted in The Accountant, 18 March 1893, p. 244]. Further, and
in the manner described earlier by Webb and Webb [1917] and
Roslender [1992], it also sought to restrict to practitioners with
the appropriate credential to “the office of Auditor of any Public
Company, Receiver in Chancery, or of an expert appointed by
any Court to report on Accounts, or of Liquidator of a Company,
or of Trustee of any Estate to be administered under Bankruptcy
Law” [Section 19b, Chartered Accountants’ Bill, quoted in The
Accountant, 18 March 1893, p. 244].24
Frederick Whinney explained the public interest rationale
for the bill in the following terms:
They [the Council] wanted all practitioners who fol-
lowed the calling of a public accountant to be Char-
24 Persons contravening section 19 were liable to be fined up to £20, with a
further fine payable “not exceeding one pound for every day on which the of-
fence is repeated after conviction” [Chartered Accountants’ Bill, quoted in The
Accountant, 18 March 1893, p. 244]. Section 20 dealt with non-Chartered Insti-
tutes, Societies or other bodies of accountants who adopted the chartered desig-
nation or letters implying chartered status, with fines of up to £50 provided for.
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tered Accountants – men who had given some guaran-
tee to the world that they were able to exercise the
duties of their calling, and men who at the same time
would be subject to the control and under the jurisdic-
tion of the Council of the Institute, who could expel
them if they did anything whatever which was discred-
itable to a public accountant [The Accountant, 27 May
1893, p. 503].
This initiative, and a number of others, foundered on “the
dilemma of exclusiveness versus market control” [Macdonald
and Ritzer, 1988, p. 257]25 with, in the end, the ICAEW unwilling
to include the memberships of all existing accounting bodies.
In addition to the above somewhat negative measures, the
Council of the ICAEW took steps designed to raise awareness of
the significance of the “chartered accountant” credential within
the commercial and professional community. Early meetings of
the Council incorporated discussion of the institutional means
to achieve greater recognition given that in the endeavor to por-
tray an image of professionalism, members were not permitted
to advertise their services. From the outset, the Institute was
eager to publish their list of members [ICAEW, MS28411/1, p.
120]. Thereafter, this annual publication was increasingly used
as a device to promote the ICAEW and its members among
influential circles. At their meeting of 5 December 1883, Council
resolved to print 1,500 copies of the 1884 list to be circulated
free of charge to members (who numbered 1,316 at the end of
1883) and to be “sent to the judges and others” [ibid., p. 280].
The contents of an undated circular (issued around June
1892) indicate that, in the years that followed, the Council was
increasingly proactive in bringing the chartered accountant be-
fore a much broader constituency of influential persons
[ICAEW, MS28432/2, n.p.]. In excess of 500 copies of the list
25 This dilemma was described by Whinney in the following terms: “It was an
axiom that when they sought to make a profession a restricted one – that was to
say, a profession which could only be exercised by those who were duly quali-
fied, they must, in order to get the consent of the Legislature, take in all those
persons who, at the time the Bill was passed, or within a very short time previ-
ously, were practising that calling. . . . If they went in for restrictive legislation
confined to the members of the Institute they could not possibly get a bill
passed. If they wanted restrictive legislation they must take in all those who had
anything like a reasonable title to be considered within the purview of the Bill.
. . . The President of the Board of Trade said ‘I cannot give you a monopoly,’ and
thereupon they had to modify their Bill, and they did modify it so as to make it a
pure Registration Bill – one which would protect their title” [The Accountant, 27
May 1893, p. 503].
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were distributed to accounting societies, government offices
(such as the Inland Revenue, Board of Trade, Treasury, Home
Office, Foreign Office and Admiralty), Judges, the Bankruptcy
Court, 50 Official Receivers, over 70 banks (including the Bank
of England), clubs, hotels, the provincial societies of the Incor-
porated Law Society, 64 chambers of commerce, 50 national
and regional newspapers, 36 town clerks, a range of literary and
other societies (including the Institute of Bankers, Institute of
Actuaries, Institution of Civil Engineers, Incorporated Law Soci-
ety), the libraries of the Houses of Commons and Lords, and a
miscellaneous category (incorporating the Secretary of the
Stock Exchange, the Registrar of Friendly Societies and Kelly &
Co., publishers of trade directories).26
Another important component of the ICAEW’s promotional
strategy was mounted through the columns of the weekly jour-
nal The Accountant. Initially the Institute agreed to place a
whole page advertisement in the journal at a cost of ten pounds
per month [ICAEW, MS28411/1, p. 3]. Thereafter, the Council
supplied more and more information about its activities and
also arranged with its publisher, Gee & Co., for both copies of,
and extracts from, the journal to be distributed to provincial
newspapers [see, for example, ICAEW, MS28411/1, pp. 29, 116,
252, 360; MS28411/2, p. 344]. Indeed, from 3 January 1891, The
Accountant restyled itself as “The organ of Chartered Accoun-
tants Throughout The World”, having previously been “A me-
dium of communication for accountants in all parts of the
United Kingdom” [emphasis added].
Council also ensured that the Institute’s membership was
placed in a series of directories used by the commercial and
professional community.27 For example, within six months of
formation, the Council resolved to place copies of the Charter
and a list of members in the Accountants Diary & Directory for
1881, at a cost of £50 [ICAEW, MS28411/1, p. 40]. They ar-
ranged to insert the same promotional material in both the Law
26 Leading officials from many of these organizations were invited to the
ICAEW’s regular dinners, as part of the chartered body’s wider promotional
strategy. The dinner held to celebrate Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, for
example, was attended by a host of government officials, politicians, members of
the judiciary, businessmen, bankers, leaders of other professional bodies, the
nobility and clergy [The Accountant, 24 July 1897, pp. 724-734].
27 A Report of the General Purposes Committee indicated a wider audience for
such a strategy. It was “of opinion that it is desirable to take opportunities when
they arise of letting the general public know more of the facts relating to the
Institute” [ICAEW, MS28426/4, p. 40].
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List [for 1894, ICAEW, MS28411/3, p. 293] and the Lawyers
Companion and Diary [for 1901, ICAEW, MS28411/4, p. 381] at
annual costs of £50 and £40 respectively. The Institute’s leaders
were also eager to promote the body and its membership in
more general trade directories. In August 1889, for example,
Council arranged with Kelly & Co to place the names of ICAEW
members in a separate list in their London and country directo-
ries, subject to the members describing themselves in the com-
mercial portions of the directories as “chartered accountants”
[ICAEW, MS28411/3, p. 18]. John Corderoy ACA had spoken of
the need to promote the “chartered” credential in this manner
some four years earlier, imploring Council, “[t]o arrange with
the publishers of the various directories to print a separate
heading for ‘chartered accountants,’ and not include them in a
long list of accountants, comprising an increasing number only
such in name” [The Accountant, 28 March 1885, p. 7].
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Prior studies of the early years of the professional project in
accountancy in England and Wales have concentrated on the
external implications of the ICAEW’s policies, particularly the
resultant proliferation of accounting bodies and the internecine
warfare associated with the highly-charged registration issue
that soon came to the fore. The existence of entry hurdles to the
ICAEW, that were significant in achieving exclusionary closure,
has been accepted but left unexamined. A key part of the
ICAEW’s professional project involved differentiating its mem-
bers from outsiders on the grounds of their levels of general
education, and their ability not only to pass rigorous technical
examinations, but to fund a prolonged period of vocational
training. Part of this process of “producing the producers” re-
stricted entry to the ICAEW to the affluent and the well-edu-
cated and as a result, contributed to the formation of the SAA.
We examine the need to establish credentials to distinguish
chartered- from non-chartered accountants in the market place,
and in further contrast to prior studies, reveal the internal ten-
sions produced by these endeavors to achieve exclusionary clo-
sure.
The ICAEW’s system of training had “the great advantage
for an infant profession of being highly visible to the audience
who mattered most, that is the business community who pur-
chased the profession’s services” [Macdonald, 1995, p. 196]. The
combination of supervised personal training and compulsory ex-
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amination was also already recognized in society, being the cho-
sen method of preparation for entry to the Scottish accounting
bodies and the legal profession, whose status the ICAEW sought
to equal. Moreover, by rapidly instituting a comprehensive sys-
tem of examinations, the ICAEW placed itself ahead of certain
occupational groupings (in particular, engineers and architects)
which had organized somewhat earlier, and also contrasted it-
self markedly with the activities of its predecessor bodies.
The definition of the “well qualified” chartered accountant
did, however, attract criticism and create a series of conflicts
within the newly formed ICAEW. Whilst the Institute’s govern-
ing body repelled calls to modify its mode of vocational prepara-
tion for the profession and reduce the law content of its exami-
nations, it did take action to rectify variations in examination
standards that threatened to undermine the quality of the “char-
tered accountant” designation. Paradoxically in terms of its clo-
sure strategy, having established a three-tiered system of rigor-
ous examinations, which at the final level failed an average of
almost 35% of candidates despite them having overcome the
‘basis of culture’ preliminary and technical intermediate
hurdles, the Council created a new non-examination entry route
in 1893. Despite criticism of its policy and the attendant risks of
damage to its image, it appears that the governing body of the
Institute was clearly willing to adapt its rules, almost on an ad
hoc basis; to facilitate the admission of certain practitioners de-
nied entry by the initial framing of the “well qualified” chartered
accountant.
The importance of the incorporation of the ICAEW by
Royal Charter and the creation of the “well qualified” chartered
accountant, however contentious, was well recognized by con-
temporary commentators. The Accountant, for example, argued
that the Charter would “secure public confidence”, by enabling
“the public and the press certain means of distinguishing be-
tween competent and reputable accountants, and those outsid-
ers who figure in the newspaper reports ‘described as accoun-
tants’” [26 April 1879, p. 4, 3 April 1880, p. 3]. Similarly, for
Frederick Whinney, the creation of the “chartered accountant”
and the “distinct marks attached to his name”, would enable a
“broad distinction [to] . . . be drawn between the real members of
the profession, and those untrained and incompetent persons
who now so frequently announce themselves as accountants”
[The Accountant, 1 May 1880, pp. 5-6, emphasis added]. How-
ever, as we have demonstrated, the importance of the “chartered
accountant” credential appears, initially, not to have been fully
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appreciated by all the members, with the ICAEW Council strug-
gling to persuade even some of the leading names to adopt it.
For the nascent Institute attempting to convince the business
and professional communities that only those who had sur-
mounted its rigorous education and training hurdles were wor-
thy to undertake the work of the public accountant, this was
particularly problematic. With established accountants continu-
ing to generate substantial fees based on their reputation and
track record, and not on the back of the “chartered” credential,
as the numbers of training firms and accountants increased, so
the ICAEW faced a growing imperative to establish the brand
image of the “chartered accountant.” This required members to
shift from an individual or firm-based identity to a collective or
association-driven identity.28 We chronicle in the paper the
ICAEW’s early attempts to meet what has proved to be an ongo-
ing challenge. According to a recent ICAEW President:
Our activities in 1994 have focused on strengthening
the value of the qualification ‘chartered accountant.’
That is not, however, a new objective . . . It is a shared
interest in the value of the title that has always united
all members . . . For the qualification chartered accoun-
tant to maintain its status as a premium brand it must
continue to be seen as combining the higher standards
of professional education and training with technical
excellence . . . maintaining that brand image [ICAEW,
1995, p. 4].
Whilst registration and attempts to monopolize work
through legislation failed, an indication of the progress made by
a profession so vilified by sections of the judiciary and press
before the ICAEW was granted its Royal Charter [Walker,
2004a] is provided by ‘E.F.H.’, a correspondent to The Accoun-
tant, in 1896:
Thanks to our Royal Charter, and the ability and
discretion displayed by the members of the Institute
ever since its incorporation . . . the mind of the public is
beginning to get settled down in the opinion that the
profession of an accountant (without undertaking mul-
tifarious and incongruous trading pursuits) is not only
a useful one, but one of importance and absolute neces-
sity to the commercial world generally.
28 Chua and Poullaos [2002, p. 426] demonstrate the importance of the “sym-
bolic capital” attaching to individual accountants’ names in the market for ac-
countancy services in the Transvaal in the early 20th century.
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This impression is, I would suggest, the natural out-
come of the efforts of our Institute (and its predeces-
sors), in marshalling and training members for their
important duties involved in the ‘calling’ of a public
expert in matters of account [12 December 1896, p.
1022].
To what extent it can be stated that chartered accountants
became an “absolute necessity to the commercial world” is un-
clear. However, the fact that the burgeoning number of ICAEW
members were deemed to be the most competent professional
grouping to act as “a sort of attorney or registrar-general of the
births, marriages, and deaths of every kind of commercial enter-
prise, partnership contraction, and legal dissolution” would im-
ply that the definition of the “well qualified” chartered accoun-
tant, although contentious, was something highly valued, and
through its varied promotional activities, both visible and recog-
nizable in the market place [The Accountant, 11 October 1890, p.
534].
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INTRODUCTION
“Citizenship would be a privilege of the civilised; the
uncivilised would be subject to an all-round tutelage”
[Mamdani, 1996, p.17].
“Subjects are always disproportionately placed in oppo-
sition or domination through the systemic decentring
of multiple power relations which play the role of sup-
port as well as target or adversary” [Bhabha, 1994,
p.72].
Accounting and financial management techniques, compu-
tations and practices have been both implicated and directly
used in political systems that promote unjust, inhumane, op-
pressive and racist policies [Davie, 2000, 2005; Fleischman and
Tyson, 2000, 2004; Jacobs, 2000; Funnell, 2000; Neu, 2000a,
2000b; Achary, 1996]. This study makes a further contribution
by examining the significant role of accounting in the imple-
mentation of British imperial policies relating to the subjectifi-
cation of the Native population in the peripheries. It provides
new insights into accounting’s regulatory role in the production
of a quantified and imperialistic knowledge about British impe-
rial rule. An examination of British expansion into Fiji1 in the
1 British expansion into Fiji was dependent upon collaboration with indig-
enous Chiefs. This meant that an indigenous social structure based on a hierar-
chy of Chiefs became an essential requirement in the complex processes of
British imperialism and empire-building in the South Pacific. Indigenous Chiefs’
collaboration was secured by employing Chiefs as government officials. The
nature of European rule within the collaborative system is reflected by the fol-
lowing quote from The Fiji Times [29 July 1871]: “we require their sanction . . .
In all other respects, the European will rule . . . and if a prominent figure be a
native whether in the form of a king or president, it is only a puppet, the strings
of which are pulled by the white man.” The British-indigenous collaborative
form of imperialism enabled domination and control, both prior to and after a
formal annexation. British expansion at the time followed what Gallagher and
Robinson [1953, p. 13] referred to as the principle of “trade with informal con-
trol if possible; trade with rule when necessary”. Formal rule in Fiji, through
annexation on 10 October 1874, became necessary to protect British settlers and
plantation owners’ trade interests as well as to secure a strategic expansion into
the South Pacific within a broader context of metropolitan scramble for colo-
nies. More importantly and in the context of the arguments of this paper, after
annexation the collaborative system of empire management and expansion was
reinforced through the legislation of Native Regulations. As Davie [2000, p. 335]
highlights “[t]he Native Regulations and the chiefly-based structure of control
and power permeated virtually every aspect of indigenous society. What was
thought to be traditional chiefly privileges became part of an “indirect” system
of British domination.” That is, the control of the indigenous population
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late 19th century shows that accounting computations were an
integral part of indirect rule. Indirect rule was a colonial project
that translated an indigenous form of social stratification into
an administrative system for the domination of Native peoples.
It was a tribal approach to imperial government that dispersed
customary laws within “the wider context of alien domination”
[Mamdani, 1996, p.110]. Indirect rule enabled exploitation of
the moral discipline, trust and respect associated with clan-
based communal social structures for despotic purposes. It also
enabled human engineering for exploitative development of la-
bor as an economic resource. Insofar as the Native policy deci-
sions were sustained indirect rule gave a pre-eminent position to
accounting. The archival material related here reveals that ac-
counting had multiple functions in this project. Accounting and
budgeting were not only essential to highlighting the financial
status of the colony. They were also used by the British colonial
officials and European plantation owners to help prosecute a
particular privileged form of citizenship which gave pre-emi-
nence to Europeans and their exploitative interests.
Collaborative themes of indirect rule have recently been
used in accounting research studies. For example, Davie [2000]
applied these themes to widen the compass of accounting his-
tory to examine the interests that accounting calculations and
explanations served in imperial forms of rapprochement. How-
ever, the concern of that research was not citizenship. Annisette
[2000] also used imperial collaborative themes to study the ac-
countancy profession in Trinidad and Tobago. However the con-
cern of that paper was not expressly citizenship or accounting
calculations and explanations but rather the organization of the
accountancy profession. In the current study archival data,2
hitherto not available or examined by accounting historians,
and other relevant materials are used to show how accounting
came to promote policies that actually denied the Natives citi-
through their Chiefs. The indirect system of rule also enabled the introduction of
a poll tax based on Native labor and as imperialism progressed, the introduction
of a Native communal taxation scheme.
2 Archival data for this study was obtained at: the National Archives, Kew,
London; the National Archives of Fiji, Suva, Fiji; and the following libraries in
Australia: State Library, Sydney; Australian National University, Canberra, Aus-
tralia. The dichotomy between archival and other sources used here is not in-
tended to privilege different types of source materials but rather to provide
information about searching for the location of required archival data. The
paper acknowledges that the choice of source material is selective and therefore
biased and to this extent analyses must be viewed as subjective.
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zenship rights on their native land. In particular, the focus is on
two inter-related aspects of British imperial rule in Fiji. First,
emphasis is placed on the creation of a Native Authority within
the British controlled Fijian central governments and on the
way in which accounting became involved in institutionalizing
inequality and oppression. This was achieved through ensuring
that individual and influential Chiefs of high Fijian societal
ranking became members of the Executive Council of the Native
Affairs Office, and Chiefs of lower ranking were engaged as gov-
ernment employees to manage operations in the villages. Sec-
ond, the paper highlights the way in which oppression and in-
justice came in two further forms of forced labor. Prior to
annexation in 1874 a relatively heavy poll tax was imposed uni-
formly but differentially as between indigenous Fijian men and
women to be paid for through forced labor. From annexation to
1913 a further important provision was a requirement that Na-
tive taxation be communally rather than individually based and
paid in kind. Multiple and diverse factors contributed to an em-
phasis on generating “considerable revenue” from the Natives
[CSO3 Despatches 1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878]. It was this em-
phasis on revenue that was crucial in defining the nature of
citizenship practiced at the time. How to finance colonial activi-
ties was to be determined by the prevailing belief that the Fijian
natives in the periphery needed protection and civilizing but
within their own customary institutions of authority. Account-
ing played a central and primary role in representing one kind
of rational calculative justification for subjectification.
With the above stated focus the paper contributes to re-
search in accounting history that demonstrates the social conse-
quences of an imperial approach to government. In comple-
menting Neu [2000b] and Tinker [1980, 1991] this research
study contradicts Solomon’s [1991] general argument with re-
spect to accounting’s neutrality within political economic con-
texts such as colonialism. There is now an emerging accounting
research literature that provides greater understanding of ac-
counting calculations in differing indigenous cultural contexts
[Davie, 2000, 2004; Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Jacobs, 2000;
Neu, 1999, 2000a] as well as in politicized contexts of race and
ethnicity [Davie, 2005; Fleischman and Tyson, 2000, 2004].
3 The following abbreviated references are used in this paper: CO – Colonial
Office; Cd or C. – Command Paper; CSO – Colonial Secretary’s Office; LCP -
Legislative Council Paper of Fiji; NR – Native Regulation; PP – Parliamentary
Papers; SP – Stanmore Papers.
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Research into the function of accounting calculations in these
somewhat sensitive arenas however remains largely unexplored.
This study complements and responds to such calls within a
historical context of British imperial rule. In doing so, it adds to
our awareness of the suppressed voices in the accounting litera-
ture. Of particular significance to this paper is Funnell’s [2000,
p.187] call for accounting historians to give “matters of justice”
greater “prominence” in their research studies.
The next section provides theoretical notes on citizenship
rights and on British indirect rule. This is followed by an outline
of the initial acts of indirect rule and citizenship rights in Fiji
prior to annexation in 1874. Thereafter a critical examination is
offered on the ways in which accounting became closely aligned
with indirect rule and citizenship rights in Fiji after British an-
nexation. The section explores how and the reasons why ac-
counting became an integral part of British imperial rule in Fiji
with specific reference to strict requirements for the colony’s
financial sufficiency. The arguments of the paper are summa-
rized in the concluding section.
CITIZENSHIP AND INDIRECT RULE:
CITIZEN PRIVILEGE AND SUBJECT TUTELAGE
Ideas of citizenship are numerous and varied. T. H.
Marshall’s [1950] seminal essay on Citizenship and Social Class4
presents the bedrock ideas of citizenship. Marshall theorized
three interdependent rights-based dimensions of citizenship
consisting of civil rights, political rights and social rights.
Marshall defined the civil element of citizenship as “the rights
necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, free-
dom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and
to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” [p. 10]. The
political element of citizenship he defined as “the right to par-
ticipate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body
invested in political authority or as an elector of the members of
such a body” [p. 11]. “By the social element” he meant “the right
4 Marshall has been criticised for ignoring how citizenship rights were
earned through class struggles [Giddens, 1982, 1991]. It has been suggested that
ideas of citizenship developed in a circuitous manner [Birnbaum, 1997 quoted
in Insin and Wood, 1999] and that his analysis is limited to just one form of
inequality, namely class, when in fact there are other forms of inequality in
society [Turner, 1986]. Although these criticisms seem valid, his central concepts
remain influential, and continue to form the basis for new concepts of citizen-
ship.
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to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the soci-
ety” [p. 11]. Citizenship in these terms can be seen primarily as
a yardstick for measuring an individual’s societal worthiness
and membership. Boundaries of citizenship are contextually em-
bedded and are problematic, as access to membership can
emerge in “specific places in response to specific struggles and
conflicts” [Insin and Wood, 1999, p. 5]. Rawls [1999, p. 3] points
out that, “in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship . . .
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interests”. As Held [1991, p. 20] notes “citizenship is above all
about the involvement of people in the community in which
they live”. To this extent, debate about citizenship, he argues,
must involve examination of the “very nature of the conditions
of membership and political participation” [ibid.]. Through such
an examination accounting historians can explore the relation-
ship between accounting and the ways in which citizenship op-
erates in different societal contexts. In this paper, emphasis is
given to the role of accounting within political economy
struggles as between social groups linked within a system of
power relations as defined by British indirect rule for empire
building.
In the context of imperial rule citizenship in the peripheries
operated as an instrument of control through social stratifica-
tion as well as exclusion. Claims of status were not only to a
hierarchical social structure but also to race-based ethnicity.
The basic ideas of racial difference in these states were incorpo-
rated into the political identities5 of social groups as civilized
citizens and so-called uncivilized subjects. Where “[c]itizenship
would be the privilege of the civilised [colons]; the uncivilised
[natives] would be subject to an all-round tutelage” [Mamdani,
1996, p.17]. Like all colonial powers the British, from the mid-
19th century, ruled through a dual system of control: one for the
ruling ‘civilized’ citizens who had civil, political and social rights
and another for the so-called ‘uncivilized’ Native subjects who
were denied similar citizenship rights. There were two comple-
mentary ways of controlling the Native subjects: direct rule and
indirect rule. Direct rule was a centralized form of despotism,
defined by the so-called ‘civilized’ laws of Britain. It did not
5 The social groups were political in the sense that they were imperial cre-
ations and impositions for control and domination (for detailed discussions see,
for example, Bhabha [1994]; France [1969]; Mamdani [1996]).
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recognize Native institutions. Mamdani [1996, p.17] describes
direct rule in European colonies more generally as “the reinte-
gration and domination of natives in the institutional context of
semi-servile and semi-capitalist agrarian relations” which “signi-
fied an unmediated – centralised despotism”. In contradistinc-
tion, indirect rule was a decentralized form of despotism that
exploited Native institutions. It was a system of control that
creatively molded and, where not present, invented customary
political institutions to empower a hierarchy of collaborating
chiefs by gazetting them as Native Authorities (see, for example,
Afigo [1987]; Crowder and Ostuntokun [1987]; France [1969];
Geschiere [1993]; Padmore [1936]). Indirect rule was about gov-
erning the subject peoples through their own indigenous Chiefs
“with newly defined powers and accountability” [Mamdani,
1996, p. 63]. Padmore [1936, p. 315] defines the principle of
indirect rule as: “the system of governing the Blacks through
their own chiefs and political institutions under the control of
European officials . . . The Whites, however, hold the real politi-
cal, financial, and military powers in their hands, while the
chiefs serve as their marionettes”.6
In this way, the subject populations in the peripheries were
“disproportionately placed” to “play the role of support as well
as target or adversary” [Bhabha, 1994, p. 72]. It was not only a
calculated way of denying citizenship rights to a vast majority of
the subject population. Indirect rule was also an inventive form
of social engineering for exploitation. These aspects of the theo-
rizing can provide a useful lens for accounting historians to
examine the relationship between accounting and the ways in
which inequality can be institutionalized in different contexts of
social arrangements. In terms of Marshall’s theorizing of citizen-
ship rights indirect rule in Fiji did not give the Natives the free-
dom to, for instance, individually own land or to engage in valid
contracts. It did not give the Natives political or social rights as
they did not have the freedom to democratically choose their
ruler nor did they have the right to social security. Indirect rule
6 A more apologetic understanding of the collaborative aspect of indirect
rule is reflected in Gallagher and Robinson’s [1953] definition of imperialism. In
challenging the traditional Euro-centric perspective they emphasise the non-
European dimensions in the peripheries. They argued that British expansion
and trade depended upon informal control through collaboration if possible and
with formal political rule only when absolutely necessary. This explanation has
since been developed to emphasise the unequal bargains between the Europeans
and the indigenous collaborators in the peripheries (see for example, Robinson
[1972]; Mommsen [1986]).
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in this instance ensured decentralized despotism which gave the
Supreme Chief, the European Governor, absolute power to for
example, call upon the Natives to supply free labor to generate
revenue for the Treasury. The following two sections examine
the nature of citizenship rights during British indirect rule in
Fiji and the ways in which accounting calculations became an
integral part of it.
INDIRECT RULE AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
PRIOR TO ANNEXATION
On Setting the Foundations of Indirect Rule: In Fiji, European
presence became prominent somewhat later in the mid-19th
century.7 The foundations of a non-European, local dimension
of British expansion became evident in 1867. Then Cakobau, an
indigenous Chief more pliable to European control, was ostensi-
bly installed as the King of Fiji and a government formed in his
name [Fiji Times, 1869]. The Cakobau Government appointed
Native Chiefs as provincial governors, chief magistrates, police
inspectors and sergeants, and clerks to govern the Native sub-
jects. The creation of a Ministry of Fijian Affairs further rein-
forced the governing of the Natives through their traditional
Chiefs and political institutions [Constitution Act, 1871,
Cakobau Government]. An outward correspondence from the
Native Affairs Office to a Provincial Governor dated 12 April
1872 is revealing. The traditional authorities not only had to “be
chiefs of rank” but they also had to “be influential chiefs” [Na-
tive Affairs Office, Outward Correspondence, 1872, Vol. 1, Set
45]. Customary powers of the Chiefs were thus incorporated
into an Executive Council where a hierarchy of Chiefs as Native
Authority became a decentralized arm of imperial rule. How-
ever, although the Chiefs were the pillar of Native Authority and
had absolute power over the Natives they were merely puppets
of the European rulers. This was the basis of indirect rule in Fiji.
It set in place an inexpensive and effective mode of control over
the Natives [Davie, 2000; McNaught, 1974]. This is probably
7 By the second half of the 19th century the major powers of Europe had
assumed sovereignty over most of the tropical world. In the South Pacific the
rush for colonies occurred during the latter half of the 18th century. Similar to
other British colonies, the influences crucial to the making of 19th and early
20th-century British colonies in the South Pacific were multiple, diverse and
contradictory. Fiji was attractive for a number of reasons: it had strategic geo-
graphical importance; it was a source for cotton for the Lancashire textile indus-
try; and it provided fertile land for sugar cane plantations for the Colonial Sugar
Refinery Company, a Sydney based partnership of unlimited liability.
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why, contrary to most if not all responses from the periphery,
imperial officials in Fiji were able to positively respond to the
Treasury’s attempts in London to reduce salaries [Davis and
Huttenback, 1986, p.19].
An 1874 hand-written wages record is particularly revealing
in this respect [im Thurn Papers, MS2, No. 13]. Although the
single-entry accounts do not reveal much about the accounting
practiced they do reveal much about contemporary ideas of hu-
man rights and equality. The distinction between the civil and
the customary is manifested in, for example, the accounting of
the “Salary Expenditure”. The “Salary Expenditure of the Ad-
interim Government”8 lists salary payments to both European
officials and Native Chiefs. There are two striking features: the
accounting classifications; and the amounts paid. The ledger
records show in three separate columns the “name”, “appoint-
ment” and “yearly salary”. Salary payments to Native Chiefs
were classified in two ways. They were mostly recorded as “Gen-
eral Expenses” or clearly described as “Native” followed by a
description of the position held under the appointment column.
The salary differences between the personal rights-bearing
colons and the subjected Natives highlight contemporary prac-
tice of difference. In all cases it was a native Fijian that received
the least amount in any ledger account. On average it appears
that a Native Chief received only about 15% of a European’s
salary.
In the 1870s colonial expenditure far exceeded revenue gen-
erated from various sources [CSO MP 516/79 of 1879; The Cyclo-
pedia of Fiji, 1907]. It is clear from the archival documents “that
the financial position of the Colony [w]as not one of a satisfac-
tory nature” [PP of 1876, Vol. LIV, p. 52]. A number of reasons
contributed to the urgency for financing imperial activities in
Fiji. The Cakobau Government was in an embarrassing financial
position with an outstanding debt of close to £337,0009 [PP of
1874, C. 1011]. The debt was “incurred [primarily] for the pur-
poses of the white settlers, and the balance . . . for the benefit of
high chiefs, principally Cakobau” [Derick, 1950, p. 230]. Other
factors included: malcontents amongst the Europeans [Derrick,
1950]; lack of European investment in the colony due to
8 The Ad-interim Government was a care-taker government prior to annex-
ation in October 1874.
9 These included £150,000 debt of the Cakobau Government [Stanmore Pa-
pers, Vol. XIX]; disputed amount of £87,000 owing to the land pledgers
[Hansard, Vol. CCXXI, 1874, p.1275]; and £100,000 loan from the Treasury in
Britain [Hansard, Vol. CCXXX, 1876, p. 1691].
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unsettled land disputes [Hansard, 1876, Vol. CCXXXI, p.1157];
Britain’s colonial policy on self-sufficiency [The Cyclopedia of
Fiji, 1907, pp. 113-114; Robinson, 1978, p. 142]; and an unsuc-
cessful attempt to raise money from a newly established bank
[Derrick, 1950]. Engaging collaborating Chiefs on the cheap was
only a partial answer to the finance problem. A further British
imperial answer to the finance problem was extraction of forced
Native labor for taxation purposes.
Forced Labor. Initial Acts of Subjectification: Forceful acts fea-
tured prominently amongst the methods used for balancing the
books of accounts. A labor tax in the form of a heavy uniform
poll tax of £1 per man and 4s per woman was imposed on
Fijians. Native participation was enforced in two ways which
also defined the two principal groups of beneficiaries: by the
European controlled government and by European plantation
owners. One method involved taking away Natives from their
villages for some 20 days per year to provide free labor for
“public works” as assigned by the British ruled Central Govern-
ment. Since the prevailing conceptions of public welfare gener-
ally excluded the indigenous population,10 public works in this
context meant building infrastructure for European trade. But
more significantly, the tax system was also a means for obtain-
ing forced labor for European planters. The Natives were “con-
signed to servitude under the operations of the law” to contract
with European planters “for a year or more of gratuitous ser-
vice” in return for payment of their tax and default penalties11
[CSO Despatch #22/26, No.22 of 1876]. For livelihood the Na-
tives depended on wild crop gathering, extended family contri-
butions and village economies. In short, trade for the Europeans
spelt servitude for the Natives. Given the required overriding
urgency for financial solvency, European need for cheap labor
and the nature of subjugation, two factors became important – a
heavy reliance on collaborating Native Chiefs and the imposi-
tion of necessary punishments. A 22 October 1872 outward cor-
respondence from the Treasury to the European Officials, for
10 The development of the indigenous state of well-being was subsidised by
the Wesleyan and the Catholic Missions. Also, a 19 September 1883 minute
prepared in response to a petition to H. M. Queen indicates that the Natives as
“the principal contributors to the revenue . . . contributed to an expenditure in
which they [had] either no interest or at best only a remote one ” [SP, Vol. V].
11 According to the same despatch this was possible because the “unknown
consequences of disobedience” instilled “a mysterious terror over the minds of
the natives”.
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example, shows the significance of Native customary authority
[Ministry of Finance, Colony of Fiji, Outward Correspondence,
1872-1873]: “I may rely on you using your best endeavours with
the Chiefs to secure their cooperation in collecting the Native
Taxes as speedily & as thoroughly as possible”.
The official government machinery for punishing defaulters
was jail. But as this was a relatively expensive option, defaulters
were often punished by “imprisonment on plantation” for indefi-
nite periods [CSO Despatch #22/26, No. 22 of 1876]. There were
also “cases in which most or even all of the men in whole dis-
tricts were dragged from their homes and sold as labourers to
European planters” [Derrick, 1950, p. 231]. But despite these
draconian measures and the Chiefs’ involvement extra-economic
coercion through forced labor did not contribute much to the
Central Treasury as management was difficult and defaulters
were still plenty. The need for an alternative method to balance
Treasury budgets became urgent. There was a search for a “sub-
stitute for the existing system which would bring larger returns
to the Treasury” [LCP, No. 11 of 1886]. As a result, coercion
through forced individual labor was replaced by coercion
through forced communal cropping. This is discussed in the
next section.
COLONIAL SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
Forced Communal Cropping. A Civilizing Mission?: After British
annexation in 1874 a full-fledged regime of indirect rule was
established through: (a) geographical divisions of the colony
into provinces and further sub-divisions of districts made up of
villages; and, (b) strictly enforced Native Regulations. The rules
of the system defined the basis for claims to liberty and gov-
erned the rights and duties of the Natives and in doing so forced
them into living a particular way of life. Davie [2000] outlines
the ways in which Native Regulations defined every aspect of
the native Fijian people’s domestic and everyday work and social
life. There were, for example, regulations relating to the commu-
nal ownership of Native land [Native Lands Ordinance No. XXI
of 1880; No. V of 1888; No. XXI of 1892]; dealings between the
Natives and other inhabitants of the colony [Native Ordinance
No. X of 1883]; functions and status of Native Courts [Ordi-
nance No. VIII of 1876]; regulations that defined the duties and
social obligations of the Natives [NR 4 of 1877; CSO 3434/1900
of 8 August].
Accounting too became an integral part of these despotic
laws. There were regulations relating to the accounting for
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Native Taxes and Expenditures [LCP No.21 of 1886; LCP No.25
of 1891]; accounting for Provincial Court Fines and Fees [NR
No. VIII of 1876]; and, accounting for Provincial Deposit Funds
[NR No. 2 of 1891]. The establishment of various councils – the
Council of Chiefs, the Provincial Councils and the District Coun-
cils consisting mainly of province, district and village Chiefs –
fortified the powers of the Chiefs within the colonial hegemony
[NR No. VIII of 1876; Native Taxes Ordinance of 1876; NR No.
III of 1912]. Among the rewards for collaboration the Chiefs
acquired: salaried civil service positions (see for example,
McNaught [1974] for an extended analysis); a 10% share of Na-
tive taxation refunds [PP of 1904, Cd 2240] and rights to “lala”12
which entitled them to demand labor from their subjects “with-
out any cost to themselves” [CO83/62, 1895] as it was “lawful for
the chiefs to demand the personal services of his people” for
their privileges and the Chief’s protection [NR No. 6 of 1912].
Collaboration also gave the Chiefs certainty of security from
intra-tribal wars and possible domination by other imperial
powers. Display and demonstration of more sophisticated war
weapons forced mountain Chiefs’ collaboration. Monetary pen-
alties imposed upon Native Chiefs held responsible for not help-
ing European officials forced the collaboration of coastal Chiefs.
For example, fines were imposed on Chiefs or their salary pay-
ments either withheld or forfeited [LCP No. 21 of 1886]. The
Chiefs thus simultaneously supported and also became the tar-
get of indirect rule.
Incorporation of a Native customary authority implied a
harmony between the interests of the ruling few Europeans and
the subjected many Natives.13 At the same time it provided a
convenient pretext for denying the Natives the rights of citizen-
ship by withholding political rights from them since governance
under customary law meant that the Natives individually could
not be enfranchised. Political rights of the Native people were
12 Although lala, described as “gratuitous services . . . rendered by the Com-
mon people to the Chiefs” was a customary institution sanctioned by some
European rulers the tyranny that it represented was also strongly criticised by
some. For example, im Thurn, the Governor in the early 1900’s described Native
governance as depriving indigenous people of respect and dignity. In his address
to the Council of Chiefs he stated that the Fijian people were “not allowed any
liberty to think and act for themselves” [im Thurn papers, 1905, File No. 33]. In
the same address the Governor highlighted two reasons for this: (a) customs
imposed upon the people by the Chiefs; and, (b) the Colonial government mak-
ing those customs into laws for the Natives.
13 For example, in 1879 there were approximately 110,000 native Fijians and
less than 500 Europeans [LCP No. 11 of 1886].
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represented in the Legislative Council by collaborating Chiefs,
nominated by the Council of Chiefs and selected by the Euro-
pean Governor as the Paramount Chief.14 The success of the
political institution so created also depended upon adequate fi-
nancial support. To secure financial sufficiency meant imposing
liberty-diminishing constraints which denied the indigenous
people equal economic and social rights. Native Regulations de-
fined the subject population’s obligation to the Native rulers, to
the European controlled Government and also to the Christian
religion [Native Labour Ordinances No. X of 1877; No. XXIII of
1880; No. IV of 1883]. The regulations legitimized the provision
of free labor and food as “obligations of the Fijians to his (sic)
chiefs, the government and his (sic) church” [CSO 3434/1900].
The regulations also continued to “enable planters, under cer-
tain circumstances, to acquire the enforced services of Fijian
villagers” [CO 83/34, 1884]. The Fijian Colonial Government in
this respect can best be described by what Friedman refers to as
“an agency of legitimised coercion” [1970, p. 152]. The Natives
did not have the right to choose an alternative way of life – they
were enslaved by ordinance.
A striking feature of post annexation British imperialism in
Fiji was the substitution of Native taxes in labor for Native taxes
in kind. The inclosures to the despatch of 16 October, 1874 (also
reproduced as Parliamentary Papers of 1876, Volume LIV), are
particularly illuminating. There are a number of important ob-
servations to be made from these colonial documents. First, it is
clear that there was a strong desire to promote the idea that the
substitution was “for the purpose of enabling the Native
[p]opulation to provide their [t]axes in a manner accordant with
Native [c]ustoms” [Inclosure 3, p. 83]. The traditions that the
colonial powers privileged as the customary were payment of
taxes in produce and a communal social system headed by a
hierarchy of Chiefs. The communal system was based on the
argument that: “[t]he only law hitherto known to the Fijians is
the command of his Chief and the customs of his tribe” [Inclo-
14 The indigenous Fijians did not acquire democratic voting rights until
1963. Indeed, the Chiefly hegemony set in place by British indirect rule contin-
ues to haunt Fijian society into the 21st century. A 19th century British imperial
expediency is today significantly instrumental in defining Fiji’s socio-political
economy. Since independence in 1970 the Great Council of Chiefs has continued
to be at the apex of power in Fiji. When the Alliance Party, a party with alle-
giance to the Chiefs lost the general election in 1987 two military coups were
staged to maintain the Chiefly hegemony, lost through democracy. Another coup
was staged in 2000 also in the name of the Chiefly hegemony.
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sure 1, p. 73] and that “[t]he individual, as regards rights and
obligations, is not (sic) known to Fijian law” [p. 80]. Second,
economic calculations also played an important part. It was said
that communal Native taxes in kind would not only be “more in
accordance with native customs” but would also be “productive
of a larger amount of revenue” [p. 83]. The following quote
shows the role revenue and cost calculations played:
If the several districts are assessed in the quantities of
produce . . . and one-half, or 10-20th of the value, is
paid to the revenues as assessed taxes, it would leave
7-20th to be paid to the producers, and 3-20th to go
towards paying for the machinery provided in each dis-
trict; that is to say, the revenue rate on the quantities of
produce there named would be 7s. By this calculation,
the native revenue should be about 11,000l, not perhaps
in the first year, but as soon as the system begins to
work. Up to the present time, and by seeking to raise
the tax in money, the sum of 4,000l per annum has
barely been reached [Inclosure 1, p.78].
Third, once Native taxation was associated with custom it be-
came necessary for the custom “to be properly defined and
settled in order to produce a very fair amount of revenue from
native sources at a moderate cost of collection” [Inclosure 1, p.
73]. Accordingly, tradition and custom were creatively sculpted
and given the force of law.
Of particular interest here is the Native Taxes Ordinance,
1876. It set in place a new way of financing post-annexation
imperial activities. Under that Ordinance every district was com-
pelled to cultivate land and to plant crops as payment in kind for
a communal taxation system. These became commonly known
as ‘Government Gardens’ and/or as ‘Government Plantations’.
The respective Provincial and District Councils of Chiefs were
responsible for their proper and careful management. Since
“collection and shipment under white supervision [were] very
expensive” these were also left to the Natives [CSO 86/1156 of
1886]. The government assessment of each district’s contri-
bution to the Fijian Central Treasury was based on population
size, soil fertility and degree of civilization [CSO Despatches
1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878].
Simple two-column tables were produced to show the
pound sterling equivalent of Native taxes to be paid by each
province or district. Exactly how these amounts were calculated
is not clear. But there were claims that revenues due from the
Natives, as an accounting classification, were calculated using
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the contentious Colonial Government’s “own notions of value
and weight” [Fiji Times, 10 August 1878; quoted in CO83/16,
1878 p. 270]. These were “so fixed” as to ensure “large profit to
the Government when sold” [CO83/16, 1878, p. 270]. Whatever
the methods utilized the amounts calculated provided a basis for
holding districts or provinces financially accountable. Restric-
tions on movements outside the “Home Districts” [Native Land
Ordinance Part II, 1885] ensured an abundant supply of free
labor as well as a maximum collection of revenues for the Colo-
nial Government. Allegations of oppression, slavery and servi-
tude [LCP No. 11 of 1886; CO83/16, 1878; CO83/62, 1895] were
dismissed by official claims of philanthropy: that the policy both
protected the traditional communal social system as well as
taught the “semi-civilised” Natives “European agriculture” [Fiji
Times, 16 September 1895; CSO Despatch #22/26, No. 22 of
1876; CO83/16, 1878]. Despite mounting reports of oppression,
unjust and inhumane treatment, social dislocation, deprivation
of respect and dignity, and infringement of liberty the official
ideology remained unchanged as one of civilizing the Native
peoples. In this way an imperialist financial need was repre-
sented in terms of the Natives’ need as requiring protection,
preservation and civilizing.
Cultivation of Government Gardens/Plantations was located
at the interstices of the market and barter systems of economic
relations. Contemporary tribal economy was based mostly on
barter [Wilkes, 1845, p. 250]. The taxation regulations prevented
the Natives from contracting for wage-labor [LCP, No. 21 of
1886]. Money was therefore in little circulation among the Na-
tives. This provided a political justification for forced cropping:
that the scheme was better adjusted to the native lifestyle be-
cause payment in money was “inconsistent with the state of
Fijian society” [F/83/1/1 of 30 November, 1933]. Paradoxically,
as more money came into circulation among the Natives and as
trading transactions with the Natives increased a differential
pricing system came into operation. The Natives had to pay the
“native price” for their purchases which meant paying “double
the amount” of that asked of Europeans [The Cyclopedia of Fiji,
1907, p.148].
Moreover, according to a despatch of 24th March 1878 Eu-
ropean merchants paid only about half the market value for
commodities that were produced and traded by Natives [CO 83/
16]. A quote from a European planter in the same correspon-
dence provides a possible explanation for differential pricing:
“We don’t want them to be well off. If they were starving, they
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would be much more ready to go over to labour for us in other
islands”.
In spite of such wants a correspondence dated 24 March
1878 from the Governor to the Secretary of State described the
regime as “attempts on the part of the Government to benefit
the natives” [CSO Despatches 1877-1880, No. 37 of 1878]. It was
also argued that the communal “system [was] the one most
suited to Fijian peculiarities,” and that it “achieve[d] the maxi-
mum collection” of revenue for the Treasury [F/83/1/1, 1933].
Moral imperatives thus appeared paramount. Pecuniary consid-
erations for Empire were, however important imperatives. Colo-
nial revenue and expenditure calculations showed that “[t]he
Treasury was empty”, and at the end of 1875 the Governor of the
Colony had only £16,000 to meet an estimated expenditure of
£70,000 [The Cyclopedia of Fiji, 1907, p.135]. The new account-
ing-inclined regime was therefore a political as well as a finan-
cial necessity. The following discussion shows how accounting-
based arguments became an integral and important part of
British rule in Fiji.
Accounting Justification and Interrogation: As the system of in-
justice developed, accounting and its calculations were used as
bases for multiple and, conflicting discourses. Accounting calcu-
lations were produced in abundance to justify the new regime of
servitude. Given the precarious financial status of the Fijian
State of later 19th century it was essential to highlight economic
and financial success. The calculation and presentation of pre-
cise accounting numbers were considered to be absolutely es-
sential for making proper financial and economic comparisons.
The way in which accounting functions and practices mani-
fested particularly simple characteristics is interesting. Simple
receipt, expense and profit calculations were used to promote
and justify a relatively complex British system of indirect rule.
For example, by comparing revenues collected by forced indi-
vidual labor and forced communal cropping regimes accounting
provided a focus for interrogating previous policy decisions as
well as rational justifications for policy changes that prosecuted
a distinct form of rule that denied citizenship rights to a vast
majority of the Native population.
Such colonial functions of accounting are reflected in the
Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon’s report on the system of Native
taxation in Fiji, 1879, presented to the Royal Colonial Institute
in London [Gordon, 1879]: “The receipts from the native taxes,
which in 1875, under the old system of collection, amounted to
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but £3,499, reached in 1876 (during only a part of which year
the new scheme was in operation) the sum of £9,342; in 1877
that of £15,149, and in 1878 amounted to nearly £19,000”. He
further justified the system by highlighting both the low collec-
tion expenses as well as by emphasizing acts of humanity by
reference to gratuity: “The expenses incurred in 1877 in collect-
ing and shipping the produce to Levuka15 and in payment of the
eighteen persons engaged in those duties, amounted to £1,341. A
further expenditure was also incurred for the purchase and gra-
tuitous distribution of seed, tools, bags, &c., amounting to £386
5s. 10d.” Arguments were therefore presented in narrow terms
of profits based on revenue and expense budgeting forecasts to
show the “financial success” of the policy: “if the expenses be
assumed as equal to those of 1877, there will be a clear profit to
the Treasury on this tax of over £17,000, while the expenses of
collection will not have reached £2,000” [ibid.].
Such accounting-based, comparisons were reiterated by the
Governor at his Annual Message to the Legislative Council in
1879 [quoted in LCP No. 11 of 1886]. In order to show with
absolute “certainty” “that the scheme [was] a remarkable finan-
cial success” the low “collection costs” were especially high-
lighted: “The whole cost of collection, therefore, is the sum ap-
pearing as such in the accounts, which was, in 1878, £1,407. As
the gross revenue from this source in the same year was, as
above stated, £18,178, the cost of collection is thus only 7.74%.”
Emphasis on “a really huge revenue” led to the argument
that “there can no longer be any doubt that the scheme has been
a financial success” [ibid.]. From the European rulers’ point of
view the produce-based system of taxation not only succeeded
as a “social experiment” it was also “financially successful” since
“the gross revenue from the source increased substantially” at a
relatively “low cost of collection” [ibid.]. Satisfaction at the im-
provement in the financial condition of the Colony was ex-
pressed both in financial returns as well as in auditor’s reports.
As imperialism progressed statements covering several years
showing the total amount of Native taxes received each year and
its proportion to the total revenue received by the Treasury were
prepared to illustrate that Native taxes as an “item of revenue
[w]as not to any appreciable extent affected by commercial or
agricultural depression” except “by the direct visitation of God”
[PP of 1888, Vol. LXXII, p.10].16 Indeed, revenue statements
15 Levuka was the capital of Fiji at the time.
16 In reference to natural disasters such as hurricanes and droughts.
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showed that communal Native taxation in kind was a consistent
and a guaranteed source of revenue for the Treasury.
That Native taxation had to be produce-based meant an
exact money equivalent was difficult to calculate in the absence
of any well-organized local produce markets. Excess production
was common and resulted in ‘refunds’ for the Natives and an
additional accounting statement for the Central Treasury to pre-
pare. Accounting thus took on a function of a kind of moral
mediator. Perceived acts of justice and fair-play were demon-
strated through the use of accounting measures such as Native
revenue and surplus calculations: “in addition to the large
amount of revenue shown above, a sum of £24,367 13s. has been
returned by the Treasury in the form of refunds in respect of
produce paid in excess of district taxes as sub-assessed” [LCP
No. 11 of 1886].
Additional financial statements were produced to show how
the new taxation scheme increased Native productivity. Periodic
refund statements, for example, were prepared to show in re-
spect of each of the previous years: (a) the annual tax assess-
ment; (b) the total payments made by the Natives; (c) the
amount paid to public accounts as Native taxes; and, (d) the
amount refunded to the Natives after satisfying the assessment.
Table 1 illustrates such record keeping.
TABLE 1
Statement Showing Refund Amounts, 1889-1893
Total Payment Amount Paid to
Year Assessment(£) made by the Public Account as Refund(£)
Natives (£) Native Taxes (£)
1889 18,980 22,886 17,484 5,432
1890 19,740 25,658 20,770 4,388
1891 19,740 30,645 20,911 9,231
1892 19,740 28,448 18,256 9,692
1893 19,740 27,202 17,436 9,327
Source: PP of 1895, Vol. LXX, p. 18.
Such financial statements made it possible to argue that not
only were the Natives able to pay their assessed taxes but “that
during the past five years the natives have paid in excess of their
assessed tax . . . which has been refunded to them . . . [And] that
the amount of refund earned during each of the past three years
of the five is very nearly equal to one half of the assessment” [PP
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of 1895, Vol. LXX, p.18]. New ways of presenting refund ac-
counts had to be developed with concomitant development in
the taxation scheme. Annual, five-year and ten-year statements
of refunds made to the provinces were prepared for comparative
purposes. The Natives’ increased productivity was in this context
measured by their entitlement rights: money-equivalent refunds.
Accounting’s function was not only mediatory but also justifica-
tory.
But more importantly, accounting also became useful in its
perceived ability to reveal an objective view of indigenous eco-
nomic activities. The contortions of defining Native involvement
in capitalistic agriculture in terms of related revenues and ex-
penditures enabled claims to colonial social ontology: that the
Native Regulations were a successful means of developing the
Natives. In this way accounting became rooted in the ultimate
explanation of the regime’s moral-social intentions for being
able to influence more people and thereby for gaining their
greater support. Assessments of the degree of Native freedom
and equality were to this extent contaminated by imperialist
judgments about what mattered from the European imperialist
perspective – financial sufficiency. At the same time, emphasis
on financial success helped divert attention from more concern-
ing issues of exploitation and injustice. Conflicting viewpoints
about the social consequences were dismissed by a strong belief
that the system was “neither oppressive, nor opposed to the
traditional habits and feelings of the people” [CSO Despatch
#22/26, No. 22 of 1876]. They were also clouded by the belief
that revenue was not only “collected without oppression” but
they were also “cheerfully and readily given” [SP, Vol. XI, p. 21].
There was resistance, and accounting-based calculations be-
came involved in interdictory discussions and arguments. A
complex combination of both respectful regard for the Chiefs
and fear of the Chiefs’ newly acquired disciplinary powers pro-
vided a fertile ground for Native subversion. A consequence of
the Native taxation scheme was shortage of cheap labor for the
plantocracy. Explicit objection therefore came largely from
plantation owners within the European community and ac-
counting featured prominently in the production of their
counter arguments. This was most obviously manifested in the
petition for the discontinuance of the produced-based regime.
The petition presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
by the Chamber of Commerce used net aggregate receipt figures
and an annual tax per head to contradict official claims of finan-
cial success [LCP No. 11 of 1886 Annex 4]. According to the
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Petitioners: “up to the date of the Petition, financial results had
not realized expectation, the net aggregate receipts for the years
1876-77 and ’78 being but £38,426 7s. 5d, or an annual contribu-
tion of less than 2s.6d. per head from a population estimated at
110,000” [p. 9]).
The petitioners also remarked on two related points: com-
merce and labor. Allegations were made that the deplorable
state of trade in the Colony was a consequence of denying plan-
tation owners Native labor. Parliamentary Papers of 1887 [Vol-
ume LVIII, C. 5039 of 1887], which contains correspondence
relating to the Native population of Fiji, contains numerous ex-
amples of the Colonial Government’s response to such critiques.
It contains various statements that highlight the scheme’s eco-
nomic contribution to the colony. These include: the total value
of taxes paid into the Treasury by each province each year be-
tween 1876 and 1885; refunds made to the various provinces in
each year from 1877 to 1884; analyses of the amount of tax
produce exported between 1876 and 1880; and Native donations
made to the Wesleyan Missionary Society each year between
1872 and 1884. The power of accounting in colonial discourse
resided in this instance in its capacity to serve competing and
conflicting interests. The next section focuses on the way in
which accounting responsibilities changed as imperialism pro-
gressed.
Accounting Responsibilities and an Aura of Citizenship: Changes
in accounting practice reflected developments in forced crop-
ping policy. They were also suggestive of accounting’s increasing
importance to the sustaining of the regime. It is clear from the
colonial correspondence that crucial regulatory dimensions
were introduced as the project developed. Changes in account-
ing for tax refunds, for example, provide an illustration of the
rulers’ response to human indiscretion. Initially a Buli as the
head of the Native social organization was responsible for dis-
tributing refunds to the Natives. He received 10% of the total
amount refunded to the Natives for surplus production. As a
result of mounting complaints of “shortages in the repayments”
against the Bulis “more effective means [were] adopted to secure
repayment in full to the individual” Natives [PP of 1904, Cd
2240]. Special returns were prepared showing the distribution of
refunds to each district within a province and the 10% payable
to the Buli. Also, previous practices of crediting future assess-
ments were removed and full payment of refunds made compul-
sory.
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Accounting work was initially centralized at the Native Of-
fice. Much effort was put into designing the keeping of provin-
cial books of account. As a result, there was a push for Native
Chiefs who held official positions to learn how to properly keep
provincial cash accounts. This was to help them meet the statu-
tory requirement for a six monthly financial report to be sent to
the Native Office [LCP No.21 of 1886]. It thereby became pos-
sible to link the financial performance in each province to over-
all profitability of the Native Authority within the Central Gov-
ernment. At the same time comparative financial reporting
became an important mechanism for inducing competition for
increased cropping. It seems most probable that the six monthly
financial reports were used to assess the Chiefs’ performance
and for imposing penalties. Fears of punishment, albeit in dif-
ferent forms, continued to help meet Treasury budget require-
ments. The control mechanisms implemented reflect the focus
on a particular kind of accountability and on getting the system
right in terms of balancing Treasury budgets.
Accounting played a vital part in exacting a stricter financial
accountability and one that reflected institutional arrangements
of rights and duties. From about the early 20th century there
was a gradual transfer of “the accounting work of each prov-
ince” to local offices [CSO Despatch No. 25, Enclosure No. 1 of
19 June 1914]. There are two important observations to be made
from the colonial records. First, deliberate efforts were made to
define and encapsulate the financial responsibilities of the
Chiefs. Each province headed by a Native Chief had its own
annual estimates of revenue and expenditure. Separate provin-
cial classifications enabled a continuous assessment of Native
revenues and expenditures through regular comparisons. Prov-
inces were rated according to efficiency and effectiveness
against one another in financial terms of “Surplus and Deficits”,
“Increase/Decrease in percentage of Collection” and “Gross and
Net Deficits”. From these records the colons were able to pre-
pare surveillance statements of refunds, revenue, expenditure,
and assets and liabilities as specified in detail by the Central
Treasury in Fiji. These were used to ensure that all obligations
and privileges as converted into monetary equivalents were sat-
isfied.
Second, tighter financial and accounting control mecha-
nisms were introduced by requiring annual and later quarterly
financial reports to be submitted to the Secretary for Native
Affairs for auditing by European officials at the Central Trea-
sury. Attempts were made to allocate auditing responsibilities in
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the provinces to high ranking Chiefs by suggesting that they
should: “provide a more thorough and frequent audit of the
accounts of native officials, who are entrusted with public and
provincial monies” [CO 83/185/10, 22 March 1929].
But the European Auditor reminded the Colonial Secretary
about the rules and regulations of the Director of Colonial Audit
and highlighted that “[u]nder Native Regulations the Auditor is
responsible for the audit of Provincial Funds” [ibid.]. Moreover,
he stated that:
. . . irrespective of the fact of the existence of the
Director’s ruling, I consider it to be a very unwise policy
for me to adopt, of setting a native official of high rank
to oversee and audit the accounts in charge of a Roko
or Buli of possibly lesser rank, in view of the peculiar
circumstances which govern Fijian relationships [ibid.].
As a result, he deliberately “avoided” implementing a system
that did not respect the Chiefly hierarchy. In this way the design
of the accounting system and the auditing of it were fused with
the status and power of each Chief within the Native Authority
and with the Central Colonial Government. It helped both re-
flect and reinforce contemporary colonial structures of domina-
tion and exploitation. A new culture was enforced through the
design of an accounting control system that involved an in-
creased but selective Native participation. The financial defini-
tion of responsibilities and obligations of the Chiefs provided a
kind of aura of citizenship. In so doing, the British rulers further
reinforced the philosophies of indirect rule in Fiji.
CONCLUSIONS
British indirect rule in Fiji exposed the ultimate conse-
quences for a society based on a conception of civilizing where
entitlements and rights were defined entirely in terms of deny-
ing citizenship to the vast majority of the population. Contrary
to apologist arguments and official colonial documents indirect
rule was not about progress and development of the Native
population in Fiji. Rather it was about the exploitation of ances-
tral symbols of leadership for Empire building. So deliberate
was the effort to create a second class status that the Native
Authority became a fetish for the colonized population. It was
this fetishism and the lack of challenge from the Natives that
denied them citizenship rights within their own land. As a tech-
nology which evolved in response to developments within in-
direct rule, accounting appears to have been indispensable to
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British imperialism. Accounting measures of performance facili-
tated British imperial strategies of hierarchization and
marginalization of its subjected population. Accounting pro-
vided a very practical way of measuring, monitoring and ex-
pressing in economic-monetary terms the institutional conse-
quences of indirect rule. In addition, accounting provided
calculations to compare and contrast the achievements and pos-
sibilities of alternative policy decisions. With an institutional
structure in place, innovations through accounting provided a
new way of controlling and coordinating the subjected popula-
tion within imperial systems of government. Accounting systems
design reflected and helped reinforce Native hegemonic struc-
tures of power within British imperialism which deprived the
native Fijians of citizenship rights. Once established these insti-
tutionalized accounting calculations were used to justify as well
as to interrogate, evaluate and contradict specific policies relat-
ing to the maintenance of servitude. In this respect the power of
accounting resided in its ability to simultaneously serve multiple
interests. In short, accounting was intertwined with the emer-
gence and perpetuation of the philosophies and practices of ex-
ploitative human engineering in British ruled Fiji.
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THE BORDÁZAR MEMORANDUM: COST
CALCULATION IN SPANISH PRINTING
DURING THE 18TH CENTURY
Abstract: Since the first printers settled in Castile, books were regu-
lated as a basic necessity and their retail prices were controlled. The
bestselling works were sacred prayer books. The printing monopoly
in Castile was enjoyed by a Flemish workshop (Plantin). In 1732
Antonio Bordázar de Artazu, authored, printed and distributed to the
authorities a Memorandum in which he tried to prove that Spanish
printers were able to print books at lower prices and still maintain
quality standards. This Memorandum presented a costing model, and
provides an early example of the use of cost accounting to challenge a
monopoly in Spain.
INTRODUCTION
Antonio Bordázar de Artazu, a renowned printer from
Valencia wrote and printed a Memorandum in 1732 addressed
to the King of Spain with two objectives: to demonstrate his
ability to take over the printing of sacred prayer books and to
show through a costing statement that these books could be
printed in Spain at lower prices. The Memorandum is 24 pages
long and is available at the National Library, Madrid (under the
reference 2/14180).
There are three basic reasons why this Memorandum merits
a depth analysis. First, the document shows an early example of
the usage of cost calculations to challenge a monopoly within a
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strictly regulated market. Second, and in contrast to similar and
earlier costing documents, the Memorandum entered the public
domain; it was addressed and sent to the government. Third, the
costing systems used in the printing industry are of particular
interest and were associated with relatively sophisticated techni-
cal processes during the 18th century. This paper seeks to con-
tribute to the growing literature on accounting in the printing
industry [Daniels, 1994; Walker and Mitchell, 1998]. The fact
that Bordázar was an experienced and successful printer aged
61 when he published his Memorandum, together with his solid
mathematical background, makes his paper a unique source for
understanding the changes that were about to occur in the
printing industry during the second half of the 18th century.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The objectives of the paper are to compare Bordázar’s cost-
ing model with that of a benchmark workshop (Plantin) and
assess the impact of Bordázar’s Memorandum on the printing
industry. The evidence obtained will be used to verify the utility
of Bordázar’s model for decision making and to analyze the
document in the context of theories of change in accounting
technology.
These purposes determine the structure of the paper. The
first section relates the historical background and explains the
printing process in 18th century Spain from a legal and techni-
cal perspective. The second section focuses on a description of
the Bordázar costing model, a discussion of the findings and a
comparison with the costing model of Plantin. The third section
elaborates on the impact of the Memorandum when it was pub-
lished. Conclusions follow. This paper seeks to contribute to the
history literature on the adaptation of accounting systems in
specific organizational circumstances as recommended by au-
thorities on accounting innovation and change [McWatters,
1993] and the history of costing systems in monopolistic indus-
tries [Carmona and Donoso, 2002].
THE PRINTING BUSINESS IN SPAIN
DURING THE 18TH CENTURY
Historical Background: Until the 18th century, the principal
works of the classic Castilian writers such as Cervantes,
Quevedo or Lope de Vega were printed on poor quality paper,
using eroded or even damaged printing types. In other Euro-
pean countries higher quality printing was produced [García
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Cuadrado, 2001]. In Spain there was no lack of demand for
printed products. Illiteracy in Castile was no lower than in other
European countries, and the purchasing power of its citizens
was similar.
The reasons for poor quality printing in Spain were well
known to contemporary printers and the relevant authorities. A
regulation from 1480 regarded books as a basic necessity. As a
result they were free of indirect taxation (alcabalas) which was
the main source of income for the Crown [Albi and Garcia,
1986]. In order to make books affordable to most people, the
retail price was capped and determined according to size re-
gardless of content. Although the retail price remained stable for
at least two centuries, both labor and paper costs grew con-
stantly. As a result the quality of printed work declined.
During the 16th and 17th centuries the bestselling volumes
were sacred prayer books, the sale of which was a monopoly
held by the monks of El Escorial, an important monastery close
to Madrid built by Phillip II in the 16th century. These monks
did not have their own workshop, so printing was performed by
a Flemish printer. This arrangement was not unusual due to the
fact that Flanders was part of the Spanish empire until the be-
ginning of the 18th century. In 1731, King Philip V issued a
Decree stating that the sacred prayer books had to be printed in
Spain. Nevertheless, the Decree did not specify the manner in
which this decision was to be implemented. Bordázar wrote his
Memorandum a year later in order to reveal the economic feasi-
bility of printing prayer books in Spain.
Since the end of the 15th century the printing regulation of
Castile was included in the Recopilación de las leyes de Castilla.
In addition to price capping and censorship, this regulation had
the following characteristics. First, it was reactive legislation
and amended whenever subversive practices or ideas (such as
Protestantism) were detected. Second, the legislation was con-
tinuously breached. In fact, there was a crisis in the printing
industry in 1752 when printers challenged a Digest of old regu-
lations made by Juan Curiel, the ruling Judge of Prints during
the reign of Ferdinand VI. The industry considered that the leg-
islation had become obsolete and was disregarded by citizens
and the authorities [González, 1945]. The King was asked to
dismiss the Judge for having issued the Digest, the main object
of which was to boost the Spanish printing industry. Amongst
other rules, it forbade Spanish writers from having their works
printed abroad, limited the import of books, and established a
new censorship procedure (discussed later). The economic effect
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of this Digest was such that some countries sent claims through
their ambassadors [García Cuadrado, 2001]. However, in 1754
the Digest was confirmed by the Council of Castile. Many books
that were printed abroad until then became scarce. According to
García Cuadrado [2001], this was the reason why the most im-
portant printers incorporated the Compañía de Mercaderes de
Libros de la Corte in 1758, which would later become the
Compañía de Impresores y Libreros del Reino.
Legal Requirements: The administrative procedure required to
obtain a license to print books had remained unchanged since
1558. Galley proofs had to be sent to the Council of Castile,
which granted the License and later the Privilege. The Council
also set the Tasa or highest retail price. These functions were
later delegated to the Prints Commission. Several copies had to
be sent to the Council of Castile following the printing of a
commercial edition. The librero (who financed the edition) had
to send a list of misprints attached to the galley proofs. Thus, if
a forbidden statement was found in a commercial edition, the
librero could not argue that it was a misprint [González
Palencia, 1945].
The License: The Bulla inter multiples of Pope Alexander VI
stated in 1501 that all books had to be censored before publica-
tion. In 1523, the Concile of Trento extended this obligation to
all Catholic countries and, therefore, to the Spanish Empire.
The license could only be bestowed by a select list of churchmen
in order to control the publication and dissemination of ideas.
Licensed editions could be seized by the Inquisition even after
commercial printing if the content was considered lato sensu,
adverse to the Catholic religion. If this happened the publisher
did not receive any indemnity. For example, the Plantin work-
shop in Antwerp, which will be referred to in this paper as a
benchmark, was seized and its assets were sold when it printed
a heretical book in 1562 [Edler, 1934]. Plantin managed to prove
that the book was printed by one of his employees without his
authorization. In spite of this, he had to repurchase his assets to
restart the business. There was a second seizure in 1567, when
two of Plantin’s partners, the van Bomberghen brothers, had to
leave the country to escape religious persecution. Losing their
business and jeopardizing their lives was a real concern for
printers.
Furthermore, until the amendments of Charles III, it was
also necessary to obtain a new license to make second editions.
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This situation worsened when a third censorship of a technical
nature was established for any publication about medicine or
geography. The censorship was administered by specialized au-
thorities such as the Royal Academy of History.
The Privilege: The privilege consisted of the right to reprint dur-
ing a specified period, usually five years. This applied only to
Castile territories. The publisher was the owner of this right
until Charles III assigned the intellectual property to the writer.
Until then, and in accordance with practice [Edler, 1937], the
writer only received a lump sum when selling the manuscript to
the printer.
One of the most long-lasting privileges -and doubtless the
most harmful for the printing industry- was the exclusive distri-
bution of prayer books in Castile awarded by Phillip II to the
Jerónimos monks of El Escorial. From the beginning of this
monopoly, the Jerónimos commissioned the prestigious printer
Plantin of Antwerp to produce the prayer books. They distrib-
uted these books in Castile; that is, all Spain (including overseas
territories) except Aragon and Navarre. The works printed by
Plantin were of high standard, both in relation to the printing
technique and the quality of the materials used.
The Tasa (Retail Price): The Council of Castile was the only au-
thority allowed to set the retail price (tasa). The aim was to
make books affordable to most customers and thus avoid specu-
lation. The price was calculated according to the number and
size of the sheets used, at a price that varied from, for example,
3.5 maravedíes (lowest value coin) for the first part of Don
Quixote (1608) to six maravedíes (mrs.), a level at which it re-
mained from the second half of the 17th century until its aboli-
tion 100 years later.
The tasa regulation seems to have been disregarded like the
rest of the legislation. There are two reasons for this [López-
Glazier, 1994]. First, the continuous reduction in the difference
between retail prices and printing costs - until the reforms of
Charles III. Second, the booksellers did not adhere to the regula-
tions. The sale of books was in most cases, a way to support
their main businesses. In relation to the tasa, non-compliance
with the law must have been quite frequent, as can be seen from
a Decree of Ferdinand VI which stated that books should not
only show the amount per sheet, but the total price as well,
because not all customers were skilful enough to count the num-
ber of sheets. This operation was not always straightforward
94
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/13
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200586
because every printed sheet produced between four and 64
pages, depending on the size of the book. The tasa was fixed
regardless of the content of the book. The text on which the
authorities approved the tasa had to be included at the begin-
ning of the book in order to make it easier for the purchaser to
compare the actual and the legal prices.
The printing industry in Castile before Charles III was thus
a risky business and one which delivered low returns. Low re-
turns were a consequence of the limitation of the retail price,
and risk arose from the possibility of a second or third censor-
ship that could trigger the seizure of the editions on sale. Be-
sides, the attitude of the last kings of the Austrian dynasty and
the early ones of the Bourbon dynasty towards the industry was
changeable. For example, Philip IV prohibited the printing of
books on matters regarded either as not necessary or “inconve-
nient”. This could also occur when the censors considered that
there were already sufficient books on a specific subject. The
consequence of all this was that for more than 200 years, includ-
ing the so-called “Golden Century”, Spanish books were of a
very low quality compared to those of other countries. They
were characterized by bad paper, worn out printing types, and
narrow margins.
The Printing Process in the 18th Century: In order to understand
the costing system described by Bordázar, it is necessary to be
acquainted with the printing process at the end of the 18th cen-
tury. If the handwriting in an author’s manuscript was irregular
or had too many corrections, the text had to be re-written. Regu-
lar handwriting permitted a proportional distribution of duty
among the typesetters. The printing process took a session
(jornada) of four and a half days. Hence, the year had 80 ses-
sions. The typesetters made up the moulds of the sheets or cop-
ies that had been allotted to them. It was preferable although
not frequent, particularly in the case of the prayer books, that
the typesetters were competent in Latin and spelling.
The prayer books were printed using two inks (red and
black), and this required the reprinting of each “copy” (a double
sided printed sheet). Two assistants gathered the paper and pre-
pared the inks using nut oil, linen and turpentine for the glaze.
Black was obtained from pitch, and red was a mixture of melted
fish tails and wine. Plantin achieved very high accuracy both in
the correlation between the two different inks and between the
printed parts of each side of the paper. It should be noted that
until the second half of the 18th century every sheet was
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stamped in two parts, because of the large size of the marquilla
or marca real paper.1
Given the book clamps used at the time, the pressure of the
type on the paper depended upon the press officer’s skill. If the
pressure was excessive, the paper of low quality, or the ink too
liquid, then the printed text was not clean, making it difficult to
read. Despite the skill of the press officer, spoilage was common.
In response one of the officers of the great Spanish printer
Joaquín Ibarra discovered a system to reduce imperfections and
this was widely incorporated to the printing process at the end
of the 18th century [Fanlo and Murillo, 1993].
According to the Bordázar Memorandum, the proportion of
typesetters to printing machines was lower than 1:1. Four or five
typesetters were enough for a workshop of six printing presses.
The presses used were almost the same as the model designed
by Gutenberg (born in 1397). In these machines, the impression
on the paper was made by twisting the screw on the printer
plate. The pressure of the plate on the paper depended on the
force exerted by the officer. A whole side of the paper could not
be printed in one impression because of the large surface to be
printed. Thus, this action was carried out in two movements:
once the first part had been printed the assistant moved the
plate and the paper to print the other half of the same side of the
copy. Thus, a double sided paper needed four stampings for
every color. Bearing in mind that the prayer books required a
double printing process because they needed two inks, the pro-
duction of every session of four and a half days was 1,500 copies
or printed sheets on both sides. The annual average production
was 1,045 books containing 114 sheets.
The printer would then send the galley proof to the book-
seller who was financing the edition. This proof was sent to the
Prints Commission, who would deliver it to the censor. In order
to avoid any pressures regarding deadlines or approvals, the
bookseller was not supposed to know who the censor was. How-
ever, it was the bookseller who proposed one or several censors
to the Commission. Appointment as a censor was frequently
refused because of the dramatic consequences triggered by
granting approval to certain books. The censorship procedure
deteriorated during the 18th century, and it became usual for
the license to be written in laudatory terms.
1 The sizes marquilla and marca real papers are approximate to DIN A2.
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The Digest of Juan Curiel, 1752 replaced the system out-
lined above. Years later there was a notorious default in the
renewal censorship system [González Palencia, 1945]. The case
was the publication of an almanac titled Piscator Complutense.
To quote the terms of the report signed by Ricardo Wall, Minis-
ter of Ferdinand VI, this almanac “contained many errors, inso-
lence and contempt, that hardly a sentence can be found that is
not vile, obscene and shameless” [González Palencia, 1945, p.
152]. The Piscatores were hand almanacs that forecast the
weather for a full year and included short poetry, epigrams and
ironic allusions to famous people. They were very popular, and
included titles such as Piscator of the Ladies, and the Great
Piscators of Ávila or Salamanca.
The Piscator Complutense was written by Francisco de
Valdemoros, a theology professor of the Alcalá de Henares Uni-
versity, and was approved by the Benedictine priest Vicente
Marín. Its publication at the beginning of 1756 challenged the
working of the whole censorship system as it was passed despite
containing many defects. The defense of the Judge of Prints is
well described by González Palencia [1945]. The ensuing scan-
dal, in which Ferdinand VI intervened, triggered a hardening of
the censorship regulations and the deportation of the author
and the censor. The Judge of Prints survived the scandal as he
proved that all procedures had been adhered to and that the
error was due to the lack of care by the censor and his non-
observance of the legislation. A new Digest was published in
June 1756, five months after the scandal, and included precise
instructions on the performance of the censorship task. It rein-
stated the censor’s anonymity and appointed 40 censors who
were “obliged” to accept the appointment. The Digest also fixed
the fee for censorship, which, in the opinion of the booksellers,
had become too high. This fee was 2 reales (silver coin) or 78
maravedíes per sheet. The Notary received 24 reales, the Com-
mission of Prints received 62 reales for the Privilege and 32
reales for the License.
The publishing process ended once the approval of the
Commission had been granted. Texts concerning the License,
the tasa and the Privilege had to appear at the beginning of the
book. The whole edition could then be printed. Some copies had
to be sent to the Commission.
BORDÁZAR’S COSTING MODEL
The Bordázar Memorandum, 1732 is cleanly printed on pa-
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per of excellent quality. The frontispiece includes an engraving
signed by Tomás Planas and several samples of the typefaces
available for printing for prayer books. Bordázar explains that
the technical quality of the edition and engravings was aimed at
showing the standard at which the Spanish workshops could
perform.
The Memorandum is structured as follows:
1. An open letter in which Bordázar explains that his
Memorandum is a consequence of the Royal Decree of
1731, where the King decided that the sacred prayer
books had to be printed in Spain, although there were
no instructions on the implementation of this Decree. In
this letter Bordázar says that Spanish printers could un-
dertake the task at a lower cost while maintaining qual-
ity standards. This is not the first open letter he had
written. He had published at least one other related to
the convenience of unifying weights and measures in all
the territories of Spain. This part of the Memorandum
consists of two pages including the frontispiece.
2. The Memorandum itself, detailing categories of raw ma-
terials and techniques of printing (paper, type settings,
engravings, tables, scores, materials and instruments).
This part is 71⁄2 pages long.
3. A feasibility study (Conveniencia), in which Bordázar
proposes the creation of a workshop with six printing
machines to carry out the orders coming from El
Escorial. This part is 101⁄2 pages long.
The Royal Decree of 1731 did not eliminate the printing
monopoly, but compelled the Jeronimos to bargain with print-
ers and priests (purchasers). By the time of Bordázar’s death in
1744 these negotiations had not been concluded. The first con-
tract between the Jerónimos and the Compañía de Impresores del
Reino (Company of Printers of the Kingdom), was actually
signed 20 years later, during the reign of Charles III. The Com-
pany, whose shareholders included the main booksellers, took
on the task of printing the books to a similar quality and price
as offered by Plantin.
The systematic reluctance to change shown by the owners
of the monopolistic Privilege and on their behalf, the Prior of El
Escorial, Eugenio de la Llave, can be explained by comparing
the huge difference between the prices proposed in the Memo-
randum and those at which the books were being sold, which
was twice as high. If the monks accepted to change their sup-
plier and the prayer books were finally printed at the price sug-
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gested by Bordázar the reason for maintaining the traditional
gross margin on sales of 50%, would disappear, since there were
neither copyrights nor any relevant distribution costs to pay,
and net profits were not allowed.
This high margin was a strong incentive for both the King
and the customers to negotiate with El Escorial, but the
Jeronimos would probably refuse to change, as in the past. This
could explain Bordázar’s proposal to determine a margin for the
sellers. According to his proposal, the retail price (what he calls
“extrinsic value”), had to be calculated by raising the printing
costs (“intrinsic value”) by 25%. He believed this could be ac-
ceptable even though it meant a reduction of the Jerónimos’
gross margin by 75%, providing the price at which they pur-
chased the books abroad was similar to the one determined by
the model. Bordázar [1732, p. 12] explains this 25% as follows:
“25% is to be added to the intrinsic value of these books; 15% in
order to compensate for the delay in recovering the capital em-
ployed.2 Extending their highest selling delay to six years [the
cost] equals to 5% a year.”
The printed batch of prayer books was sold out in six years.
Therefore the printing costs would have to be financed for an
average of three years. Based on an annual rate of 5%, the total
cost is 15%. Thus, the cost of financing this stock is included in
a higher retail price. I will elaborate on this later. Without any
further explanation, Bordázar allots an additional mark-up of
10% for “administration wages, corrections, and any other ex-
penses”. The lack of provision for profits is discussed later.
The most interesting part of the Memorandum is the feasi-
bility study (Conveniencia), which contains a description of the
printing costs. It should be born in mind that Bordázar was
already printing prayer books for the Benedictine monks of
Valencia. These books had a specification similar to other
prayer books as regards the variety of inks, the printing quality
and paper, as well as the absence of misprints in the Latin texts.
Bordázar states three types of costs in his business: (i) paper, (ii)
engravings and (iii) impression. He does not mention any other
cost of the workshop apart the wages of the master and two
porters, the lease of the shop and fuel.
2 Note how Bordázar does not include ‘interest’ in this cost, because this
would be inconsistent with the rules of the Concile of Letran. On the other hand,
compensation for the “loss of profits” even when lending money was accepted by
the Catholic Church since the times of the doctor angellicus.
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Paper: The paper was made in several standard sizes. In fact,
one of the aims of the tasa was to avoid the publication of books
on low quality paper. Bordázar describes four sizes. These are
shown in Table 1 with equivalents in centimeters.
TABLE 1
Paper and Sizes in Centimeters and Dedos
Dimensions in centimeters Dimensions in dedos
Width Length Surface Width x Length Surface
Marquilla 36.5 51.87 1893.255 19x27 513
Marca real estrecha 46.11 50.91 2347.4601 24x26.5 636
Marca real ancha 46.11 54.75 2524.5225 24x28.5 684
Marca real mayor 46.11 60.51 2790.1161 24x31.5 756
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
Printing Costs: The material on printing costs is amongst the
most interesting in the Memorandum. The way in which the
costs of some fungible items and the wages of the press officers
are incorporated in the costing model is clearly superior to that
of Plantin. At the beginning of his Memorandum, Bordázar al-
lots costs per sheet for paper, engravings and impression. The
cost of paper in the model is the market price. At the time it
appears that there were enough paper mills to ensure that price
and quality matched those abroad. The engravings were created
by artists and craftsmen who could be contracted freely. Both
paper and engravings were purchased, and thus, no calculation
was needed to determine their cost. The printing cost was calcu-
lated by Bordázar based on his own experience, and according
to the method that is now described. His estimations would
appear arbitrary but he gave explanations. Thus, he presents a
table explaining the cost of each activity included in the printing
process (see Table 2).
The Memorandum contains a number of negligible arith-
metic errors, as for example when determining the price of pre-
paring the Diario en octavo. These errors do not impact on the
general accuracy of the model. They do reflect the rapid prepa-
ration of the Memorandum and the lack of subsequent scrutiny
and checking.
The column “Impression” in Table 3 shows the costs of
printing every size of paper calculated by Bordázar. Bordázar
provides prices but does not explain how he determined them.
But as shown in Table 3, a simple calculation shows that the
price of paper is in direct proportion to its surface area.
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TABLE 2
Activities of the Printing Process
Styles of types Settings Printing Cutting Inks & Total
(Amounts in rs.) Types wages
Grancanon & Peticano 12 60 4 70 146
Misal & Parangona 14 60 4 70 148
Texto 16 60 6 70 152
Atanasia 20 60 6 70 156
Lecturas y cicerón 24 65 8 70 167
Entredos 32 65 8 70 175
Breviario 45 70 8 70 193
Glosilla 60 75 10 70 215
Total wages 1352
Simple average 169
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
TABLE 3
Printing Cost and Paper Surface
Prices in maravedíes (34mrs. = 1 real)
Surface Surface Paper Paper Impression Impression
% % %
Marquilla 1893.255 67.86% 2.17 61.91% 5 67.80%
Marca estrecha 2347.4601 84.13% 2.50 71.43% 6.2 84.07%
Marca ancha 2524.5225 90.48% 2.67 76.20% 6.7 90.85%
Marca mayor 2790.1161 100.00% 3.50 100.00% 7.375 100.00%
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
TABLE 4
Crew
For each machine Total workshop
Master 1
Assistant to the master 1
Paper and ink porters 2
Officers of prints 1 6
Print assistants 1 6
Official typesetters 0.75 to 0.83 4 to 5
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
R2 coefficient between “Surface” and “Impression” is 99.98%.
The same coefficient between “Paper” and “Impression” is lower
(83.58%). This finding will be discussed later. The crew
(workforce or labor) estimated by Bordázar for a workshop of
six machines is shown in Table 4.
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Bordázar estimates that the wage of a workman who is di-
rectly involved with the presses is 10.331 reales a year for the
master, 6.199 reales for the assistant, and 2.066 reales for por-
ters. Subtracting the costs that Bordázar assigns to ink and
printing types, lease of the shop and fuel, the remainder of the
impression costs was to be used to pay the wages of the rest of
the crew. Bordázar reserves the difference between the actual
wages and those he used for his calculations to reward produc-
tivity.
Engravings: Engravings were the third cost component. Engrav-
ings were commissioned from specialists. The engravings were
frequently renewed, even if those of prior publications were still
available. The reason for this is that the novelty of the engrav-
ings and their appropriateness to the taste of the period was
frequently used by the printers as a sign of prestige [López-
Glacier, 1994]. The price of the engravings depended on the
book size, and the smallest were proportionally more expensive.
Table 5 shows Bordázar’s calculations of all costs depending on
the type of book.
TABLE 5
Engravings
Tipe of Book Total prices in maravedíes (mrs.)
Book Title Size Sheets Engravings Paper Impression Engravings TOTAL
Epístolas Marquilla 124 12 268.7 620 144 1032.7
Misal Marquilla 218 12 472.3 1090 144 1706.3
Breviario Octavo m.m. 220 16 770 1622.5 96 2488.5
Breviario Dozavo m.a. 160 16 426.7 1072 80 1578.7
Diurno Octavo m.m. 43 10 150.5 317.1 60 527.6
Semana Santa Dozavo m.a. 34 12 90.7 227.8 36 354.5
Oficio Nª Señora 32avo m.e. 4.5 11 11.3 27.8 22 61.1
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
Since the average production of every print session was
1,500 sheets, based on a simple average of 114.78 sheets per
book, the annual production was probably 1,045 books by press.
Bordázar proposed that the prayer books should be printed in
only one workshop using six presses that could meet total de-
mand.
The Memorandum includes a table comparing Bordázar’s
prices with those of Plantin. This revealed the high margins that
either the printer or the Jerónimos were benefiting from. By
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heading the column that contains the prices of the monopoly
with “Price at which they are sold in San Gerónimo those of
Antwerp” instead of using an innocuous descriptor (name of the
printer, current tariff, etc.), Bordázar emphasizes the extent to
which printing was being done abroad (see Table 6).
TABLE 6
Retail Prices
Cost according Price at which they were sold in
TITLE to Bordázar San Gerónimo of Antwerp
Epístolas 1032.7 2720
Misal 1706.3 3306
Breviario 2488.5 6964
Breviario 1578.7 3212
Diurno 527.6 1072
Semana Santa 354.5 726
Oficio Nª Señora 61.1 212
AVERAGE 1,107.06 2,601.71
Source: Bordázar [1732].
Bordázar does not mention the existence of profits, and nei-
ther does he show much interest in accuracy because the aim of
his Memorandum was to challenge a monopoly that was selling
books far beyond their cost, and creating wealth in foreign
countries.
DISCUSSION OF THE COSTING MODEL
The model described by Bordázar was relatively unsophisti-
cated compared to modern management accounting. Neither
was it an early example of scientific management in the terms
described by Wells [1982]. This is because the object of the
document was more limited in scope, i.e. to determine a retail
price in order to challenge a highly profitable monopoly. Never-
theless, there are several findings to discuss.
Publication: The Memorandum presents a costing model used in
an early industrial process. This is not particularly remarkable,
but the difference to other costing models is that this was
printed, published and sent to the government in order to sup-
port a regulatory change and trigger the end of a monopoly. The
literature on costing history indicates that published costing
methods before the 19th century were rare. The memorandum
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provides evidence of the existence of costing models in the early
18th century.
Indirect Imputation of Costs: As shown in Table 3 above, there is
an extremely high R2 correlation between paper surface and
printing cost. That is, there is a statistical relationship between
these costs, showing that Bordázar applied a cost per square
inch when determining the printing cost to every book. The
costing model of Plantin can be used as a benchmark. This
costing model was later described by Edler [1937]. It consists of
separate accounts for every rough material such as paper and
wages. Platin’s model opens an account for every project (i.e.
every book printed), thus managing stocks of work in progress
and stocks of books ready for sale. Nevertheless, Plantin’s model
treats ink, glue, thread and other materials as a general cost that
was not booked in the account of each project. These costs were
considered as general expenses of the workshop and were not
identified separately. The difference with the model of Bordázar
is twofold. First, Bordázar makes a separation between the
wages of the workers directly involved with printing and those
who were not. Then, he determines a printing cost per square
inch by adding the cost of fungible items to the wages of the
workers dividing the total by the paper surface printed. Plantin’s
model does have the advantage of opening a new account for
every project, although these accounts did not include all costs.
Bordázar did not advance a theoretical development of the im-
putation of costs to the process and he did not show great con-
cern for scientific accuracy.
Profits: The determination of profits was recommended in the
first handbook on accounting published in Spain [Solórzano,
1590], although the method suggested (hacer avanço) consists of
obtaining the difference between amounts received from cus-
tomers and paid to suppliers. Solórzano does not suggest that
profits should be calculated periodically. When Bordázar wrote
his Memorandum, the calculation of profits on an annual basis
was established practice [Enciso, 1957; Jócano, 1793]. Yamey
[2000] suggests that the determination of profits on an annual
basis is triggered by the instability of businesses, i.e., whenever
there was a period of stability in trade and margins, merchants
did not need to know regularly the profits they were achieving.
Bordázar did not elaborate on profit determination; his model
was not aimed towards management decision-making.
According to Tallón [1992] and Donoso Anes [1998],
104
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/13
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200596
Sebastián de Jócano wrote the first Spanish exposition of a
management accounting system in 1793 [Jócano, 1793]. This
was for use in the production of official newspapers (the
Mercurio and the Gazeta), where profits were calculated on a
yearly basis (alcance). In some respects Bordázar’s model is far
more sophisticated, and was published several decades earlier.
Jócano’s model was similar to the systems followed in other
public companies [Carmona et al, 1998]. Bordázar does not cal-
culate nor even mention profits, but this does not detract from
the significance of his model. It has to be considered, that the
Fifth Concile of Letran had defined usury at the beginning of the
16th century as the profit obtained in exchange of a fungible
thing without any labor, danger or risk. Pope Benedict XIV
wrote a letter to the Italian bishops in 1745 where he defined
usury as the intention to receive more than was lent, disregard-
ing the balance between what was given and what was recov-
ered. Within the bounds of these definitions, making profits
when selling sacred prayer books seems unacceptable, particu-
larly when considering the lack of any risk, danger or sales ef-
fort. In any case, the wages of the owner and the savings due to
productivity would reward capital invested and management
ability. Profits were not regarded as a priority in the costing
models of other monopolistic industries [Carmona et al, 1998].
Bordázar does not present any formal statement comparing
turnover and expenses, but the data provided by his model have
been used to build Table 7, which compares turnover and ex-
penses.
Depreciation: Bordázar does not include any amount for the de-
preciation of printing machines. This practice was not unusual
at the time. Whenever a fixed asset had to be repaired, the cost
was simply booked as an expense of the period. According to
Garner [1954] this was a sound practice among the printers of
the period. Daniels [1994] considers that the depreciation of
long term assets by the printers Walker Evans & Coswell
(WE&C) in the USA in 1874 represents an early case.3
Subactivity Costs: Bordázar says that during the periods in
which some of the six machines were not busy with the produc-
tion of sacred prayer books, they could be used for printing
other books. Although he does not expand on this, he was effec-
3 One of Plantin’s presses, which can be seen today in the Plantin Museum in
Antwerp, is still used occasionally for special editions.
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TABLE 7
Income and Expenses
Amounts in maravedíes Amounts in euros
Item Nature4 Per Per press Per Pre press Per work-
book p.a. book p.a. shop p.a.
(1045 /year) (1045 /year) (6 machines)
Sales 1,107 1,156,815 113.10 168,970.97 1,013,825.80
Paper PAP 313 327,085 45.78 47,775.89 286,655.35
Engraving GRA 83 86,735 12.12 12,669.00 76,014.04
Inks and types IMPR 182 190,190 26.58 27,780.23 166,681.38
Print officers
and assistants5 IMPR 264 275,880 38.56 40,296.60 241,779.60
Rest of crew6 IMPR 238 248,710 34.76 36,327.99 217,967.97
Lease and fuel IMPR 27 28,215 3.94 4,121.24 24,727.46
Difference (profits) 0 0 0 0 0
The cost of paper (312.9 mrs.) and engravings (83.1 mrs) is the simple average of the
seven types of books (312.9 mrs).
Source: Based on the data provided by Bordázar [1732].
tively proposing the absorption of fixed costs. Bordázar seemed
to know from his own experience about the existence of
subactivity costs.
Distinction between Direct and Indirect Labor Costs: Since the
model considers an average wage cost of 171.5 reales, I will
assume this amount in spite of the small error (see Table 2).
Bordázar then multiplies the said amount by 1,500 copies
(sheets) of marquilla paper for every 4.5 days’ session, amount-
ing to 220rs. and 20mrs. Subtracting from this amount the di-
rect labor costs for every copy, Bordázar obtains an “excess of
wages” of 49rs. and three mrs. for every session. Assuming full
utilization of the six printing machines of the workshop,
Bordázar obtains the annual amount of 49rs. 3mrs. x 80 ses-
sions x 6 machines = 23.562rs, which he calls residuo de los
salarios (remainder of the wages). This was basically used to pay
for the leases and the wages of the rest of the crew. There is a
small error here, since Bordázar calculates 23.662 reales instead
of 23.562. (Using the same criterion as above, I will use his
figure in spite of the mistake). This residuo de los salarios should
absorb the fixed costs of the workshop, which Bordázar [1732,
p. 17] calculates as follows:
4 Nature refers to the three categories suggested by Bordázar: Paper (PAP),
Engravings (GRA), and Printing (IMPR).
5 Could be considered as direct workforce.
6 Could be considered as indirect workforce.
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Residuo de los salarios 23.662 rs.
Lease of the workshop and fuel: 3.000 rs.
20.662 rs.
Absorption:
Master 5 parts/10 10.331 rs.
Assistant 3 parts/10  6.199 rs.
Paper porter 1 part/10  2.066 rs.
Ink porter 1 part/10  2.066 rs.
This shows that the average printing costs used by Bordázar
at the beginning of the Memorandum was obtained by adding
direct and indirect labor costs. The reliability of the printing
costs per unit of surface shown by Bordázar depends upon the
wages on which he had based his model. These wages can be
compared to those of other studies of the same industry and
period [Enciso, 1957], and there are no significant differences.
As for the size of the crew, there is no way of knowing if it was
adequately dimensioned. Considering that 80% of the printing
costs were wages of the direct workforce (typesetters, print offic-
ers and their assistants) there was little margin for error.7
Determination of the Retail Price Based on Multiples: The current
system used in the printing industry for calculating the retail
price5 is multiple on cost. Bordázar did the same when he deter-
7 Walker and Mitchell [1998] indicate that most workshops in Britain hired
fewer than 20 hands at the end of the 19th century. The workshop described by
Bordázar was of a similar size.
8 The calculation methods for fixing the retail price have changed of course,
as has printing technology. But the main elements of the system used by
Bordázar are still identifiable. See for example, the criterion proposed by Néret
[1951] in order to fix the retail price based on the publication cost of French
books with official prices:
Retail price = printing cost
(1-avg. discount) x ( 1-amortization rate - author proceeds)
The amortization rate is a figure between 0.45 for bestsellers and 0.65 for
those of slower sales. This formulation is similar to that described by Bordázar,
considering the lack of the copyrights and amortization rate, inasmuch as the
Jerónimos of El Escorial purchased the entire edition and financed the stock.
Alfonso Mangada prefers the following formula:
Multiple on cost = 1
(1- tb + gg ) [ (1- tb + gg) g ] - d
Where:
tb profit on sale
g distribution expenses
d copyrights
gg general expenses on net sale.
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mined the “extrinsic cost” or retail price by increasing the “in-
trinsic cost” by 25%. As explained above, this percentage was
determined by estimating the total costs that would be incurred
before the batch of books was sold out. This system is similar to
the one used by WE&C in the early 19th century as described by
Daniels [2001].
Application of Interest: Considering that the finished books had
to be stored for several years until the whole production was
sold out, Bordázar suggests increasing the retail prices by 5%
p.a. in order to include the financial cost.
Productivity: As mentioned above, Bordázar reserved some
amounts to reward productivity. He does not elaborate on this,
nor does he explain how these rewards would be calculated, but
this can be considered as an early example of “human account-
ability” in the terms described by Hoskin and Macve [1988].
Objective of the Model: According to Flingstein [1993], the use of
accounting practices become pronounced only during the fi-
nance control phase. Although Bordázar’s Memorandum pre-
sents a costing model, it was not aimed towards improving fi-
nancial control. In fact, it was rather focused on determining
retail prices in order to trigger the end of the monopoly in the
manufacturing and sale of books. This finding accords with the
discussion of Flingstein’s theory on control conceptions which
suggests that there is no direct link between emerging account-
ing practices and specific conceptions of control.
Change in Accounting Technology: Bordázar’s Memorandum
matches the elaboration of change in accounting technology
made by Edwards et al. [1995] and Boyns [1996]. The change
agent of accounting technology was in this case the proprietor
of an existing and successful printing office.
IMPACT OF BORDÁZAR’S MEMORANDUM ON THE
PRINTING INDUSTRY
A few decades after the appearance of the Bordázar Memo-
randum in 1732 important developments took place in the Span-
ish printing industry. In 1763, barely three years after being
crowned King of Spain, Charles III changed book and printing
legislation. The tasa was abolished except for schoolbooks and
catechisms. The Decree explains this decision by arguing that
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“free trade is the mother of abundance”. This resulted in an
immediate improvement in the quality of materials and favored
the return of Spanish printers who had migrated in search of
better opportunities abroad. A new set of favorable regulations
was approved one year later when the obligation to gain a new
license for second editions was eliminated. Further, the censor-
ship system was relaxed and censors no longer remunerated. In
consequence of the pressure exerted by the King on his confes-
sor, who also enjoyed the supreme command of the Inquisition,
censors determined not to confiscate any publication without
first hearing views of the bookseller.
The Compañía de Impresores del Reino (Printers Company
of the Kingdom) was constituted at the beginning of the 1760s,
and the contract with El Escorial was signed in 1764. Up to eight
shares in this company could be bought annually for 1,500 reales
each. The result of the first contract was disappointing: the time
agreed for the first delivery was defaulted and the Compañía
incurred additional costs due to the delay, which swallowed up
all the profits. Thereafter, the Compañía had to ask for discounts
when purchasing vermilion and antimony from the royal mo-
nopolies. The company was not profitable until it built its own
workshop in 1787. Later, this workshop became royal property,
and carried out the printing of all the Spanish official papers
(Boletín Oficial del Estado). The legislation permitted the Com-
pany to print publications other than prayer books. In order to
avoid unfair concurrence, this authorization did not include the
right to print popular, high selling books.
No evidence has been found of any influence of Bordázar’s
proposals on these events. Too much time elapsed between the
Memorandum (1732) and the amendments of Charles III (1763)
or the contract between the Compañía and El Escorial in 1764.
Thus, it is unlikely that a direct influence could have existed.
The Memorandum shows that the main issues of printing cost
calculation, such as cost identification, indirect allocation of
costs, determination of prices through multiples on cost, and the
application of interest, were already known and used in early
18th century Spain. Besides, this paper suggests, that the end of
the monopolies that occurred during the 18th and 19th centu-
ries was probably triggered not only by political reasons, but
also by the pressure of an expanding industry for free trade.
García Cuadrado [2001] suggests that the printers incorporated
the Compañía in order to undertake the printing of some books
which could not be imported any longer as a consequence of the
Digest of Curiel.
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No evidence survives about the role of costing models, such
as that described by Bordázar, in ending this monopoly. The
first attempt to undertake the printing of sacred prayer books by
the Compañía was a failure from an economic point of view.
This suggests that there was no previous business planning. The
Compañía failed to allot the whole production to only one work-
shop as suggested by Bordázar. The shareholders of the
Compañía preferred to increase their own activity instead. In
consequence the Compañía finally built its own workshop.
CONCLUSION
The Bordázar Memorandum used a costing model to chal-
lenge a monopoly in order to show that sacred prayer books
could be printed and sold at lower prices. This costing model
included concepts such as the imputation of indirect costs, ap-
plication of interest and the separation of direct and indirect
wages. In addition, the retail price was determined as a multiple
of the total cost of the books.
The costing model of Bordázar entered the public domain.
However, no evidence has been found of its impact on the cost-
ing models used in the printing industry. In any case, the model
suggests that the costing tools and procedures described by
Bordázar were known in the industry. If compared with the
other costing models used in Spain before the 19th century, the
Bordázar Memorandum was also oriented towards the determi-
nation of the sales price, and does not focus on other aspects of
management decision making.
The main differences between Bordázar’s costing model and
that by Plantin, were twofold. First, Bordázar separated the
wages of workers directly involved with printing from those who
were not. Then, he determined a printing cost per square inch
by adding the cost of fungible items to the wages of the said
workers and dividing the total by the paper surface printed.
Plantin’s model seems to have been superior in that a new ac-
count was opened for every project, although these accounts do
not include all costs. The Bordázar model also proposes the
application of interest by increasing the prices of products on
sale if they have to be stored for several years. The lack of con-
cern with profits should not be considered as a weakness of the
model, as both the nature of the goods produced, as well as the
Catholic regulation on usury made profits unacceptable.
Although no evidence has been found regarding the
Memorandum’s impact on the printing industry, the publication
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and its target audience suggests that the end of the monopoly in
1764 was not triggered by the legal amendments issued in 1731,
but by the pressure of the industry and its consumers.
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Abstract: This paper argues that a complex of accounting measures —
account books, inventories of accumulated wealth, and detailed in-
structions for production performance — were used to inculcate
Western values into the native population located at five Franciscan
missions along the San Antonio River in New Spain (present-day
Texas) from 1718 to 1794. Bolstered by the need to alleviate commu-
nications problems caused by extreme isolation, the missionaries con-
structed detailed mission documents that described the acquisition of
scarce resources, reported the aggregation of material and spiritual
mission wealth, and controlled daily production performance of the
native population. In short, the resulting mission economic system,
which held the Indians to certain notions of accountability, primarily
by restricting their choices, nourished the Western view of income
distribution based on effort. We propose that these procedures ulti-
mately caused the Coahuiltecans to abandon their native beliefs, and
gradually, to be absorbed into Spanish society. The 150 Coahuiltecan
tribes ceased to exist as a distinct culture by the early 19th century.
The exploitation and ultimate subjugation of the Coahuiltecan Indi-
ans parallels strikingly subsequent developments in Canada, Austra-
lia, and the Scottish Highlands.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the extent to which accounting prac-
tices employed by the Franciscans during the San Antonio mis-
sion era (1718-1794) in New Spain (present-day Texas) en-
meshed not only the indigenous peoples, the Coahuiltecan
Indians, but also the missionaries themselves in particular webs
of power. We argue that the dual economic paradigms of mate-
rial wealth accumulation and income distribution based on ef-
fort, expressed through the language of accounting, extracted
power from the indigenous population and led them to ex-
change their native beliefs for Western values.
Extant records suggest that isolation prohibited effective
communications between the missionaries and both their secu-
lar and religious superiors. To counter this problem, the mis-
sionaries utilized three forms of accounting measures: account
books, inventories of accumulated wealth, and detailed instruc-
tions for production performance. The resulting mission eco-
nomic system reflected the dual-relationships of high trust that
existed between the missionaries and their superiors and low
trust that existed between the missionaries and the Indians.
Account books provided a monetary record of mission sup-
ply activities. Crown contributions were limited and the trans-
port of material goods was problematic. Thus, the efficient use
of scarce resources remained a pressing issue throughout the
mission era. Although the account books depicted financial
transactions regarding the annual fulfillment of temporal needs,
audits by superior authorities were sporadic at best.
Audits of a different nature — the creation of inventories —
were used by the Franciscan hierarchy to measure the results of
mission activities and to maintain some element of control over
the missionaries in the field. Such tabulations, which detailed
both spiritual assets (number of natives baptized) and secular
assets (physical structures, agricultural products, and livestock
accumulated), reflected the importance placed by Western soci-
eties on economic wealth accumulation and the concomitant
disregard for the essential elements of the native culture.
 Lastly, the missionaries developed detailed instructions
that performed the same function as a modern-day budget sys-
tem regarding the rationing of scarce supplies, the efficient use
of raw materials to produce economically valued goods, the re-
warding of appropriate behavior with material goods, and the
ordering of time and space through a system of time that de-
manded conditioned responses to mission bells throughout the
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day. These instructions offered guidance to both the missionar-
ies and natives on how to behave more efficiently and effectively
in Western terms.
We argue that the institutionalized accounting activities
conducted at each mission were deployed to extract power from
the indigenous population. Inventories of mission property by
Spanish superiors were only conducted sporadically. In con-
trast, the Indians were closely supervised and held to certain
notions of accountability that aided in the imposition of desired
behavioral patterns on the native population. We propose that
these procedures ultimately altered the Coahuiltecans’ view of
themselves as human subjects, caused them gradually to be ab-
sorbed into Spanish society and, by the early 19th century, cease
to exist as a separate culture. We suggest that the use of ac-
counting procedures to inscribe into measurement unequal
power relations predates by a century similar activities con-
ducted by British authorities to dispossess the Aboriginal popu-
lations in the Canadian provinces, the Scottish Highlands, and
the Australian Western Desert.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First,
we discuss as background the utilization of accounting mea-
sures in the abrogation of Aboriginal peoples by the British in
the 19th century. Then we offer a brief history of the San Anto-
nio missions. We next identify key characteristics of the mission
accounting practices and suggest how each may have contrib-
uted to the decline and ultimate elimination of the Coahuiltecan
culture in New Spain. In conclusion, we attempt to integrate the
historical practices uncovered with modern ideas of account-
ability and then offer a brief comparison of the Spanish and
British colonization efforts. Suggestions regarding possible fu-
ture research close this section.
BRITISH COLONIAL ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
DURING THE 19TH CENTURY
Numerous authors [Chew and Greer, 1997; Gibson, 2000;
Neu, 2000a and 2000b; Walker, 2003] argue that notions of ac-
countability emerge from 19th century colonial accounting
practices that were developed “to answer for the execution of
responsibilities” [Gibson, 2000, p. 297]. Colonization was viewed
as an opportunity to control a group of people who “require and
beseech domination” [Said, 1993, p. 8].
The accounting techniques utilized in Canada created the
mechanisms through which the distant colonial powers trans-
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lated their imperial objectives into practice. “Like a map, ac-
counting calculations construct[ed] a certain image of distant
domains, thereby both problematizing certain issues and fram-
ing possible interventions” [Neu, 2000a, p. 270]. The ensuing
accounting numbers were not neutral, however. Neu [2000a, p.
273] suggests that accounting measures created incentives that
were central to achieving the dual British goals of containment
of the indigenous people on the North American continent and
appropriation of the land and its outputs by the settler society.
Thus, accounting techniques helped the colonial government
not only to appropriate land, but also rationalize unequal ex-
changes through the measurement of value implicit in the ex-
changes [Neu, 2000b, p. 176].
Chew and Greer [1997] and Gibson [2000] argue that the
economic paradigm of material wealth accumulation, expressed
through the language of accounting, was also partly responsible
for the historic dispossession of the Australian Aboriginal
people. Gibson [2000, pp. 290-291] suggests that the extant ac-
counting practices minimized societal values that could not be
quantified in terms of the accumulation of economic goods and
fostered a perception that cultures that do not value the accu-
mulation of economic goods are unworthy and thus in need of
change.
Similarly, Walker [2003, p. 843] notes that accountants fa-
cilitated the dispossession and acculturation of a large segment
of the Highland and Island population of Scotland during the
mid-19th century. Repeated bankruptcies among the landed
class caused accountant-trustees to take actions that focused on
the dual financial goals of maximizing estate revenue while dis-
posing of sufficient lands to satisfy creditors. Financial account-
ing measures imposed economic rationality on the ensuing solu-
tions and caused the traditional culture of the Scottish Gaels to
be discounted as the product of an inferior civilization.
We argue that the crude accounting practices utilized in the
San Antonio missions created similar consequences. Measure-
ments reflected both secular goals guided by Western notions of
wealth accumulation and religious activities guided by alterna-
tive assumptions. The ensuing system of accounting measure-
ments implemented by the missionaries attempted to control
the nomadic behavior of the Indians and to instill into this non-
ownership culture an acceptance of the Western notion of eco-
nomic wealth accumulation. Thus, the missionary actions
within this accounting context contributed to the dismantlement
of the indigenous culture.
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SAN ANTONIO MISSIONS
The San Antonio missions owe their existence to the com-
bined efforts of the Spanish explorers and the Franciscan Friars.
Searching for the Seven Hills of the Aijados, where gold was
believed to be so plentiful that “the natives, not knowing any of
the other metals, make of it everything they need”, the Span-
iards gradually explored the Texas Province after Pineda charted
the Gulf coast from Florida to Tampico in 1510 [Bolton, 1912,
pp. 1-3]. Following the 1537 edict of Pope Paul III that Native
Americans are “truly men capable of understanding the Catholic
faith” [Fisher, 1998, p. 1], Franciscan friars accompanied the
explorers “to the remotest corners of New Spain in search of
souls to save” [Ortega y Gasca, 1979, p. 148]. The San Antonio
River was discovered on one such expedition. Fray Damian
Massanet wrote on June 13, 1691, “I named this place San Anto-
nio de Padua, because it was his feast day. In the language of
the Indians, it is called Yanaguanna” [Noonan Guerra, 1987, p.
8].
The Region: The San Antonio River was viewed as an excellent
site for colonization and evangelizing. On May 14, 1716, Fray
Isidro Felis de Espinosa described the San Antonio River mis-
sion site as follows:
[The location] is very desirable and favorable for its
pleasantness, location, abundance of water, and multi-
tude of fish. It is surrounded by very tall nopals, pop-
lars, elms, grapevines, black mulberry trees, laurels,
strawberry vines and genuine fan-palms. There is a
great deal of flax and wild hemp, an abundance of
maiden-hair fern and many medicinal herbs. . . .
[S]even streams of water meet. Those, together with
others concealed in the brushwood, form at a little dis-
tance its copious waters, which are clear, crystal and
sweet. In these are found catfish, sea fish, piltonte,
catan and alligators. . . . This place . . . is enticing for
the founding of missions and villages, for both its plains
and its waters encourage settlement [Tous, 1930, pp. 9-
10].
The Actors: Three groups of actors, representing the church, the
state, and the native population, interacted at the San Antonio
site.1 Each attempted to control their environment by achieving
1 A military and civilian population also impacted the Texas provincial envi-
ronment. Mission activities were supported by the actual and symbolized power
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sometimes-conflicting goals.
Missionaries were the first group. As followers of St. Francis
of Assisi, the missionaries combined an active apostolate, espe-
cially the poor and needy, with a life of celibacy, obedience,
personal poverty, and prayer [Habig, 1968a, p. 23]. Two apos-
tolic colleges located on the northern boundary of the populated
area of Mexico — the Colegio Apostolico de Santa Cruz de
Queretaro, founded in 1683, and the Colegio de Nuestra Senora
de Guadalupe de Zacatecas, founded in 1707 — trained resident
friars, previously ordained as priests, for frontier service [Fisher,
1998, p. 3]. This training included “lectures on Indian languages,
moral theology, mission administration, [and] conferences on
‘the art of converting, catechizing, and instructing’ the natives”
[Almaraz, 1979, p. 54]. The apostolic colleges of New Spain
functioned under the supervision of the commissary general of
the Indies [Leutenegger, 1973, pp. 3-4].
Fray Juan Agustin Morfi [1783, p. 209] notes that the mis-
sionaries in the Texas Province espoused one goal: “to lead [the
Indians] to embrace Christianity, wherein they would find true
happiness. For this purpose it was that [the Indians] were en-
treated to abandon their wild and anti-social lives, and to desire
to live in society in the future, congregated, like the Spaniards in
residing in the presidio. Military personnel protected missions, helped mission-
aries construct buildings and clear fields, instructed Indians on manual labor,
protected supply convoys and travelers between the Rio Grande area and East
Texas settlements, guarded settlements, and subdued recalcitrant Indians [De
Leon, 1979, p. 24; de la Teja, 1988, pp. 33-34].
Soldiers, who enlisted for ten years, typically took their families to new
posts or married into a family in the civilian settlement, acquired land and
livestock, and settled permanently in the area at the end of their tour of duty [de
la Teja, 1991, pp. 30-31]. The Alarcon expedition, that founded the Presidio San
Antonio de Bexar on May 5, 1718, included 34 soldiers, seven of whom brought
their families [de la Teja, 1991, p. 31]. Virtually all of these military recruits were
“mulattoes [offspring of Spanish-Black unions], lobos [Indian-Black unions],
mestizos [Spanish-Indian unions], and coyotes [Indian-Mestizo unions]” [de la
Teja, 1991, p. 33].
The villa of San Fernando was founded in 1731, when a group of 56 Canary
Islanders arrived to take possession of land promised them by the Crown
[Tinkle, 1965, p. 10]. In addition to the Canary Islanders, a racially mixed group
of craftsmen, merchants, and other pioneers from the interior provinces of
Coahila, Saltillo, and Nuevo Leon, seeking a better life, settled Bexar [de la Teja,
1991, pp. 29-30]. Fray Juan Agustin Morfi [1783, p. 79] wrote of town conditions
in 1779, “On the west bank of the San Antonio river is situated . . . a town so
miserable that it resembles a most wretched village.” The environment was
harsh: many couples lost half or more of the children born to them [de la Teja,
1988, p. 108].
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a town”. To accomplish this goal the missionaries assembled the
Indians in settlements called reducciones. Here, the Indians
could be converted to the Catholic faith, weaned from social
practices deemed incompatible with Christian morality, and in-
structed in artisan crafts, agriculture and self-government [de la
Teja, 1988, pp. 17-18]. Almarez [1979, p. 55] notes that the typi-
cal Spanish mission included a church and a complex of ancil-
lary structures enclosed by a fortified wall. Each mission also
owned a large farm outside the compound and, at some dis-
tance, a cattle ranch. The mission complex became the source of
institutionalized activity, as well as the spiritual center for the
natives it served.
Agents of the state were the second group of actors. The
missions, along with the nearby presidio and villa, could not
have survived on the frontier without the financial support of
the Crown. Following an “aggressive-defensive” policy, Spain
initially established the mission-presidio complex as a barrier to
protect the Imperial mining interests in New Spain from the
threat of French encroachment [Myres, 1969, p. 10] and later as
a deterrent to the Apaches, “enemies of every living being”
[Morfi, 1783, p. 243]. The plan initially adopted by the Crown
called for the settlement of Indians in missions with a limited
military presence and at minimal cost to the Crown [de la Teja,
1988, p. 46].
The Viceroyalty of New Spain provided resources in three
ways. First, the Crown bore the initial expense of furnishing the
church, providing agricultural and other domestic tools, and
sending European livestock, such as Ganado mayor (cattle,
horses, oxen) and Ganado menor (sheep, goats, swine) into the
areas to be colonized [Habig, 1968a, p. 18; Thonhoff, 1998, p.
64]. The Crown also granted land, held in trust by the Church, to
all Indians who pledged their allegiance to Spain [Torres, 1993,
p. 4] and outright to Spanish colonists who agreed to settle near
the presidio [de la Teja, 1988, p. 93]. Finally, the Crown offered
ongoing support to the mission-presidio colonial system by pro-
viding an annual allotment of 450 pesos to each missionary
[Almarez, 1979, p. 64] and 300 pesos to each soldier [Almarez,
1979, p. 68] serving on the frontier.2
The Indians were the third group of actors. Mission Indians
2 The individual missionaries did not receive the annual allowance of 450
pesos. It was given to the Apostolic Syndic of the College, who paid the bills for
supplies sent to the missions.
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came from 150 culturally diverse tribes who lived in small fam-
ily gatherings, each speaking a unique dialect. Known collec-
tively as Coahuiltecans, the indigenous peoples were hunter/
gatherers, who moved with the seasons as food availability dic-
tated [Torres, 1993, pp. 10-11]. Fray Massanet noted in a letter
to the viceroy on July 15, 1690, that the Indians “live in a barba-
rous way on the land, for they have no fixed abode. They neither
sow nor have any seeds. Their food is the fruits of the earth and
herd of buffalo” [Morkovsky, 1979, p. 121].
Gibson [2000, p. 293] notes that such hunter/gather societ-
ies were heavily dependent on mobility for survival. Thus, land
ownership, physical shelters, and personal possessions were
minimal, as whole communities needed to carry everything they
owned as they moved from one location to another. These com-
munities were unfamiliar with the Western preoccupation with
wealth accumulation: they viewed themselves as custodians, not
owners of the land [Gibson, 2000, pp. 290-294].
The Coahuiltecans did not possess a moral stricture that
included regular worship of a god as a community exercise.
Collective celebrations of both joy and sorrow, called mitotes,
did occur periodically. Fray Jose de Solis offered the following
description in 1767:
For their mitotes [the Indians] build a great fire and
dance about it, day and night, without stop. These
mitotes last three days and three nights. . . . They have
several saints in whose honor they held these mitotes:
one is the god Pichini; another the saint Mel. Of these
they ask, through their superstitious dances, victory
over their enemies, success in their campaigns, abun-
dant crops, or good luck in hunting deer, bison, and
bear [Forrestal, 1931, pp. 12, 21].
Chew and Greer [1997, p. 285] suggest that Aboriginal com-
munities were bound together by complex kinship systems that
denoted specific rights and duties, and thus, offered guidance to
individuals on how to behave. Unlike Western societies, Aborigi-
nal peoples did not develop market, legal, and political struc-
tures to co-ordinate social interactions [Chew and Greer, 1997,
pp. 285-286]. The Coahuiltecans, like Aboriginal communities
elsewhere, considered formal controls unnecessary.
The Founding of the Missions: Habig [1968a, p. 29] suggests that
Queretaran missionary Fray Antonio de San Buenaventura y
Olivares is the “true father of the idea of founding of a mission
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and the establishment of the nucleus for a civil government on
the San Antonio River”. Fray Olivares began a campaign to
build a mission on the San Antonio River after being introduced
to the area on a 1709 expedition. In November, 1716 he pro-
posed to the new viceroy, the Marques de Valero, Don Baltazar
de Zuniga, that the movable assets from the largely unsuccessful
mission San Francisco Solano be transferred from the banks of
the Rio Grande north to San Pedro Springs. The viceroy agreed
and appointed Don Martin de Alarcon as governor of Texas and
head of an expedition to take settlers, missionaries, soldiers, and
livestock to establish a presidio and mission on the San Antonio
River [Habig, 1968a, pp. 33-37]. Over a year later, on May 1,
1718, Fray Olivares broke ground for Mission San Antonio de
Valero [Noonan Guerra, 1987, p. 11]. Fray Pedro Perez de
Mezquia described the site in his diary on May 6, 1718, “The
mission of the reverend father is near the first spring, half a
league from a high ground and adjoining a small thicket of live
oaks, where at present he is building a hut” [Hoffmann, 1931, p.
318].3 Morkovsky [1979, p. 127] notes that within eight months
the mission had gathered Indians from the Payaya and Pamaya
tribes.
Fray Antonio Margil de Jesus of the College of Zacatecas
founded the second San Antonio mission. He had become enam-
ored with the area after retreating to San Antonio from an East
Texas mission in 1719 when France declared war on Spain and
invaded East Texas [Morkovsky, 1979, pp. 129-131]. On Decem-
ber 26, 1719, Fray Margel de Jesus wrote a letter to the gover-
nor, Joseph de Azlor Virto de Vera, the Marques de San Miguel
de Aguayo, asking permission to establish a Zacatecas mission:
There is already a tribe of numerous Indians, called
panpoas, who have always been feared by the other
Indians in this area. . . . Having seen the harvest corn at
Mission San Antonio, they too would like to sow much
corn. . . . We already have church furnishings and a
statue of Senor San Joseph [which was given to us] on
condition that it would be used for a mission having the
title of St. Joseph. . . . But, as you well know, in order to
plow and sow we need some yokes of oxen and some
corn. From the missions among the Tejas we took only
the church goods and the necessary food supply. . . . We
3 A league is a measure of distance where one league equals approximately
2.4 miles [Habig, 1968b, p. 28].
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venture to beg you to come to our aid by supplying
some oxen which have been used for work in the field
by the soldiers in the local presidio and villa, with two
or three yokes and some fanegas of corn. With these a
beginning can be made to get the land ready for the
present [Leutenegger, 1979, pp. 110-114].4
The Marques agreed and commissioned Captain Juan
Valdez of the Presidio of San Antonio to locate a suitable site.
On February 23, 1720, overcoming the objections of Fray
Olivares that a second mission was unnecessary, Valdez went
south from Mission San Antonio, measured three leagues along
the river bank (in compliance with the Law of the Indies), and
selected a site on “an elevated, spacious, and very level plain”
[Habig, 1968a, p. 85]. The Mission San Jose y San Miguel de
Aguayo was officially founded on March 13, 1720, and land and
water rights were given to the Pampopa, Suliejame, and Pastia
tribes.5
The final three San Antonio missions, Mission Nuestra Se-
nora de la Purisima Concepcion de Acuna, Mission San Juan
Capistrano, and Mission San Francisco de la Espada, opened on
the banks of the San Antonio River on March 5, 1731. The mis-
sionaries moved members of the Pacao, the Pajalat, and the
Pitalac nations, along with any portable chapel furnishings and
herds of livestock, 150 leagues from their former East Texas
home to San Antonio [Morkovsky, 1979, p. 138; Fisher, 1998,
pp. 39, 77-78, 87]. The relocation of these missions marked the
end of a 40-year period in which missionaries from the College
of Queretaro unsuccessfully attempted to colonize the Tejas In-
dians in East Texas [Winfrey, 1965, p. 104]. Table 1 lists some of
the Indian tribes associated with each mission.
Mission Expansion and Decline: The San Antonio missions flour-
ished for several decades, reaching a peak population of 1,173 in
1762 before contracting to 269 at the time of secularization in
4 A fanega is a dry measure equal to 1.575 bushels [Barnes, Naylor and
Polzer, 1981, p. 69].
5 The Reverend Padre Fray Jose de Solis on April 6, 1767, spoke of Mission
San Jose as follows: “This mission is so pretty and in such a flourishing condi-
tion both materially and spiritually, that I cannot find words or figures with
which to express its beauty” [Forrestal, 1931, p. 373]. Fray Morfi [1783, p. 95]
agreed, reporting of his 1779 visit, “It is, in truth, the first mission in America,
not in point of time, but in point of beauty, plan, and strength, so that there is
not a presidio along the entire frontier line that can compare with it.”
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TABLE 1
San Antonio Missions and the Indian Tribes
Served by Each Mission
San Antonio de Valero:
Coco Sama
Hierbipiame Scipxame
Jarame Tamique
Karankawa Tecame
Kiowa Tops
Pamaya Tov
Pampoa Xaraname
Patagua Yprande (Apache)
Pamaya Yute
Payata Zana
San Jose y San Miguel de Aguayo:
Aguesalla Pastia
Canama Postito
Cana Suliajame
Gentile Barrados Tacame
Mesquite Xaunaes
Pampopa Xaraname
San Nuestra Senora de la Purisima Concepcion:
Alobja Pitalac
Borrado Sanipao
Manos de Perro Sciquipile
Pacao Tacame
Pajalate Toareque
Paxalote
San Juan Capistrano:
Marahuiayo Piguique
Orejone Pitalaque
Pacao Sayopine
Pajalat Theloja
Pamaque Tolujac
Pasnaca Venado
San Francisco de la Espada:
Alasapa Pacao
Archahomo Pampopa
Barrado Pauache
Chayopine Pausane
Maraquita Tacame
Mescale Titijaya
Sources: Morfi [1783], Tinkle [1965], Winfrey [1965], Habig [1968a], Casso
[1979], Morkovsky [1979], and Fisher [1998].
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1794. Table 2 contrasts the population of the missions with that
of the presidio/villa during the 18th century.
6 Fray Mariano de los Dolores y Viana recounts an occasion when the mis-
sion Indians assisted the villa and the presidio in repelling a large Apache force.
“On June 30 of this year [1745], a large number of Apaches came at dawn and
entered this Presidio of San Antonio and the Villa of San Fernando; the Span-
iards of the presidio and villa were taken by surprise, as this had never happened
before. Being quickly informed, with speed and force the Indians of this pueblo
[Mission of San Antonio] rushed in with arms and horses to resist the Apache
enemy. . . . The enemy was put to flight; some were killed and others wounded
[Leutenegger, 1985, pp. 46-48].
TABLE 2
Population of San Antonio River Area
1710s-1790s
Approximate  Population of  Population of Approximate
Dates Missions Presidio(Fort)/  Totals
Villa(Village)
1710s 50 50
1720s 573 200 770
1740s 1,105 437-560 1,600
1760s 1,173 514-661 1,760
1770s 773 1,351 2,120
1780s 554 1,463 2,020
1790s 269 1,600 1,870
Sources: Habig [1968a], Morkovsky [1979], De la Teja [1988] and Torres [1993].
Several factors contributed to the decline of the missions.
Death and desertion in the face of frequent epidemics of small
pox, measles, and cholera and attacks by marauding Apache and
Comanche bands periodically depleted the mission population
[Habig, 1968a, pp. 91, 138; Diekemper, 1979, p. 43; Fisher, 1998,
11].6 The inability of the missionaries to develop an appropriate
religious motivation led some Indians to disappear in good
times as well [Castaneda, 1936, p. 373]. Winfrey [1965, p. 112]
and Torres [1993, p. 24] suggest that the natives found it par-
ticularly difficult to resist the temptations of their nomadic life
in the spring when traditional mitotes were held. To a certain
extent, the missionaries relied on the resident soldiers to inspire
loyalty to the mission life among the Indians. According to the
Guidelines for a Texas Mission, it was considered part of the
missionary’s task to “from time to time . . . journey to the coast
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and bring back the fugitives, who regularly leave the mission”
[Anonymous, 1760, paragraph 80].7
In 1778, a government ruling hastened the demise of the
missions. Teodoro de Croix, Commandant General of the Inte-
rior Provinces, issued a decree declaring all unbranded stock
(mestenos) to be the property of the Crown. He imposed a fee of
four reales per head on anyone who took or slaughtered any
such cattle [Habig, 1968a, p. 63; Myres, 1969, p. 37]. Most of the
mission cattle were unbranded; thus, the decree deprived “the
missions of a major source of income” [Myers, 1969, p. 13].8
Fray Jose Franco Lopez wrote in 1785:
Commander General in 1778. . . . declared that all wild
or unbranded cattle within his jurisdiction belonged to
the royal treasury . . . Thus he opened the door to nu-
merous irregularities. . . . It is not easy to ascertain who
has eaten or killed off the most. It may be the Apache
Indians who, on a moderate estimate, account for at
least 20 head a day. It may be the Spanish hunters, who
on each expedition kill more than a hundred head. . . .
In the third place it may be the purveyors for the
presidio, who, from month to month, do not fail to
bring to the presidio more than a 150 beeves. Fourth, it
may the soldiers in charge of the horses, who are not
satisfied with 2 beeves a day for 20 men, but on occa-
sion kill 4. . . . Fifth, it may be the troupes of the
presidio. . . . Lastly, it may be those who have taken
away whole herds during the last eight years, totaling
more than 15,000 head, most of them cows. . . . The
herds of cattle constitute[d] the principal wealth. All the
missions had considerable property of this kind. With
these herds they maintained themselves without endur-
ing many hardships or privations. . . . [But now] these
unfortunate missions have been reduced to such penury
and want that even in order for them to eat what is
unquestionably theirs, that is, the cattle born of their
7 The entire population of Indians residing at Mission San Francisco de
Espada returned to the woods to live on June 7, 1736. Father Ysasmendi re-
quested a military escort to retrieve the natives [Winfrey, 1965, p. 118].
8 The missions were already facing pressure from other sources. In January,
1778, the Adaesanos, who had been forced to leave their homes in East Texas in
1773 as a result of the Rubi Expedition regulations, petitioned the Crown to get
assistance to obtain land in the San Antonio area. On June 8, 1779, Don Teodoro
de Croix issued a decree calling for the secularization of Mission San Antonio
and the distribution of the land to the Adaesanos [Poyo, 1991b, p. 100]. The
order was not carried out for 15 years.
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own branded herds and in their pastures or ranches . . .
it is necessary for them to pay like any stranger the
stipulated fee of four reales per head [Dabbs, 1940, pp.
12-14, 17-19].9
Torres [1993, p. 30] argues that the success of the villa made
the missions obsolete. Certainly, the population statistics pre-
sented in Table 2 indicate that an increase in the military/villa
population (of 939 between 1762 and 1793) occurred com-
comitant with the observed decline in the number of Indian
mission residents (904). Poyo [1991a, p. 46] suggests that inter-
marriage, where the offspring were able to subsequently self-
classify themselves as Spaniards, played a central role in the
Indian integrative process.10
The missions ceased to exist in 1794.11 Fray Lopez offered
the following description of the mission Indians two years prior
to secularization:
[T]hey are not now, nor can they be called neophytes,
or even Indians, since most of them, being children of
marriages between Indians and white women, are mu-
lattoes. . . . It can be inferred that this mission cannot
be called a mission of Indians but a gathering of white
people. The few pure Indians who remain are, in trad-
ing and communication, as intelligent as the others. . . .
In the sixty or more leagues surrounding these missions
of Bejar there is no nation of pagan Indians which can
be converted. . . . Although they have not given up en-
tirely the traits that are proper to and inseparable from
their natural low way of living and their fickleness, they
9 After the Crown took ownership of the unbranded cattle, ranchers were
allowed four months in which to round up and brand their unmarked cattle
[Myres, 1969, p. 37]. Villa ranchers took advantage of this opportunity to round
up and brand 7,000 head of cattle [Ranching in Spanish Texas, 2002, p. 2]. Due
to inadequate resources, the missions did not participate. Subsequent to the
roundup, ranchers paid the 4 reales tax on unbranded wild stock that were
collected and exported the cattle to Rio Grande and Louisiana settlements where
they were sold at 4-41⁄2 pesos a head [de la Tejas, 1988, p. 259]. From 1779-1786,
more than 18,000 head of cattle, many of which were unbranded, were disposed
of in this fashion [de la Tejas, 1988, p. 269].
10 The most prevalent San Antonio working class resident ultimately became
an amalgam of Spanish, Negro, and Indian blood [De Leon, 1979, p. 25].
11 Fray Mariano Antonio de Vasconcelos described the ensuing seculariza-
tion process in his journal: “August 6, 1794 - During the month of July the goods
of the missions on the San Antonio River were given over to Governor Don
Manuel Munoz, who divided among the Indians the plots of land, leaving eight
of them and all the grain and cattle for the community” [Leutenegger, 1977b, p.
36].
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nevertheless are seen to be more civilized and cultured
than many other Indians and pueblos in lands beyond.
Finally, the experience of so many years has taught us
that the best fruit we can promise ourselves for the
future of these Indians will be only to preserve in them
the faith and Christianity they have received . . . by the
help and preaching of their pastors [Leutenegger, 1974,
pp. 490-491].
The remainder of the paper examines how the complex of
mission accounting practices may have contributed to the dis-
possession of Coahuiltecan culture.
MISSION ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PRACTICES
Religious and Secular Governing Body Goals: From the outset,
the Spanish mission enterprise was defined by overlapping secu-
lar and religious goals. The Church’s role in Spain’s territorial
acquisition and accumulation of wealth plans was augmented in
1508, when Pope Julius II conceded royal patronage to the
Spanish monarchs, giving them the right to administer the
Church in the Indies [Matovina and Poyo, 2000, pp. 2-3]. Both
the religious and the secular sectors embraced the gathering of
natives in enclosed compounds — the Church for religious and
the Crown for defensive purposes.
Diekemper [1979, p. 35] notes that the espoused goal of the
Franciscan Order was “to preach the good news of salvation to
every creature”. The missionaries were given very clear direc-
tives as they set out into the frontier. In addition to spreading
the Christian gospel, the missionaries were directed “to cover
[the Indians’] nakedness, to cultivate their lands, and to raise
cattle for their sustenance” [Casso, 1979, p. 88]. These goals, in
combination, necessitated the construction of missions.
The creation and subsequent maintenance of missions also
achieved Spanish imperialistic policy. Missions were deemed by
the Crown to be “outposts for the defense of the rims of the
empire” [Diekemper, 1979, p. 47]. As such, the missions “visibly
demonstrated the commitment of missionaries and soldiers to
the colonial policy of controlling the region and its native inhab-
itants by force of arms or by peaceful conversion to the Spanish
brand of Christianity” [Almaraz, 1979, p. 49].
Poor communications and isolation proved to be a persis-
tent problem for the missions throughout their existence. In
1788, Fray Oliva observed that it took 41⁄2 months to make the
round trip with pack mules from Zacatecas to San Antonio
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[Leutenegger, 1977a, p. 8]. Fray Mariano Antonio de Vas-
concelos indicated that the 1790 supplies took more than five
months (November 16 to May 3) to deliver [Leutenegger, 1977b,
p. 28]. Indeed, in describing his visitation to the Texas missions
during 1767-1768, Fray Solis indicated that it took 19 days to
travel from the College of Guadalupe to Saltillo, seven days to
reach Boca de Leones where he remained for 55 days “because
of bad weather”, nine days to reach the Rio Grande River, 14
days to reach the Bahia area, and then four days, “with an escort
of eight soldiers, sent by the captain, and six Indians armed with
guns,” to finally reach the San Antonio missions [Forrestal,
1931, pp. 357-372].
Distances created a need for formal accounting techniques
(both numerical and verbal) between the missionaries in the
field and their secular and religious superiors. To alleviate the
communications problem, the missionaries created or were pro-
vided with three forms of accounting records: annual account
books recording supply activities, sporadic inventories of the
accumulated wealth, and detailed instructions on various as-
pects of production performance. These records are now exam-
ined.
The Account Book: The missionaries used the monies provided
by the Crown to procure supplies in Mexico and have them
conveyed to Texas. The missions utilized a single entry “cargo y
discargo” account book that provided a monetary record of mis-
sion supply activities.12 Donoso Anes [1994, p. 115] argues that
such records are useful to control the specific activity being
carried out (supplies procurement in this instance).13 The con-
tents of this document, which was prepared annually, denoted
the source of funds used to pay for the supplies, and detailed the
quantities and prices of the items purchased in Mexico and
shipped to the San Antonio missions.
Extant records suggest that isolation prohibited effective
communications between the missionaries and their religious
and secular superiors. Ideally, both Crown and College officials
12 Mills [1987, pp. 100, 105] notes that such written account books, which
could serve as evidence in disputes between parties, commanded wide respect in
the early-modern Castilian legal system.
13 Donoso Anes [2002, pp. 444-445] notes that similar account books were
maintained by the South Sea Company to report on slave trade activities carried
out on behalf of the Spanish Crown during the 1713-1722 period. The general
account of one ship conformed to the legal format. Expenses were summarized
on the debit side and turnover was recorded on the credit side.
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should have conveyed their current objectives to the frontier
missionaries, and the missionaries, in turn, should have indi-
cated how they planned to attain those objectives and what re-
sources would be required to achieve them. Such communica-
tion between upper and lower levels of the mission system did
not exist. The missionaries were largely on their own in estab-
lishing temporal needs for the following year and in initiating
accommodations for shortages or deprivation when delivered
supplies proved inadequate or inappropriate. On June 12, 1745,
Fray Mariano de los Dolores Y Viana offered the following la-
ment regarding the 900 pesos given by the Crown to the Apos-
tolic Syndic of the College for his mission: “It is not possible
[that] . . . the missionaries can be maintained, the divine Lord be
adorned, pueblos be provided with implements which wear out
or are lost, and annually so many Indians are clothed and sup-
plied with tobacco, sugar cones, salt, knives, gun powder, bul-
lets, bowls, iron griddles, metates, pots, and other things needed
for a Christian, civilized life” [Leutenegger, 1985, p. 39].
Mills [1986, pp. 70-72] notes that an account book creates
financial transactions that are subject to audit. Though 16th
century Spanish texts recommended that an administrator
should exhibit his book of receipts and expenditures for annual
audits [Mills, 1986, p. 71], precise adherence to this suggestion
by the Missionary College of Zacatecas was not evident until the
missions had suffered significant enrollment declines.
The council board examined three years of accounts (1786-
1788) for the Texas missions on January 16, 1789.14 They con-
cluded that the account books “were found to be not in proper
form because of errors found in the liquidation of the accounts,
in adjusting prices, and in the application of the allowances.”
Accordingly, the council board ruled “that the brother conduc-
tor should settle matters and present Fray Guardian and the
venerable council board in the future, [a document that con-
14 Council reviews of the account book may have been initiated in response
to a change in the procedures used to purchase supplies. On March 24, 1779, the
council board ruled, “It was decided that it would always be better not to have
the management of funds on the books of the college. . . . [T]he prelates should
not interfere with the allowance which His Catholic Piety [the king of Spain]
assigns to the missionaries, for this should be at their own disposal to meet their
own needs; in this way the best compliance with these regulations would be
attained. Hereafter, the help given should pass through the hands of that person
whom the missionaries elect. For though it is certain that the college has never
been concerned about these allowances, still, in this way every unfounded suspi-
cion will be avoided” [Leutenegger, 1973].
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tains] at the head of the memorandum of each mission the al-
lowance of the missionary and stating the highest and lowest
prices of the times” [Leutenegger, 1973, p. 56].
The council acknowledged the need to also examine field
accounts on April 15, 1789: “Since it is the custom to give ac-
count of expenditures and receipts, it was decided that each year
the missionaries must give a report to the president [of Texas]
on the goods each mission has, their increase or decrease, a list
of the distribution made by the syndic, and the expenses and
receipts. Everything should be made known to Fray President
who will send a report to the council board so that it may know
what has been pledged in matters that are evident, plain, honest,
and necessary” [Leutenegger, 1973, p. 59]. Wealth accumulation
and the efficient use of scarce resources had thus become an
issue.
Table 3 contains a summary of the last supplies transported
to the San Antonio missions prior to the onset of the seculariza-
tion process in 1793 [Libro en que constan las Memorias
(Memorias), September, 1792].
TABLE 3
Mission Supplies Shipment
September, 1792
Description15  Pesos  Percentage
Tobacco (11 tercios; 11 dozen plugs) 780.1 17.6
Chocolate (24 arrobas fine; 20+ arrobas ordinary) 363.2 8.2
Clothing (15 habits/vestments; 14 shoes/sandals;
26 petticoats; 9 dozen women’s shoes;
51 blankets; 28 shaw/muffler/wraps;
11 dozen shaw/muffler/wraps;
14 undergarments; 1 dozen silk stockings;
7 dozen cloth stockings; handkerchiefs) 884.7 20.0
Fabric (118 pzas; 459 varas) 2,009.6 45.4
Sewing notions (ribbons; thread; buttons) 139.4 3.1
Rosaries and jewelry 19.6 0.4
Miscellaneous (paper, rope, grinding stones;
books) 105.0 2.4
Freight 129.0 2.9
Total 4,430.6 100.0
Source: Memorias [1792].
15 Various measurements follow:
An arroba is a Spanish weight for corn and wheat, usually equal to 25.36
pounds [Barnes, Naylor and Polzer, 1981, p. 73]. A plug is a flat, oblong cake of
tobacco [Webster, 1936, p. 763]. A tercio is a unit of weight equal to 162 pounds
[Leutenegger, 1977c].
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An examination of the 1792 mission accounts suggests that the
missions produced most of the food needed for subsistence.
Only tobacco and chocolate, created from agricultural products
that could not be produced locally and representing 25.8% of
the total monetary value, were shipped from Mexico. Aside from
these two luxuries, much of the remaining monies (2,149 pesos,
48.5% of the monetary value of the total shipment) were used to
purchase fabric and sewing notions. The 1792 Memorias offers
evidence that by the end of the 18th century, the Coahuiltecans
utilized many manufactured goods. Thus, they found themselves
in a situation similar to that described by Berndt and Berndt
[1988] regarding the Australian Aborigines. The land no longer
possessed the man: the man possessed the land.
The Inventory: As early as the 16th century, the attest function
was used in Spain to examine the truthfulness of financial
records and ascertain whether distant parties had properly per-
formed assigned duties [Mills, 1986, pp. 71-73].16 Baron [1996,
p. 20] argues that inspections of physical capital were an impor-
tant element of the administrative fabric of New Spain. The
inspector typically “wrote down what was done, what was said,
and what was counted during the inspection” [Baron, 1996, p.
21]. Religious and secular officials utilized this audit mecha-
nism on several occasions to ascertain whether missionaries in
remote areas were complying with their obligations and prom-
ises. Secular authorities typically conducted assessments of the
presidios and religious officials inspected the missions.
Presidio Inspections: Formal reviews of the remote frontier
presidios were ordered by the Crown “to remedy economic
abuses and address other urgent needs” [Jackson, 1995, p. 72].
Long supply lines, coupled with increasingly numerous presidio
installations, created a serious drain on the Crown’s resources
[Jackson, 1995, p. 6]. Thus, periods of peace reduced the enthu-
siasm of the Spanish authorities for funding frontier activities,
and caused them to investigate cost-reduction possibilities. Two
presidio inspections, the 1727-1728 expedition by Brigadier
16 Congruent with the activities in New Spain, the Distribution Book was
utilized in the New Settlements of Sierra Morena and Andalucia, a Spanish
colonial farming project, founded in 1767, as a control mechanism to manage
the population [Alvarez-Dardet Espejo, Sanchez-Matamoros and Fenech, 2002,
p. 420]. Information on each parcel of property, as well as details (age, gender,
and kinship) about the family that occupied it were systematically collected to
enhance the effectiveness of the controls [p. 429].
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General Don Pedro de Rivera and the 1766-1768 expedition by
Cayetano Maria Pignatelli Rubi Corbera y Climent, Marques de
Rubi, were conducted by Crown representatives.
The 3,082 league Rivera inspection of the line of presidios
from Sonora to Texas, resulted in the Reglamento of 1729-1735
[Almarez, 1979, p. 68; Jackson, 1995, p. 12]. Morfi [1783] notes
that Rivera advocated: (1) a reduction of the East Texas garrison
at Los Adaes to 60 soldiers, “The humility with which the Indi-
ans wait upon the Spaniards is an evidence of the peaceful spirit
that animates them”; (2) the abandonment of the presidio of Los
Texas (also in East Texas), “Since the year 1715 when it was
founded, its garrison has not been employed in any action that
may justify the object of its erection;” and (3) a reduction of the
garrison at San Antonio, “[T]here being no other enemies in the
neighborhood other than the Apaches who live in Lomeria
Grande. But this nation is not so numerous as to cause any
uneasiness to the presidio, even if its garrison were smaller”
[Morfi, 1783, pp. 244-254].
After his 1767 inspection, which required 23 months and
covered 2,900 leagues, Rubi called for 15 presidios, each 100
miles apart, stretching from coast to coast along the 30th paral-
lel, with two settlements (Sante Fe and San Antonio) retaining
presidios above this line [Jackson, 1995, pp. 76, 80]. Morfi
[1783, p. 415] notes that Rubi “found the [Texas] presidios in
the most deplorable and unfortunate condition as a result of the
selfish interests of their respective commanders”. As a result of
his recommendations, the garrison at San Antonio was in-
creased to 80 men, the post at Los Adaes was abolished, and the
capital of Texas, along with all the residents of Los Adaes, was
moved to the villa of San Antonio [Morfi, 1783, pp. 419-421].
The Crown inspections, though 40 years apart, both focused
on economic rationalities that stipulated dominance and control
as the basis for Imperial power. Both looked for ways to im-
prove the efficiency and effectiveness of the extant presidios,
given the current environment. The ensuing reports, though
non-monetary in nature, projected substantial reductions in
monies needed to maintain a military presence. Rivera esti-
mated that his suggestions would reduce the annual cost of
maintaining the Texas presidios from 445,000 pesos (1729) to
284,000 pesos [Jackson, 1995, pp. 12-13]. Rubi estimated that
his changes would result in an 80,000 pesos-reduction in the
453,000 pesos budget for the 24 presidios extant in 1767 [Jack-
son, 1995, p. 80].
The reordering of the frontier defenses that followed the
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two inspections caused significant hardship within the Texas
mission system. The reduction of the military presence, a conse-
quence of the first inspection, led to a deterioration in the re-
spect shown to the East Texas missionaries by the Indians “so
that though we still call ourselves its masters we do not exercise
dominion over a foot [of land] beyond San Antonio” [Morfi,
1783, p. 273]. The three East Texas missions retreated to San
Antonio two years later (in 1731). The sudden influx of Spanish
settlers into San Antonio precipitated by the second inspection
probably hastened the decline and subsequent demise of the
native culture.
Mission Inventories: Inventories, both internally compiled by the
resident missionaries and externally generated by visiting cler-
ics, were used by the Franciscan colleges to measure the results
of mission activities and to maintain a certain measure of con-
trol over the missionaries in the field.17 However, time lapses
between the issuance and successful completion of an order
could be lengthy. For example, almost nine years elapsed be-
tween the issuance of a Royal Order at El Pardo for an inspec-
tion of the San Antonio missions on January 31, 1781, the deliv-
ery of the order by the Most Excellent Viceroy Count of Galvez
to the Bishop of the New Kingdom of Leon on August 4, 1785,
the completion of the report in the Mission of San Antonio de
Valero on May 5, 1789 by Fray Jose Franco Lopez, and the
receipt of the document in the city of Monterrey on November
28, 1789 by Don Jose Sanchez de Luque [Dabbs, 1940, pp. 439,
458].
Appendix 1 contains a summary of the inventories that were
sent to both governmental and religious authorities at approxi-
mately 10-year intervals. Considerable detail was provided in
each inventory of the physical structures of the missions. How-
ever, estimates were commonly used in quantifying livestock.
Only a single inspector, Fray Jose Francisco Lopez, provided a
17 Inventories were not forthcoming in the early mission period, however.
Diekemper [1979, p. 33] reports that in 1749, the Fray Commissary General of
New Spain, Juan Antonio Abasolo, sent a harsh letter to the Fray Guardian of
the Zacatecas College, stating that the Franciscan Commissary General in
Madrid “was greatly embarrassed when the lack of a recent report from the
college made it impossible for him to refute defamatory charges” that had been
leveled against the Zacatecas mission system the preceding year. He “ordered
that a detailed report of the college’s activities be sent to him.” Hereafter, inven-
tories were sent at approximately ten-year intervals.
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monetary estimate of the structural mission assets in his report
signed May 5, 1789.
Winfrey [1965, p. 107] notes that purely religious tasks oc-
cupied only a small part of the missionary’s time. Missionaries
expended significant effort converting the Indians to a different
mode of life by educating them in European methods of agricul-
ture, ranching, and crafts. Inventories thus expressed the degree
to which the missionaries were meeting the Indians’ spiritual
and temporal needs. The inventories detailed both spiritual as-
sets (number of natives baptized) and secular assets (physical
structures, agricultural products, and livestock accumulated).
Franciscan theology did not require the actual conversion of
the natives encountered. Indeed, Fray Ignacio Antonio Ciprian
admonished in his 1749 Memorial, “We must be conscious of
the fact that the Holy Gospel does not command us to convert
but only to preach. And according to the Apostle, the work of
conversion is not the work of the one who plants nor of him
who waters, but only of God, who gives the increase”
[Diekemper, 1979, pp. 40-41]. Yet the religious focus in the in-
ventories was not on intangible factors, such as the quality of
religious instruction provided or the receptiveness of the Indian
population to such instruction, but on tangible factors, such as
conversions (a total of 3,174 Indians were baptized by the mid-
1740s).
All other indicators on the inventory were not only tangible,
but secular in nature. These indicators of material wealth (5,300
bushels of corn stored in the granaries and 5,400 cattle grazing
on ranchlands in 1762) reflect the importance placed by West-
ern societies on economic wealth accumulation and the con-
comitant disregard for the essential elements of the native cul-
ture.
Detailed Instructions: The missionaries possessed detailed in-
structions regarding the rationing of scarce supplies, the usage
of raw materials in the weaving of cloth, the rewarding of appro-
priate behavior, and the ordering of time and space. These sets
of guidelines (though non-monetary in nature) performed the
same function as a modern-day budget system. The instructions
offered guidance to both the missionaries and natives on how to
behave more efficiently and effectively in Western terms.
Rationing Supplies: The Western concept of deferred consump-
tion (assets) was central to the missionary rationing system.
Missionaries adhered to strict standards outlined in the Guide-
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lines for a Texas Mission [Anonymous, 1760] regarding the dis-
tribution of supplies received periodically from the Mexican in-
terior:
When the supplies arrive, at a time when the mission-
ary thinks fitting, he begins to distribute the goods ac-
cording to his list. . . . [For the women and children] he
designates a basket (chacual). In each he puts three or
four strings of beads, . . . a necklace, if there are any,
11⁄2 or 13⁄4 varas of ribbon, 21⁄2 varas or 23⁄4 varas of
straps, a rosary, and a small brush, if there are any.
Also he has ready white underskirts or camisole . . . and
now he should have the camisoles cut from Puebla
cloth for those who use that (knowing that for each
camisole 21⁄4 varas of broad cloth are needed for the
body and 11⁄3 of narrow cloth for the sleeves). He puts
the petticoats together with the camisoles. . . . Also he
has ready two pieces of flannel from which to cut the
skirts. When all this is arranged, he calls the women
and measures their skirts. . . . When the measurements
are over, one by one the older women receive their flan-
nel, petticoats, or camisoles and other material (with
each camisole are placed 6 or 8 skeins of thread) and
the basket with all its contents [Anonymous, 1760,
paragraph 38].18
Specific instructions regarding the beef furnished weekly to
the Indians were also provided in the Guidelines:
Every week the missionary must see to it that the sup-
ply of beef cattle are brought to be rationed for the
sustenance of the Indians. To do this he must advise the
foreman to bring the horses that are needed in due
time, so that he with the cowboys, four or six in num-
ber, may go on Thursday and be back with the cattle on
Saturday. . . . The cattle are . . . slaughtered on Sunday
morning, as needed, to supply all the Indians. . . . The
fiscal has the duty to bring in the meat and to cook it so
that it will not spoil in the summer time. The tallow and
fat from all the slaughtered cattle are to be collected,
fried, and put away in a proper place [Anonymous,
1760, paragraph 23].
The rationing of other consumable assets (tobacco [paragraph
25], corn [paragraph 26], salt [paragraph 28], chocolate [para-
18 A vara is a measure of length, generally accepted as 32.909 inches [Barnes,
Naylor and Polzer, 1981, p. 68].
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graph 31], and melons [paragraph 32]) were also described in
detail. The missionaries were warned, however, that “the Indian
women frequently ask for things, importuning the missionary
for sweets, lard, beans, chili, and a thousand other things. If the
missionary is so lenient as to give them what they ask for, he
will have nothing left in the treasury” [Anonymous, 1760, para-
graph 29].
The activities of storing grain, raising domestic animals for
consumption, and rationing supplies were all alien to a hunter/
gatherer society. The missionaries made these Western notions
of wealth central in their interactions with the native popula-
tion.
Usage of Raw Materials: Not only the accumulation of wealth,
but the efficient use of raw materials to produce economically
valued goods was advocated at the missions. The missionaries
imposed a crude process budgeting system to plan and control
the Indians’ production of weaved goods. Specifically, the inputs
to be used in each unit produced were quantified and the actual
usage was compared to the standards to reveal variances. When
variances in production were noted, their source, such as poor
quality weaving, was identified and potentially corrected. Evi-
dence from the Guidelines [1760] shows that the missionaries
set standards for the quantity of wool to be spun each day, and
then compared actual output to the expected output of each
woman:
When there is a quantity of washed and dried wool, the
missionary has four or six carders to come to the work-
shop. . . . When a certain amount is carded, the overseer
each day will give the children the task of making
thread for material. To the women he gives uncombed
wool to be spun on the spinning wheel. They are
obliged to turn in their skeins every day to the overseer
who is to weigh them to find out if they are doing it
right or have wasted some [Anonymous, 1760, para-
graph 72].
Each Indian was given a specific quantified target and then
measured against that target at the end of the day:
The available children are employed in the workshop,
some picking out the seeds from the cotton, and others
making thread on the spinning wheels, and the overseer
doing the carding. Daily he distributes to each child
three ounces of carded cotton. In the evening they must
turn in their skeins to the missionary, which he sets
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aside until needed. The work given to the women for
spinning is generally one ounce and a half or two
ounces with the seed. Every day in the morning they
hand in their skein of an ounce [Anonymous, 1760,
paragraph 75].
In this manner, the missionaries could check for variances in
output, adjust the quality of the wool produced, and minimize
any waste or malfeasance:
The overseer should deposit the skeins of wool brought
daily by the women to the missionary’s cell and then
kept in the workshop. Only the estimated amount
needed to prepare the spindles for the loom is taken out
each time. The overseer is not to keep the skeins in his
possession because he may yield to some stratagem
with the spinners [Anonymous, 1760, paragraph 74].
The missionaries also established standards for the amount of
material needed for each article sewn. This allowed the mission-
aries to control the quality of the items produced by ensuring
that each item was essentially identical:
Twenty ounces of thread are allowed per mantle and
are wound on the cylinders. After the twelve cylinders,
used on their warping frame have been weighed, one by
one, they are fed into it by means of their correspond-
ing skeins. The boy working with this winds the thread
until all the cylinders are ready. . . . Once the thread has
been wound and the weaving is to begin, the missionary
employs a boy to prepare the spindles with the spool of
woof thread. He continues to do this until the cloth is
finished. . . . A piece of mantle thus woven, i.e. with
twenty ounces in every cylinder, which in all equals
fifteen pounds, with five pegs and ten varas of length
yields generally fifty or fifty-one varas of material. . . .
The width of the mantle is a little more than three-
fourths of a vara [Anonymous, 1760, paragraph 76].
The Texas mission process budgeting system mirrored those
employed in two Spanish secular entities: the Royal Textile Mill
of Guadalejara (1717-1744) [Carmona and Gomez, 2002, pp.
247-248] and the Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory (1770’s)
[Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutierrez, 1997, pp. 420-424]. Similar
to the missions, both factories utilized accounting data to disci-
pline both the consumption of raw materials and the quality of
the resulting product. Accounting thus rendered visible the ac-
tions of the labor force and made them more controllable.
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Rewarding Appropriate Behavior: The cooperative ties and ex-
tended associations characteristic of the social structure
surrounding hunter-gatherer communities contrast starkly with
the competitive nature of economic relationships [Gibson, 2000,
p. 291]. Thus, the rewarding of appropriate behavior with sym-
bols of economic wealth would have been foreign to the
Coahuiltecan Indians. The Guidelines offer evidence that the
missionaries furthered the notions of material wealth as being a
measure of success by using material goods such as corn, water-
melons, Puebla cloth, shoes, or coats as rewards for people who
“deserve it”, because of position, hard work, or “for some other
good reason” [Anonymous, 1760, paragraphs 26, 32, 35, 41, 44].
Thus, the fruits of the mission economic system were used to
nourish the Western view of income distribution based on ef-
fort.19
Ordering Time and Space: Upon entering the sedentary mission
community, the Coahuiltecans found their most difficult adjust-
ment was adapting to the dual constraints of time and space.
The Indians embraced a vastly different view of their commit-
ment to the Spanish world than did the missionaries. Regarding
the founding of Mission San Jose in 1720, Captain Valdez re-
ports:
When the Indian chiefs understood it all, they said they
wanted and do want us to give them land and water so
that they may live there and be Christians. Not only did
they agree to dig their irrigation ditches and cultivate
their lands, but also promised to teach their sons to do
19 Fray Mariano Francisco de los Dolores y Viana, principal missionary at
Mission San Antonio de Valero, suggested in 1739 that rewards in the form of
salaries were not advisable if the employer was to be a resident of the Villa. “The
neighboring Islanders of that Villa [also] want at a small cost or no cost at all the
benefits of the personal work of the Indians. . . . Since they are to pay the Indi-
ans a daily wage, the Islanders will compel them to work strenuously so that
they earn what has been seen fit to give them. On this matter there must occur
disagreements and quarrels between the settlers and Indians, since the Indians
are given to laziness and are by nature enemies of work. . . . By this distribution
of the Indians and their personal work not only would those already converted
be lost but also the conversion of those who live in the hills would be made
much more difficult, because they have grown up among the wild beasts and on
the open fields with hunting as their only activity by which they maintain and
clothe themselves. If now they come to learn from those who return to live with
them that they are to work for the Spaniards, they will never be converted to the
light yoke of our holy faith, in spite of all the exhausting efforts the missionaries
make in preaching to them” [Leutenegger, 1985, pp. 21-34].
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the same, insisting that they want to obey the law of
God. In addition, they promised to obey the father mis-
sionaries as they would also have their children do, and
they would do and observe everything commanded for
the service of God [Morkovsky, 1979, p. 131].
One Franciscan acknowledged in 1739 that this commit-
ment might be short-lived: “In the beginning [the Indians] may
see the advantages coming to them as they are attracted more by
the love of ease and the abundance of food than by the fear of
the pains of hell and any interest in heavenly glory” [Leute-
negger, 1985]. The missionaries viewed the Indians as children
in need of a father’s daily guidance. In 1785, Fray Lopez ex-
plained, “In temporal matters these missions are governed and
administered in the style and fashion of a family, by a common
father, who, being the spiritual head, also looks after [the] inter-
ests and wants [of his children] with as much exactness and
punctuality as the best father could do” [Dabbs, 1940, pp. 17-
18].
To develop desired behavior in the native population, the
missionaries created a system that demanded conditioned re-
sponses throughout the day [Torres, 1993, p. 33]. Bells marked
the management of spiritual affairs. The Guidelines [1760] sug-
gested:
On all feast days . . . Mass is offered and all should
attend. There is this difference: on the eve of a first-
class feast, the bells are rung at noon, in the evening,
and before Mass: but on second-class feasts, the bells
are not rung at noon, but only in the evening and before
Mass. On all Saturdays of the year it is also customary
to say Mass and the bell is rung just before it. . . . Since
the hours for ringing the bell varies for the Mass said
for the people, the natives know when it is a feast day
for the Indians or only for the non-Indians. . . .
With regard to the prayers which the Indians are to say
during the week, the following is to be observed: on all
days of catechizing and on Fridays the bell is rung at
sunset. When the people are assembled, the Doctrina is
recited. On Mondays and Wednesdays Fr. Casano’s cat-
echism is said aloud. When a boy asks a question, all
answer. When this is finished, all recite the Act of Con-
trition. Then the missionary ascends the pulpit and be-
gins to explain as he sees fit. On Tuesdays and Thurs-
days they recite the prayers, beginning with the Our
Father and continue on to the Sacraments and the gen-
eral confession. On Fridays they pray the Way of the
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Cross inside the church, and one of them leads the
prayers. . . . On Saturdays before the setting of the sun,
the bells are rung briefly and as soon as the people
gather, they begin to pray the Rosary and finish with
singing the “Alabado”. . . .
Every evening at the proper time, the missionary orders
the boys to set up the lamp. Then they sound the clap-
per to call the widowers and the single men together for
the singing of the “Alabado” at the door of his cell. . . .
As they sing, another person tolls the bells in the tower
for the souls in Purgatory. When this ends, the mission-
ary comes out and offers a prayer for the Holy Souls.
To this all the people respond and then leave [Anony-
mous, 1760, paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 15].
The concept of time is a purely Western idea. Sunrise and
sunset are part of the natural rhythm, but the tolling of bells
places restrictions. The Indians learned to wake, eat, study,
work, play, and sleep at specific times, thus initiating the con-
cept of clock time [Torres, 1993, p. 33]. Using a Foucauldian
framework, Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutierrez [2002, p. 243] ar-
gue that enclosure provides an additional mechanism for instill-
ing order and discipline. By specifying a work space that is
“enclosed upon itself while being heterogenous to all others”, a
locus of human responsibility is created. Specific to the San
Antonio missions, the spatial partitioning of the mission work
areas countered the Coahuiltican notion that mobility is re-
quired for survival. In sum, the attention to details, both in
terms of time and space, surrounding the implementation of the
Western spiritual and secular value system ultimately robbed
the indigenous population of its unique culture.
CONCLUSIONS
A certain notion of accountability emerges from the ac-
counting practices employed by the various parties involved in
the colonization of New Spain. Chew and Greer [1997, p. 278]
argue (using modern terminology) that a hierarchical relation-
ship which commands some form of accountability derives from
the fact that “the principal [the State, the College, or the mis-
sionary in this case] has certain rights to make demands on the
conduct of the agent [the missionary or the Indian], as well as
demand reasons for conduct undertaken, [because] the principal
transfers resources to the agent with expectations as to how
these resources are to be used”.
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Laughlin [1996, p. 230] suggests that the form of account-
ability employed is a function of the level of trust that exists
between the accountor and the accountee. The presence of high
trust leads to the use of “communal” forms of accountability,
where expectations may be ill defined and ex post reporting of
stewardship is acceptable. In contrast, low trust leads to situa-
tions where readily measurable expectations will be clearly de-
fined ex ante.
The use of the account book and inventories suggest that
the relationships depicted between the missionaries and their
superiors at the College and Crown were ones of high trust.
Records indicate that inventories were not required by the Col-
lege of the missionaries until the waning years of the mission
era and were never requested by the missionaries while the Col-
lege was in charge of procuring and shipping the supplies. In-
ventories of mission property by superiors representing the
Crown and the Religious Order were only conducted sporadi-
cally at approximately ten-year intervals. The missionaries were
largely left to carry out Church and State directives with rela-
tively little oversight.
In contrast, the detailed instructions contained in the
Guidelines suggest that the relationship between the missionar-
ies and the Indians was one of low trust. The missionary expec-
tations were clearly elucidated with accountability being re-
quired of the Indians in measurable form with ex ante reports at
several levels. Specifically, instructions reflected a crude system
of internal controls, particularly for the weaving operations,
which detailed expected performance in relation to established
standards, anticipated outcomes and the acceptability of such
outcomes. The toll of the bells reinforced the various accounting
practices by providing an ex ante reminder of the set of tasks
that each Indian was expected to engage in throughout each
day.
Schweiker [1993, p. 232] argues that the “discursive act of
giving an account is one activity in which moral identity is en-
acted through time”. He suggests that the discourse associated
with this activity “shapes, guides, and judges life” [p. 235] and
creates “an understandable identity” [p. 237]. Thus, the dis-
course that ensued between the secular and religious parties
involved in the San Antonio missions created a rationale for the
Spanish culture that was then passed through the missionaries
in the field to the Indians.
The missionaries were charged with converting the “pagan”
Coahuiltecans to Christianity, making them “civilized and re-
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sponsible citizens of the Spanish empire” [Habig, 1968a, p. 18].
The missionaries were supported by both the Crown and by the
Church in these endeavors. The written account books of supply
activities, comprehensive inventories, detailed instructions
monitoring the accumulation of wealth, the use of raw materials
in a process budget system, the rewarding of appropriate behav-
ior, and the ordering of time and space all serve as tangible
evidence of such mission activities.
The positioning of these accounting practices within the
missionary activities altered both the mentalities and practices
of the indigenous peoples. The Indians were closely supervised
and were held accountable for the fine details of their daily
activities. The infusion by the missionaries of a system of con-
stant accountability that allowed few independent choices ulti-
mately altered the Coahuiltecans’ view of themselves as human
subjects, caused them to abandon their native beliefs, and
gradually, to assume the culture of the Spanish missionaries.
The hunter/gatherer culture did not survive.
The accounting practices implemented in the missions
were, by modern standards, quite crude. Yet they constituted a
complex of mechanisms which altered the extant Indian culture.
Spanish missionaries dispossessed the Coahuiltecans a full cen-
tury before the British government utilized accounting proce-
dures to inscribe into measurement the unequal power relations
that existed in the Canadian Provinces [Neu, 2000b] and the
Australian Western desert [Gibson, 2000], and creditor agents
dispossessed the Scottish Highland Gaels [Walker, 2003]. In
sum, accounting controls were used throughout the 18th and
19th centuries to inculcate Western values into indigenous
populations. Accountability techniques were repeatedly used to
change the relationship of indigenous groups to land.
Our findings, coupled with earlier work [Chew and Greer,
1997; Gibson, 2000; Neu, 2000a, 2000b; Walker, 2003] support a
global view that accounting represents a powerful weapon in the
disempowerment and dispossession of indigenous populations.
Further research is warranted into the role that accounting and
accountability played in the colonization of other sites such as
Africa, Hawaii, and New Zealand. Such endeavors could provide
evidence that support or refute this notion.
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Abstract: It is generally asserted that corporate social reporting (CSR)
is a phenomenon of the late 20th century. The present paper contests
this view by looking at the ways in which British companies reacted
to the challenges they faced during the First World War, when they
were exposed to charges of profiteering, as well as to industrial unrest
and high taxation. The paper considers the use of the speeches made
by chairmen at annual general meetings to refute these charges and
defend themselves. It considers the relevance of these findings for
contemporary social reporting, and suggests that investigation of the
history of CSR is likely to show further examples of its use by compa-
nies to put forward “the business case”.
INTRODUCTION
A wide array of modes of corporate reporting is currently
deployed by large companies worldwide in a variety of media –
in newspapers, and magazines, in dedicated reports, on the
Web, on video. They run the spectrum from heavily regulated
disclosures in the form of audited financial statements to what
has been described as “advocacy advertising”1 [Sethi, 1977;
Milne, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002]. Somewhere in between
fall a variety of reports on corporate social responsibility, envi-
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ronmental performance, contribution to employee well-being
and so on, containing varying proportions of quantified, audited
statements, narrative, diagrams and pictures. Like the financial
reports, they are addressed to shareholders and to the public
and intended to convey information about the company’s perfor-
mance and prospects, but, unlike the financial reports, they are
voluntary and their content is not regulated.
The present paper examines an episode in the history of
corporate reporting – the extent and nature of the voluntary
disclosures made by limited companies in Great Britain during
the First World War and the beginning of readjustment immedi-
ately after the war. They are, it is suggested here, of some inter-
est for what they have to say about the relationship between
limited companies, their shareholders and society at large in
that period, and also about the role then and now of corporate
social reporting. The evidence offered here is potentially part of
a continuing history of corporate reporting, and one of the in-
tentions of the paper is to encourage further research to track
the extent to which companies – in Britain and elsewhere –
made disclosures of this kind both prior to and after the episode
outlined here.
The paper begins by outlining the role of the annual general
meeting (AGM) in the period under review, and the issues which
were of particular importance to limited companies during the
First World War. It goes on to review the treatment of these
issues in the speeches made by company chairmen and senior
directors at wartime AGMs, and considers the relationship be-
tween this form of communication and the role and content of
what is now known as corporate social reporting.
CORPORATE REPORTING – THE ROLE OF THE AGM
Britain in the mid-19th century has been described by
Cottrell [1980, p. 41] as having “the most permissive commercial
law in Europe”, and the Companies Acts of 1900 and 1907 did
little to impose restrictions. The amount of accounting disclo-
sure required in the early 20th century was minimal. Companies
had to produce an audited balance sheet, but the publication of
a profit and loss account (which did not have to be audited) was
not a requirement until the Companies Act of 1929, so the fig-
ures for sales and operating profit need not have been, and
generally were not, disclosed. To make the year’s position even
more opaque, companies had discretion over the amount of de-
preciation they charged, which tended to vary in response to the
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amount of profit they wanted to abate rather than the wear and
tear on assets, and they could also hide substantial amounts of
profit in provisions, e.g. for taxation, which melted into an un-
differentiated figure for current liabilities on the balance sheet.
Apart from the dividends that were paid out, there was little
hard information about the year’s financial performance, and
the fact that the current year’s dividends could be paid out of the
preceding years’ profits did not increase the clarity of the pic-
ture.2
There were complaints about this situation – from share-
holders and from Members of Parliament – from the late 19th
century onwards. One important counter from supporters of the
permissive status quo was to remind critics that limited compa-
nies in Britain were required to hold an annual general meeting.
At the AGM, which all voting shareholders could attend, the
directors were required to make a statement about the
company’s financial performance, obtain the shareholders’ ap-
proval of the dividend and the appointment of directors and
auditors, and answer questions about their stewardship of the
company’s assets. The limited company, it was frequently ar-
gued, was the product of a contract between directors and
shareholders; if shareholders were unhappy or curious, the
AGM was the forum in which they could exercise their rights as
individuals to the information and explanations which they
needed. It was therefore a key element of corporate governance,
the place where the deficiencies of the financial statements
could be made good. Britain did not need accounting disclosure
to be legally mandated, it was claimed, as shareholders had rem-
edies – they could sack the directors or sell their shares – if they
were not happy with the information they could obtain at the
AGM.
The AGM attracted press coverage on a greater scale than
do comparable events today. They were reported at length in
local newspapers; for instance the Sheffield Daily Independent
devoted half or three quarters of a broadsheet page to the AGMs
of large local companies such as Hadfields, John Brown or
Vickers. Often they were covered in national papers as well, and
in weekly journals – for instance companies could and did pay
2 It is of course still possible for a British company to pay dividends out of
previous years’ reserves – but the requirement to produce a detailed analysis of
reserve movements means that it is now possible for the reader of the accounts
to be aware that this has happened. If reserve movements are not charted,
dividends are the only indication of profitability available, and may not be a safe
guide to current profits.
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to have their AGM reported in The Economist. The Times re-
ported AGMs more or less daily. They were of interest because
of their potential to disclose information about the company
which could not be deduced from the financial statements them-
selves – a major part of the company’s attempt to present itself
to the world.
The present paper examines the role of the AGM during the
First World War, a period when British companies were exposed
to a series of problems and criticisms that were largely new to
them. In Cronin’s words, “the impact of the war upon workers,
employers and the state was extremely contradictory” [Cronin,
1991, p. 67]. This contradiction set up tensions which were ex-
pressed in many ways by the parties involved – for instance by
strike action, political campaigning, and legislation. The follow-
ing sections of this paper outline some of these tensions as they
affected businesses, before looking at their expression via the
AGM.
THE ISSUES FOR BUSINESS, 1914-1919
E.M.H. Lloyd, who worked in the Ministry of Food during
the war, said that there were two phrases that were repeated
“many hundreds of times” by his colleagues: “Every private in-
terest must be subordinated to the successful prosecution of the
war” and “There must be as little interference as possible with
the normal channels of trade” [Lloyd, 1924, p. 259]. There is a
tension between the two slogans, which is apparent in the issues
that preoccupied companies during the war.
The same dichotomy is more forcefully suggested by two
cartoons which appeared in the issue of Punch dated 5 April
1916. A full-page cartoon [p. 233] depicted a bleak hillside with
a gallows, the noose swinging in stormy wind. The caption read
“FOR TRAITORS” and below “A WARNING TO PROMOTERS
OF STRIKES IN WAR-TIME”. On p. 235, a half-page cartoon
showed a slightly shabby middle-class man and woman on a
London street, peering at a large chauffeur-driven car with an
elegantly-dressed couple in the back. The caption read:
“She ‘Good gracious! The Brown-Smiths!! I thought
they were so poor’.
He ‘Yes. But, you see, he’s been supplying the Govern-
ment with shells for quite a fortnight!’”
The conflict between private interests – of workers, employ-
ers and shareholders – and the interest of the government en-
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gaged feelings at various levels. There was a desire on all sides
to be seen as serving the national interest and a readily-deployed
sense of public indignation if any of the parties involved ap-
peared to be putting its own welfare first. But there was also a
strong sense among those contributing to the war effort that
national service should not be used as an excuse for exploita-
tion. The present paper will explore one aspect of this conflict –
the need for limited companies to report wartime profitability
whilst avoiding the stigma of exploitation, and the use of report-
ing at the AGM in reconciling the two objectives.
Some wartime AGMs did not address this issue – the direc-
tors briefly announced the dividend, presided over the votes,
and then adjourned for lunch or tea. Shareholders often had
little or nothing to say beyond approving the dividend and the
reappointment of the directors. But newspaper and journal re-
ports show that there were also numerous AGMs which were, if
not a forum for debate, at least a platform for the directors to
express their views and make their case on a wide range of
topics. The following section of the paper identifies the main
areas of controversy in wartime, before the nature of the corpo-
rate response to them is discussed.
Four issues appear to have been of particular concern for
business during the War. These were the impact of government
controls, the altered basis of taxation of profits, the relationship
between employers and labor, and the negative public percep-
tion of business behavior, summarized in the charge of “profi-
teering” that was leveled for much of the War. Cronin [1991, p.
68] identifies “a decisive reorientation in the relationship be-
tween businesses and the state”, and the more important ele-
ments of this reorientation are now described.
Government Intervention: One of the major changes brought
about by the war was the advancing tide – albeit unevenly ad-
vancing – of government intervention and regulation. In 1915
there were 27 government committees dealing with issues of
trade, industry and finance, by 1918 there were 107 [Hewins
Archive, 95/2/2 and 95/2/15]. In munitions, the government
directed 3.4 million workers, either directly or in controlled
privately–owned establishments. The coal mines were virtually
nationalized after 1917. The government set both prices and
wages. By the end of the war it had “direct charge of shipping,
railways and canal transport: it purchased about 90% of the
imports and marketed over 80% of the food consumed at home”
[Pollard, 1983, p. 22]. All these changes happened piecemeal, in
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response to perceived needs, rather than as part of a grand strat-
egy by the British government, but they were unprecedented in
the way they interfered with the autonomy of limited compa-
nies.
Taxation: Prior to the war, there had been no tax on businesses,
as distinct from taxation of the individuals owning them. Lim-
ited companies acted as “holding agents” [Daunton, 1996, p.
898], deducting income tax from dividends, but were not in
themselves “taxable entities” [ibid]. The British government’s re-
sponse to the costs of war had two major effects on taxation.
The level of income tax exemption was reduced in 1915/16, lead-
ing to a massive increase in the number of taxpayers – from 1.2
million in 1913/14 to 3.5 million in 1918/19 [Daunton, 1996, p.
88]. Secondly, in 1915, Excess Profit Duty (EPD) was intro-
duced. This was a “hybrid” [Hicks et al., 1941, p. 7] in that
businesses could elect to be taxed either on the return on capital
employed in excess of a statutory rate (six per cent for compa-
nies) or on the excess of wartime profits over the average peace-
time profit for the three years preceding the war [Daunton,
2002, p. 56]. The rate of EPD rose in stages from 50 per cent
when it was introduced to 80 per cent in January 1917 [Hicks et
al., 1941, p. 78].
Labor Relations: Business agreement to the principle of EPD was
expressed in March 1915, during the Treasury Conference,
which was attended by government, trades union and employer
representatives. Lloyd George called for “an understanding with
regard to the limitation of profits” and “an understanding of
course that the works will be completely under the control of the
State” [History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol. II, 1922, p. 83].
In return, “the other side of the bargain” [ibid.] was agreement
by the trades unions that there would be no strikes and that
trades union working practice restrictions would be removed
during the war. The “bargain” was part of the Treasury Agree-
ment of 1915 that resulted from the Conference, but it was soon
reinforced in legislation – the 1915 Munitions of War Act. This
ratified the Treasury Agreement, and also required the ac-
ceptance by employees of dilution (opening skilled work to
unskilled men, women and boys) and of restrictions on over-
time.
Reactions to Change: A number of commentators have regarded
the “bargain” of 1915 as a victory for employers, such that
159
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2005
151Maltby: Corporate Social Reporting
Askwith, the government’s chief industrial negotiator, saw the
danger of its “appearing as the mouthpiece of the employers”
[quoted in Middlemas, 1979, p. 73]. The President of the Board
of Trade, Runciman, described the employers in March 1915 as
“not at all in a bad humour” [Wigley, 1976, p. 101]. The reason
for their alleged good mood was what Middlemas [1979, p. 73]
calls the government’s “curiously business-oriented sensitivity
on the question of profits”. The terms given to them were “gen-
erous” [Wigley, 1976, p. 101]; the choice of tax base meant that
companies making a low profit immediately before the war
could choose to be taxed on the excess return on capital em-
ployed rather than on the increased profit. Meanwhile, the
trades unions faced restrictions that “pleased no one” [Wigley,
1976, p. 101].
Certainly labor relations reflected workers’ unhappiness.
They were limited in their ability to take industrial action, and
to move from one job to another. Dilution created conflicts be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers, and employers and manag-
ers had acquired new powers. A series of major strikes reflected
this dissatisfaction – among others these took place in South
Wales and on Clydeside in 1915, in Sheffield and again on
Clydeside in 1916 and countrywide among engineering workers
in 1917. But there were other reasons for discontent. One, as
noted above, was the extension of income tax to working men
who had never previously fallen within its scope. The other was
more prevalent and therefore more significant: “The inflation of
food and other basic commodity prices (especially coal) was the
cause of a much more intense and widespread feeling of work-
ing-class ‘unfairness’” [Waites, 1987, p. 223].
According to the Ministry of Food, prices of principal foods
in July 1918 were more than twice their July 1914 level [Times,
25 November 1918]. The Commissioners charged with investi-
gating industrial unrest in North-East England concluded that
“food prices are the most general cause of unrest”, but they
noted that the sense of “actual hardship” was combined with
“the belief that prices are enhanced not only by scarcity but also
by profiteering” [quotation from their report in The Times, 1
August 1917]. This wider concern – indignation about profiteer-
ing- will be reviewed in the following section of the paper.
Profiteering: The belief that businesses were using shortages and
government demand to fix abnormally high prices was not con-
fined to those who suffered hardship because food was dear.
Nor was the accusation levied solely against food manufacturers
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and vendors. The accusers and their targets were far more wide-
spread.
Searle [1987, pp. 289-298] discusses the extent to which the
attack on profiteering was taken up by a variety of political
persuasions. Socialists, of course, saw it as an inevitable by-
product of capitalism. For traditionalist Tories, it represented
the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of a plutocracy – “the
hard-faced men who look as though they had done very well out
of the war” [Masterson, n.d., p. 140]. Liberals saw profiteers as
the enemy of the middle-class (like the shabby couple in the
Punch cartoon quoted above) and for right-wing Radicals, they
were traitors “playing the game of the Hun” [Searle, 1987, p.
293].3
The notion of profiteering was, therefore, one that drew
attention and hostility on all sides; the issue that gave more
scope for debate was that of its identification in business prac-
tice. This has attracted the attention of a number of historians.
Studies of business performance generally [Boswell and Johns,
1982], of shipping profits [Arnold, 1991; Napier, 1991; Arnold,
1997] and of armaments profits [Arnold, 1998] have made it
clear that by no means all businesses made unfair profits. Cer-
tainly shipping companies, for instance, did in some cases make
large profits, but the effect of wartime business was “highly
variable” [Arnold, 1991, p. 339] and must be set off against high
levels of commercial risk because of the danger of losing vessels
[ibid., p. 351; Napier, 1991, p. 330]. In addition, inflation had a
major effect; after adjusting for inflation, the profits of arma-
ments firms were in fact lower between 1915 and 1919 than
from 1910 to 1914, “an early and poorly acknowledged example
of money illusion” [Arnold, 1998, p. 314]. In a wide-ranging
survey, Boswell and Johns find that business behavior covered
the spectrum from blatant profiteering [Boswell and Johns,
1982, pp. 428, 431] to efforts to save the government’s money
[op.cit., p. 432].
There was, however, evidence that persuaded the contempo-
rary public that profiteering was going on. Overall, ordinary
dividends showed an increase.
3 As an illustration of Searle’s contention, see for instance The Times of 15
June 1917 which reported both an attack by the National Transport Workers’
Federation on “the unwillingness of shipping interests to make a fair deal”, and
also the claim of a committee of Unionist MPs to have “unmistakable evidence”
of profiteering “on the part of big firms as well as small”.
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These figures were an average which took account of some
drops in profitability (e.g. trams, gas supply), but it was the rise
in the average that could be used to support the claim that
wartime emergencies were being used to boost profits. And,
more specifically, there were individual companies that were
demonstrably making vastly increased profits. Spillers and Bak-
ers, the flour millers, increased their profits from £89,000 in
1913 to £368,000 in 1915. This was reported in Parliament and
led to angry protests:
Mr. T Healy (Cork, NE, Nat.) – What we want to know
is how long this gang will be allowed to sweat the faces
of the poor whilst the common people are giving their
blood for the country. (Cheers)
Mr. Crooks (Woolwich, Lab.) – When are the Govern-
ment Departments going to cease apologizing for rob-
bery? [Times, 30 April 1915].
Shipping profits attracted similar indignation. They were taken
at face value, ignoring the reservations suggested above by
Arnold and Napier. The Economist commented that “No busi-
ness has done better out of the war” [6 November 1915] and
Asquith called the behavior of shipping contractors “disgusting”
[Masterson, n.d., p. 143].
Claims of profiteering persisted throughout the war for a
number of reasons. There was indeed evidence that some busi-
TABLE 1
Ordinary Dividends of British Companies
July-June Average Ordinary
Dividend Rate (%)
08/09 6.3
09/10 6.8
10/11 8.0
11/12 8.7
12/13 9.7
13/14 10.4
14/15 9.1
15/16 10.4
16/17 10.2
17/18 10.5
18/19 11.0
Source: The Economist, July 1919 [quoted in Waites, 1987, p. 100].
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nesses were making unfair profits in their dealings with the
government and/or the public, as noted by Boswell and Johns.
Searle, however, comments that profiteering was not discussed
“within a strictly economic frame of reference”. It was perceived
that “something was happening which ‘offended public opinion
or damaged civilian morale’” [1987, p. 287, quoting Boswell and
Johns]. The combination of high prices, large dividends and
scandals such as Spillers created public sensitivity about busi-
ness profits in general. There was an anxiety that businesses
were transgressing moral limits and the public wanted political
intervention.
The result of the changes outlined above – in the relation-
ship of businesses with government, with workers and with the
public at large – was that companies needed to renegotiate and
redefine their position. They could not count on social accep-
tance; they needed to make the case for the way they carried on
their business. In addition, despite the claims noted above that
businessmen were largely happy with the settlement outlined by
the Treasury Agreement; it can be argued that not all the war-
time changes were satisfactory for them. Indeed, it will be sug-
gested below that many businessmen felt increasing concern
that their position was deteriorating, and that they needed to
ward off threats to their present security and future survival.
The following section of the paper outlines the corporate re-
sponse to wartime change, as it was expressed via the AGM.
CORPORATE RESPONSE
Companies found themselves in a significantly changed en-
vironment. Despite the claims quoted earlier that they had been
favorably treated, they were exposed to government intervention
and public criticism. Labor problems, although not as severe as
in the years immediately before the war, were still a threat.4 The
“widespread belief that businessmen were profiting tremen-
dously during the war and that government intervention consis-
tently favoured the interests of employers” [Cronin, 1991, p. 69]
meant that companies needed to protect their public image and
their interests. This section of the paper reviews the disclosures
made at AGMs in pursuit of this aim.
4 Employers’ inability to undertake wage bargaining could entail govern-
ment-imposed settlements in case of a dispute, and shop-stewards’ committees
had a growing influence in organising and representing workers [Middlemas,
1979, p. 113].
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More companies published their AGM reports than before –
between 1914 and 1919 the numbers who paid to have their
reports published in The Economist increased from fewer than
400 to well over 500.5 They used the platform provided by the
AGM to make voluntary disclosures in a variety of ways – partly
defensively, to protect and enhance their own image, but also
polemically, to attack their critics and those who seemed to be
threatening their position.
Contribution to the War Effort: The most popular defensive tactic
of companies was to enumerate the direct contributions they
were making to the war, in terms of the men who had left them
to join the army and the levels of casualties. By May 1915, the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company (RMSP) reported that it had
more than 1,000 men in the forces [Times, 13 May 1915]. Shell
had 300 and announced to cheers at the 1915 AGM that it had
opened a rifle range in the head office basement “to give some
practice to those who have been unable to go to the front”
[Times, 23 June 1915]. The Chairman of Spillers read out the
names of the employees who had died on active service. His use
of this tactic was rather sardonically noted by The Economist:
“Directors set forth the number of employees already killed,
wounded or missing, as if the patriotism of their servants were a
set-off to the abnormal profits they are making out of ‘war
bread’” [1 May 1915, p. 851]. Many firms could also point out
the support they were giving to wives and families, for instance
by topping up ex-employees’ army pay to the level of standard
wages.6
Profiteering and EPD: The main area where companies felt the
need to defend themselves was the accusation of profiteering.
There were various strategies for countering this, and all were
deployed. One approach was selflessly to welcome EPD as a
necessary sacrifice in the national interest. Lord Inchcape, the
Chairman of P&O, declared in December 1915 that “no sacrifice
5 Stock Exchange restrictions on new issues in wartime make it likely that
the majority of these additional reports were placed by existing, rather than by
new, companies.
6 For other examples of this theme, see, among others, Sutherland Steam-
ship Co [Times, 6 May 1915], Shell [Times, 23 June 1915], Barclay Perkins
[Times, 13 July 1915], Workington Iron and Steel [Times, 8 August 1915],
Dorman Long [Times, 13 April 1916], Furness Withy [Times, 31 July 1916 and 26
October 1918], and Elder Dempster [Times, 25 May 1917].
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is too great to secure that victory without which life would be
intolerable” [Times, 9 December 1915]. He slightly spoiled the
effect by noting in the next paragraph that “it is not in the
interests of the country to withdraw large sums from earning
taxable revenue”. Company chairmen had to tread a fine line if
they were to make the case against handing over large amounts
of revenue without appearing to be unpatriotically greedy.
One way of doing this was to agree that they had indeed
made large profits, but that these were not from the war.7
Furness Withy, the shipping company, asserted that their profit
came not from food freight to Britain, but from foreign trade
and luxury goods [Economist, 1917, p. 173]. Another approach
was to admit that one’s company was making profits from the
war, but to point out that other companies were making more
Armstrong Whitworth observed in 1918 that “as patriotic tax-
payers we did not complain, but we cannot help noticing that
other industries have . . . made and distributed profits which
compare very favourably with the results we have been able to
show” [Economist, 1918, p. 375]. John Brown (whose 1915 divi-
dend was 50% higher than its 50-year average) had a two-part
defense: firstly, they had to make hay while the sun shone. Their
Chairman, Lord Aberconway, pointed out in 1915 that after the
war “it might be years before any of the armament firms got an
order”. Besides, it was unfair to pick on them. He pointed to the
Army contractors for “flour, meat, clothing, boots, tinned provi-
sions, jam, fodder . . . etc . . . Why, those firms would be making
far larger relative profits than armament firms, and when the
war was over, far from being cast out into the streets they would
go on making money” [Times, 30 June 1915].
As noted above, a number of researchers have questioned
the extent of profiteering, in view of the risk incurred by certain
companies and the impact of inflation, as well as the efforts that
some made to restrict their profits. Their findings do not deny
that profiteering took place, but encourage the thought that at
least some companies might have supported their defense by
publishing detailed financial reports. This they did not do. Some
did not produce accounts for a number of years on the ground
of confidentiality, for instance Vickers between 1915 and 1918
[Times, 9 October 1918], or delays in settling government ac-
7 See Humber Ltd and Castner-Kellner Alkali Ltd [both Times, 25 November
1915], Harrison and Crosfield [Economist, 1917, pp. 669-671] and Dunlop Rub-
ber Ltd [Economist, 1917, p. 107] for a similar contention.
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counts – Armstrong Whitworth in 1916 and 1917 [Times, 19
September 1918].8
Many others offered the amount of detail – i.e. scanty –
which was required by the 1907 Companies Act. P&O, one of the
shipping companies with hugely increased profits, cut back its
disclosure. It reduced its financial statements from 13 pages pre-
war to nine in 1915, and its profit and loss account was “simpli-
fied to a point at which figures cease to have much significance”
[Economist, 1915, p. 928]. By 1917, the journal was severely
critical: P&O’s profit and loss account information had been
“suppressed” in a way that was “a serious abuse of the confi-
dence of shareholders and . . . a bad example to be set by a
respectable company” [Economist, 1917, p. 912]. Lord Inchcape
told the P&O shareholders he had no intention of “publishing
your private affairs to the world” when rival shipping companies
in neutral countries “who have been coining money during the
war” could steal a march by reading them [Times, 5 December
1915]. The Cairn shipping line simply declined to give any indi-
cation of its profits [Times, 12 September 1918]. Spillers, who
quadrupled their profits in the flour business, made a similar
excuse to P&O’s in 1915 [Times, 3 May 1915]. Whatever strategy
British companies adopted to counter accusations of unfair
trading, they did not intend to go into detail about their results.
They preferred to treat profit and loss data as confidential and
adopt other strategies to ward off press and political criticism.
The other measure adopted by companies in the face of
criticism and intervention was to go on the offensive, and put
forward their own agenda as well as react to that of government
and other commentators. This counter-attack took a number of
forms, and was directed against both taxation and other forms
of government intervention. P&O were not alone in pointing to
the foreign threat. The point was often made that competitors in
Germany or in neutral companies were either taxed at a lower
rate or not at all on profits. EPD would damage the chances of
British firms after the war by leaving them worse off than their
rivals. Shipping companies advanced this argument repeatedly,9
but industrialists also invoked the postwar German menace; the
8 United Alkali Co Ltd was also delayed [Economist, 1917, p. 707], and Curtis
and Henry were unable to produce their 1916 accounts until after their 1917
ones because of similar problems [Times, 26 April 1918].
9 Among them Orient [Times, 22 December 1915 and 30 January 1918], King
Line [Times, 29 March 1916], Mitre [Times, 12 December 1917], Anchor Line
[Economist, 1917, pp. 127-128], and Lamport and Holt [Times, 12 April 1918].
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Chairman of British Westinghouse asserted that “there had been
no more enthusiastic advocates (of the war) than the heads of
the great German industries and financial establishments”
[Economist, 1917, p. 748]. Bradford Dyers [Economist, 1917, pp.
440-444] made similar points. This was closely allied to the ar-
gument that EPD was liable to damage post-war prospects be-
cause it prevented the accumulation of reserves – as claimed for
instance by Pearson and Knowles [Times, 1 October 1915], Spill-
ers and Bakers [Times, 8 May 1916], and RMSP [Times, 7 June
1917]. Implicit in these arguments was the assertion that war-
time profits were not “excess” – they were a fair reward for
productivity and the government should not handicap industry
by appropriating them.
EPD was also invoked in connection with two other chal-
lenging issues – labor relations and government control of busi-
ness – and these are discussed below.
Labor Relations: Companies made frequent reference to the rela-
tionship between employers and workers. This was often posi-
tive; chairmen stressed the excellent attitude of employees and
the good spirit prevailing in the factory. There were also confi-
dent appeals for further co-operation. The Chairman of John
Knight Ltd called for labor and capital to work “hand in hand”
[Times, 23 February 1918], and the Chairman of Crossley Bros
Ltd stressed that “we must all pull together” [Times, 28 February
1918].10 Linked to this was an emphasis on the benefits con-
ferred on the employees. Lord Aberconway pointed out in 1919
that over the last ten years the Tredegar Iron and Coal Company
Ltd had paid £10 million in wages and £700,000 in dividends
[Economist, 1919, p. 64]. In the same year Lord Lever enumer-
ated the welfare provision for Lever Bros employees – housing,
bank accounts, a six-hour working day and so on [Economist,
1919, p. 529]. “Industrial peace” was achieved, on this basis, by
the efforts of management.
But a number of chairmen went on to make a contrast
between the improvement in workers’ conditions and the reduc-
tion in profits caused by EPD – for instance Charles Allen of
Ebbw Vale Steel Iron and Coal remarked that “while opportuni-
ties for making profits are strictly limited, there appears to be
no boundary to that golden, rosy horizon of advancement of
10 See also e.g. Shell [Times, 23 June 1915], Dennis Bros Ltd [Times, 23
November 1915], Thomas Wallis [Times, 28 February 1918], among others.
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wages for the men” [Times, 30 June 1916]. Similar contrasts
were drawn at Bolckow Vaughan [Times, 30 September 1915] –
“of these prices the wage-earners are getting a larger proportion
than they have ever done before”– and by the Tredegar Iron and
Coal Company Ltd [Times, 1 July 1916 and 2 July 1917]. As the
war continued, criticism of labor became more severe, particu-
larly in the coal industry. The Chairman of Pease & Partners
said in 1919 that he did not think that the miners had been
“playing the game since the mines were controlled by the gov-
ernment” [Economist, 1919 p. 1095]. In the same year, the
Chairman of Ebbw Vale lamented that the attitude of labor
“grows worse day by day” and thought that, unless labor leaders
learned “a soberer, clearer and saner view”, Bolshevism would
take industry “down into the nethermost pit” [Economist, 1919,
pp. 152-153]. According to Aberconway at the Sheepbridge
AGM, “a microbe of unrest and extravagance” had infected the
British people [Economist, 1919, p. 511].
Business and Government: Company chairmen, as noted above,
stressed their willingness to co-operate in the national effort, by
paying EPD (despite the problems it created), and promoting
industrial peace (despite the demands made by labor). But they
frequently referred to the difficulties they faced in working with
government – which were attributed to the lack of government
understanding of industry and commerce. Senior businessmen
held many government posts during the war. “The Ministry of
Munitions was from first to last a business-man organisation”
[Lloyd George, quoted by Searle, 1987, p. 275]; more than 90
company directors and managers were employed there. The
cabinet included a swathe of “businessmen-cum-ministers”
[Searle, 1987, p. 276], and, at local level, the District Armaments
Committees overseeing production were primarily made up of
businessmen [Cronin, 1991, p. 68].
Despite this influx the problem was often argued to be the
refusal of the British government to pay attention to the needs
of British industry. The Chairman of the Sheffield steelmakers
Hadfields Ltd pointed out in 1916 that “there was not a single
representative of technical business men in the government”,
whereas “the head of Krupps had for ten years reported every
fortnight to the head of the German Empire as to the progress of
his work at Essen” [Sheffield Daily Independent, 25 March 1916].
The same point was taken up by the Chairman of Workington
Iron and Steel who contrasted the “pampered and petted” status
of Krupps with the treatment of British iron and steel manufac-
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turers. [Times, 2 September 1916]. There was a continuing
strand of criticism of what was called the “hydra-headed system
of bureaucracy” [Chairman of the Salt Union, Economist, 1917,
p. 558] which impeded business efficiency, and of inappropriate
government appointments – e.g. “Lord Rhondda knows all about
coal so he is placed at the head of the Food Control. Sir Eric
Geddes knows all about railways therefore he is placed in com-
mand of naval affairs” [Chairman of Lennards, Economist, 1919,
p. 191]. Dudley Docker, the Chairman of Metropolitan Carriage,
Wagon and Finance appealed in 1916 “For Heaven’s sake, let us
see to it that in matters we do know something about, our in-
dustries, our financial institutions and so forth, we keep the
politicians at a respectful distance” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.
109].11
Lord Inchcape of P&O claimed in a letter to the Times [28
December 1918] that “no man of any account in business ever
uttered a word of complaint about government control during
hostilities”. This seems to overlook an increasingly aggressive
strain in the comments made on the government’s control. The
Chairman of Moor Line attacked “pretentious gentlemen who
have no trace of commercial experience” [Times, 2 March 1917]
and Robert Mond of Mond Nickel complained of suffering “im-
mense difficulties . . . by reason of Government restriction”
[Times, 27 September 1918]. As the war continued, and the tax
rate went up, the declared attitude to EPD changed from accep-
tance to savage criticism. In 1918 it was “vicious in the extreme”
[Inchcape, Economist, 1918, p. 814]; by 1919 Lord Lever was
calling it “an assassin’s blow” to industry and shipping [Econo-
mist, 1919, p. 529]. The Chairman of Peek Bros Winch, Ltd, a
food retailer, described businessmen as “toads under the har-
row” of the government, and food controls as “a crime against
the public and especially the poor” [Times, 3 January 1918].
This kind of polemic, like the warnings of labor Bolshevism,
suggests that at least some business leaders were no longer in
the good humour they enjoyed after the 1915 Treasury Confer-
ence. If businesses could not find helpful support from the gov-
ernment, they needed to obtain it elsewhere, and the following
sections of the paper consider some evidence for this search for
support.
Representatives of the Shareholders: Part of the strategy for find-
ing support was the corporate claim to being representative.
11 See below for further details of Docker’s contribution.
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Repeatedly, chairmen stressed that they were looking after the
interests of a large body of shareholders. In 1916, Lord Inchcape
pointed out that P&O had 8,500 shareholders; ships, he said,
were owned “not by a restricted class but by the people gener-
ally” [Economist, 1916, p. 1132]. The Fine Cotton Spinners
Chairman quoted an average shareholding of £300 amongst its
30,000 shareholders; they represented “the hard-earned savings
of really careful people”. Mitre Shipping were “trustees for a
vast body of shareholders” [Economist, 1918, p. 885]. In 1919,
Mitchelson, Chairman of the mining company D. Davis, re-
minded the Sankey Commission that the “so-called coalowners”
were in fact “many thousands of shareholders drawn from the
entire community” [Economist, 1919, p. 452].12 Limited compa-
nies were attempting to distance themselves from an elitist posi-
tion – shareholding was open to “really careful people”, not con-
fined to the wealthy, and the company chairman could therefore
speak to the government (and to refractory workers) in the inter-
ests of a large social group. It was also another means of coun-
tering the charge of profiteering – profits were earned, and divi-
dends paid, for the common good.
Business Solidarity: As well as claims to representativeness,
speeches at AGMs displayed solidarity within business: com-
pany chairmen spoke up in each other’s defense. One aspect of
this has already been discussed – the calls for government to
take more account of business views and refrain from interfer-
ence. Another reflection of solidarity was the expression of sup-
port for an organization founded during the war which became
a major representative of British business, the Federation of
British Industries (FBI), founded in 1916. The FBI was one of a
number of employers’ organizations set up during the war
[Turner, 1984, pp. 39-49]; it had the advantage of being pro-
moted by Dudley Docker, who was a leading businessman in the
Midlands,13 and supported by among others the chairmen of
Vickers, Hadfields and Marconi. Docker used the 1917 AGM of
Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co to stress the im-
portance of the FBI – “the Federation will, and must, attract the
attention of the Government when forming industrial regula-
12 A point he also made at the company’s AGM [Times, 13 March 1919].
13 He was closely involved with Daimler and Birmingham Small Arms
among others. Winston Churchill in 1918 invited his wife to accompany him
to Birmingham to “see tanks and munitions workers . . . & Mr Dudley Docker”
[Davenport-Hines, 1984, p. 93].
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tion” [Times, 8 June 1917]. Similar themes were addressed at
the AGMs of Birmingham Small Arms [Times, 10 August 1918],
and Kynoch [Times, 18 October 1918]. Lord Inchcape told a
businessmen’s conference that “the mercantile community”
must “show a strong front” to prevent the government from
nationalizing “everything for all time” [Times, 10 May 1918].
Middlemas comments [1979, p. 112] that employers had “a
growing awareness of the need to increase their political power
in the second half of the war”. Certainly the formation of the
FBI appears to have been a political move. The FBI’s attitude to
the trades union movement “shifted from tentative co-operation
to active aggression during 1917 and 1918” [Turner, 1984, p.
47], a transition that is echoed in the changing tone of AGM
commentaries on labor relations. At the end of the war, the
Conservative ministers of the Coalition government “could be
heard consulting with the FBI on how to present more tactfully
the bitter question of profiteering” [Middlemas, 1979, p. 131].
By 1919, the FBI was involved in setting up “an organisation for
Anti-Bolshevik propaganda” which in 1920 was relaunched as
National Propaganda, with a budget of £250,000 [Davenport-
Hines, 1984, p. 130]. It pursued a course of attacking trade
union militancy and the threat of nationalization, under
the chairmanship of Lord Inchcape [Turner, 1984, p. 47;
Middlemas, 1979, p. 132].
The attitudes and agenda of the FBI incorporated many of
the issues raised in wartime and summarized above. The sup-
port it received14 suggests that these issues were matters of gen-
eral concern for businessmen, rather than the preoccupation of
a small number of politically active company chairmen, an issue
which will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Shareholders and the AGM: Before moving on to a discussion of
these findings, it is relevant to say something about the other
element of the AGM, which was the contribution made by share-
holders. This was often limited, because shareholders’ contribu-
tion to AGMs was normally to vote unanimously in favor of the
acceptance of the accounts. There were occasionally shareholder
objections; for instance Lipton’s results in 1915, which were very
poor, were the subject of lengthy discussion. The Vickers ac-
counts of 1915, which were delayed by wartime conditions, gave
rise to a few questions about poorly-performing bonds and
14 80 companies had joined the FBI within a month of its formation, rising
to over 400 within a year [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p. 114].
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about directors’ commission, but also to congratulations from a
satisfied shareholder [Times, 28 April 1915]. At the 1918 meeting
of Dennis Bros Ltd [Times, 2 December 1918] there were a num-
ber of comments from a shareholder, but all were complimen-
tary about the company’s conservative accounting policies and
the moderation of directors’ salaries. In the same year, at the
Dublin Steam Packet Co meeting, shareholders asked questions
which were effectively compliments – “we have listened with
great pleasure to the interesting account you have given us”
[Times, 20 November 1918].
The AGM did not operate as a forum for discussion or pub-
lic criticism of directors’ achievements: what the directors said
was a performance that was more or less entirely planned in
advance as an expression of what they considered important.
The coverage of issues such as labor relations and profiteering
was not, therefore, a response to demand from shareholders; the
audience being addressed included not only those present but
also those who would subsequently read newspaper or journal
reports of the AGM.
DISCUSSION
The preceding section of the paper has identified a number
of issues which were frequently addressed at AGMs during and
immediately after the Great War. These concerned the relation-
ship between limited companies and the government, their em-
ployees, their foreign competitors, their shareholders and the
public at large. Some of the discussions of these issues (in par-
ticular to do with the treatment of their employees on active
service or in the workplace) were quantified; others were state-
ments of principle. The tone varied from expressions of support
and solidarity to severe criticism (of government and of employ-
ees), and comments became increasingly negative towards the
end of the war. Examples were found in many industrial and
service sectors, with some concentration by particular sectors
on particular topics; EPD was markedly prominent in the ship-
ping industry and labor relations in coalmining companies.
There was also considerable overlap between the themes ad-
dressed by company chairmen and those taken up by the FBI on
behalf of British industry in general. This section of the paper
will consider the relationship between these findings and corpo-
rate social reporting as it is practiced, and discuss their contri-
bution to current research on the factors encouraging compa-
nies to make social disclosures.
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The History of Corporate Social Reporting: Sethi wrote [1995, p.
18] “The notion of corporate social responsibility . . . came into
vogue almost 25 years ago [and] it almost simultaneously be-
came an issue of general public concern. Its notoriety coincided
with the rise of social activism in the United States”. His state-
ment represents an important element of much academic com-
mentary on corporate social responsibility (CSR) – the belief
that CSR came into being late in the 20th century, and that its
adoption by companies was intrinsically linked with the devel-
opment of changed social expectations about the performance
of industry. The birth of CSR is often associated with the in-
creasing importance of the stakeholder concept in corporate
governance – the identification of groups whose interests the
“business corporation can and should serve” [Preston and
Sapienza, 1990 p. 361]. Their paper identifies the use of the
concept in business and academic writing as early as 1943, and
its “formal introduction” into management writing is placed in
1958, when Dill identified the four major sectors of the “task
environment” as customers, suppliers, competitors and regula-
tory groups. [Preston and Sapienza, 1990, pp. 361-362]. The
term, as opposed to the concept, was apparently first introduced
in 1963 at the Stanford Research Institute, “to generalize the
notion of stockholder as the only group to whom management
need be responsive” [Sternberg, quoting Freeman, 1997, p. 3].
The notion that CSR developed in the wake of the stake-
holder concept, coupled with new social demands on business
that developed in and after the 1960s, underpins much contem-
porary writing about CSR. It is notable that many surveys en-
dorse Sethi by covering the last 30-40 years of the 20th century
as comprising the history of CSR For instance, Tinker et al be-
gin their review [1991] in the mid-1960s,15 and Mathews [1997]
traces the study of CSR from 1970 onwards.16 Gray [2002], in a
recent review of the academic literature from the mid-1970s
onwards, describes social accounting as “typically thought of as
an activity (and a possibility) of emerging interest from about
the mid- to late 1960s”.
Gray qualifies this characterization by admitting that social
accounting can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th
century, and indeed that “it seems inevitable that the wider one
15 Though they admit [1991, p. 31] that the critique of accounting may have
had earlier roots.
16 Similar comments are made by, for instance, Post and Andrews [in
Preston, 1982, p. 1]; Patten [1992, p. 471] and Roberts [1992, p. 596].
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draws the definition of social accounting, the wider the accounts
it incorporates and the more ubiquitous and the deeper-rooted
in history it becomes” [Gray, 2002]. He concedes that “there is
much work to be done by social accountants on such issues”
[ibid.]. There have been studies which look at CSR before the
1960s – e.g. Hogner [1982], Guthrie and Parker [1989], Adams
and Harte [1998], and Unerman, [2000] – but the possibility that
some form of CSR was being practiced before the 1960s has
generally attracted little attention. Deegan, for instance, in an
overview of “some of the research questions that can be pur-
sued” in social and environmental reporting, identifies 13 actual
or potential research areas - investigation of the historical devel-
opment of CSR does not figure among them [Deegan, 2002, pp.
286-288].
History and an Understanding of CSR: The belief that “the devel-
opment of social and environmental accounting and account-
ability practices is still in its infancy (for example, compared to
the long historical practice of financial reporting)” [Deegan,
2002] is understandably widespread, given the focus of most
academic studies. The present paper argues, however, that AGM
disclosures 1914-1919 are part of the early history of CSR, and
that this history has implications for a contemporary under-
standing of the practice.
There are a number of possible objections to this conten-
tion, related to the form and the content of the AGM reports. In
relation to form, it is the case that the subject-matter of this
paper has been taken from newspaper and journal reports of
AGMs, whereas present-day CSR is directly produced by compa-
nies – via annual reports, separate CSR documentation etc. Are
the CSR elements of wartime reports deliberately planned dis-
closures or simply those parts of AGM speeches that were se-
lected by journalists as being particularly controversial? There
are a number of reasons for rejecting the latter suggestion.
When different publications report the same AGM very similar
content appears, suggesting that reports were transcripts, rather
than edited and angled versions of what was said. (The reports
printed in The Economist were paid for by the relevant firm,
which makes it unlikely that the journal exercised editorial con-
trol over their content).17 The absence of CSR material from the
17 For instance there are close resemblances between the reports of
Armstrong Whitworth in The Economist [1918, pp. 374-377] and in The Times
[19 September 1918], and between those of Boots in The Economist [1919, pp.
80-81] and in The Times [16 January 1919].
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newspaper reports of a substantial number of AGMs is also evi-
dence that published reports were not edited highlights of meet-
ings. It appears that political, social and economic elements
were reported when they occurred; speeches that were simply a
commentary on financial results and prospects were recorded as
such.
In relation to content, the statements made by senior busi-
nessmen fall largely into the category of CSR disclosure de-
scribed by Gray et al [1995, p. 86] as “declarative” – their mod-
ern counterparts are categorized as “mission statements,
statements of social responsibility and political statements”
[Gray et al, 1995, p. 89]. There are some quantitative and mon-
etary elements – e.g. the number of staff who had joined the
forces, the amounts of tax/wages/benefits paid in the public in-
terest – but the majority of the disclosures are narrative state-
ments or political/economic arguments. The preponderance of
qualitative material marks a difference from contemporary prac-
tice, and from contemporary attempts to find new methods of
accounting for/quantifying activities, but the qualitative material
is still a form of disclosure.
The objection might also be made that the disclosures made
are simply self-expression by businessmen with strong political
views, and that the content of the present paper is therefore
anecdotal, rather than evidence of a general tendency amongst
British businesses. The evidence offered can be supported in a
number of ways. One aspect that deserves attention is the wide
spread of companies making CSR disclosures. As noted above,
companies in certain sectors placed particular stress on certain
disclosures (shipping and EPD, mining and labor relations), but
examples of such disclosures can be found among a wide spec-
trum of industries and trades – including armaments, iron and
steel, food, textiles, chemicals, petroleum and rubber.
The topics that are covered, as noted earlier, fall into a
limited number of categories, suggesting that there were certain
concerns – about profits and taxation, labor relations, and gov-
ernment intervention – that preoccupied many businesses. The
timing of disclosures also coincides – manpower contribution
was a topic for the early part of the war; comments on EPD and
labor relations became less positive as time wore on, again sug-
gesting a shared point of view. Finally, the extent to which the
FBI acted as a proponent of similar arguments suggests that
these were shared by many businessmen who were ready to
support an organization that would speak on their behalf.
The findings summarized in this paper are of interest for a
175
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2005, Vol. 32, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2005
167Maltby: Corporate Social Reporting
number of reasons. They offer an insight into the publicly-ex-
pressed views of senior businessmen in a period where these
were not widely recorded,18 and they contribute towards an un-
derstanding of the history of CSR, which, as Gray [2002] points
out, deserves further exploration. 1914-1919 was a period in
which businesses were collectively exposed to a number of simi-
lar challenges. It was a stimulus for them to respond vehemently
with a repertoire of similar arguments that are a striking case-
study in CSR. This is not to suggest, however, that CSR was a
product of the First World War in Britain which then went into
abeyance until the 1970s. Maltby [2004] gives an overview of
similar reporting strategies by a number of large manufacturing
firms over the first three decades of the 20th century: there,
again, different companies appear to have identified similar is-
sues and applied similar arguments in countering them. As
noted above, there have been a number of previous studies
which look at CSR prior to the 1970s, but there is still a need to
establish how widely CSR was practiced during – and indeed
before – the 20th century, what social and political challenges
appear to have prompted it and what arguments were adopted
by companies in putting their case.
Why did company chairmen publicly express strong views
on issues of taxation, labor relations and government control
during the Great War? Contemporary writing about CSR offers
a number of competing explanations for the activity, which may
also be applied to the findings of the present paper. From the
company’s viewpoint, CSR may be seen as an attempt to com-
municate with an audience of stakeholders, inside and outside
the firm. Certainly the examples offered above display
management’s desire to demonstrate patriotism, and to impress
shareholders with their concern to promote profitability as far
as was consistent with serving the national interest, but it is
questionable how far management was communicating with
workers as stakeholders. At some points, the management style
was to treat the workforce as part of a team – at others, manage-
ment was accusing workers of an unrealistic or a deliberately
destructive attitude. Similarly, Maltby [2004, p. 431] quotes the
managing director of Hadfields as treating working men as “col-
leagues” in a 1907 speech; in 1920, he inveighed against the
danger of “red ruin” caused by their strikes. Workers appear to
18 Boswell and Johns, [1982, p. 425] note the potential usefulness of com-
pany chairmen’s speeches as a record of business attitudes.
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have been treated as stakeholders only as long as they were co-
operative.
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies report in order
to demonstrate their adherence to social norms and expecta-
tions – they are reacting to external pressures [see for instance
Deegan, 2002, pp. 282-311]. Political economy theory on the
other hand regards CSR as proactive, “information provided
from management’s perspective designed to set and shape the
agenda of debate” [Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351].19 Cer-
tainly, wartime reports attempted to demonstrate patriotism
and selflessness – companies’ contribution to the war effort via
tax, manpower and charitable donations. To this extent, they
were legitimizing themselves by allying themselves with the na-
tional spirit. But the vehemence with which many businessmen
defended their position arguably goes beyond legitimating.
Their attacks on government incompetence and trades union
Bolshevism suggest that the disclosures made at AGMs were
indeed an attempt to set, rather than observe, the agenda and to
“show a strong front” to a potentially hostile public. In the same
way, armaments manufacturers in the 1930s made the case that
they were not self-interested warmongers but essential to na-
tional security [Maltby, 2004, pp. 433-434].
The AGM provided companies with an opportunity to ad-
vance “the business case” [Owen et al, 2001] using a medium
that would enable them to communicate not only with share-
holders but with the newspaper-reading public in general. As the
environment changed – in wartime with the increasing level of
EPD and growing problems in labor relations – the tone of AGM
speeches became increasingly aggressive. Companies went be-
yond aligning themselves with national interests: they were
making the case for their own values – for what Sir Robert
Hadfield later called their “necessary and honourable service to
the nation” [Maltby, 2004, p. 433]. This was achieved not only
by recounting their own achievements but attacking those who
criticized them or limited their freedom of action. Limited com-
panies were not merely supporters of patriotic values; they pre-
sented themselves as embodying those values. When the Chair-
man of John Brown claimed that his company “were never
encouraged by the government to do more than they had done;
on the contrary they found themselves in advance of the govern-
19 This is the interpretation placed by Unerman on the disclosures made by
Shell 1950-1965, which commented on government behaviour and taxation as it
affected the petrol industry.
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ment demands” [Economist, 1915, pp. 22-23] he was doing more
than legitimizing his company – he was presenting it as part of
the vanguard of national security.
Recognition that CSR is not the product of a new ethos, but
rather a continuing response to social and political challenges,
offers scope for further exploration of the motives behind its
adoption and the themes which management chooses to ad-
dress. An investigation of the history of CSR has much to con-
tribute not only to the discussion of modern CSR but to an
understanding of the relationship between business and society.
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Abstract: Burchell et al’s [1985] historical analysis of value added in
the UK attributes its rise and fall to societal circumstances which
initially encouraged the voluntary disclosure of the Value Added
Statement (VAS) by companies and then, following societal change,
influenced its disappearance. This paper supplements Burchell et al’s
thesis by arguing that a fuller explanation for the disappearance of
the VAS can be found by also considering the contents of the state-
ment itself. An empirical study of the information in the VASs of UK
companies shows that they were unlikely to give support to the eco-
nomic interests of the employee user group who had been promoted
as an important beneficiary of the VAS. The study demonstrates that
the social and economic nature of accounting means that change
analyses which take account of both aspects of the discipline’s char-
acter are likely to be more convincing than those which focus solely
on one or the other.
INTRODUCTION
Although earlier reference can be found to value added (VA)
in the accounting literature (e.g. Suojanen [1954], Ball [1968]) it
was the influential advocacy of this measure in The Corporate
Report [ASSC, 1975] that coincided with the emergence of a
practical financial accounting interest in VA in the UK. At this
time VA reporting began to attract the attention of corporate
management, employees and trade unions, the accounting pro-
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fession, accounting academia and government. Each of these
groups exhibited a substantially favorable disposition towards
the preparation of VA information by accountants and its ex-
plicit public disclosure by UK companies. This consensus led,
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, to the voluntary inclusion
of a Value Added Statement (VAS) in a considerable number of
annual shareholder reports. However, the VA phenomenon in
the UK proved to be short-lived and by the mid-1980s interest in
it had waned and the VAS quickly disappeared from corporate
financial reports. Subsequently no significant practical interest
has been shown in the VAS and it therefore remains a brief
episode in the recent history of UK financial reporting.
This paper explores the reasons both for this rapid disap-
pearance and for the VAS’s continuing absence as a practical
financial accounting issue. It does so on the basis of an empiri-
cal analysis of the utility of the information content of UK cor-
porate VASs. This analysis is designed to ascertain whether the
new disclosure served the interests of the employee stakeholder
group who were identified as the major beneficiary of the VAS.
This group comprised company directors, who controlled the
voluntary disclosure of the VAS, other employees and trade
unions. A positivist approach is employed to provide an explana-
tion of a significant change in financial accounting [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979]. In this instance the positive approach is not
used as a basis for predicting behavior but to explain behavior
retrospectively by reference to the possible economic conse-
quences [Zeff, 1978] of the information contained in the VAS for
those responsible for its supply and demand. The analysis sug-
gests that the information content of the VAS was likely to have
been prejudicial to the interests of the company employee stake-
holder group that it was intended to benefit. In addition, infor-
mation deficiencies in the VAS compromised its ability to meet
some important aspects of the purposes on which its advocacy
had been based. These findings are used to supplement an exist-
ing social history of this period of accounting engagement with
VA in the UK [Burchell et al, 1985]. The findings also provide an
explanation of the VAS’s failure to subsequently reappear on the
UK financial accounting scene.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a summary is given
of the development of interest in the VAS in the UK from 1975
to 1980, a period during which its popularity reached a zenith.
Second, a review is undertaken of the existing historical study
[Burchell et al, 1985] that traces the societal influences that can
be implicated in the rise and fall of the VAS in the UK. A case is
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made for extending this analysis to encompass an examination
of VA information, from the producer and user perspectives,
both for this period and afterwards. Third, empirical data on the
content of the VAS is presented both from the late 1970s (from
voluntarily disclosed VASs) and also from a later period in
which there was no explicit disclosure of VA information by UK
companies (the information was reconstructed from accounting
information obtained from commercial corporate databases).
This data is then used to argue a positive case, reflecting infor-
mation user self interest, for the initial abandonment and non-
reappearance of the VAS in the UK. In this way the explanation
for the disappearance of the VAS is enhanced. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn on the explanation for this change in
financial reporting.
THE VAS IN THE UK
The Corporate Report [ASSC, 1975] provided an impetus for the
UK accounting profession to engage with both the concept and
practice of VA. It defined VA as sales income less materials and
services purchased that results in a measure of “the wealth the
reporting entity has been able to create by its own and its em-
ployees’ efforts” [ASSC, 1975, p. 49].
It also contained a pro forma VAS (see Appendix 1) and
advocacy of the VAS based on the notion that it would comple-
ment the existing financial statements (particularly the profit
and loss account) by providing a stakeholder as opposed to a
shareholder perspective on performance:
The simplest and most immediate way of putting profit
into proper perspective vis a vis the whole enterprise as
a collective effort by capital, management and employ-
ees is by presentation of a statement of value added . . .
profit is a part only of value added. From value added
must come wages, dividends and interest, taxes and
funds for new investment. The interdependence of each
is made more apparent by a statement of value added
[ASSC, 1975, p. 49].
Four of the UK’s leading professional accounting institutes
commissioned studies of VA shortly after the The Corporate
Report’s promotion of the VAS (Morley [1978] for The Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Cox [1979] for The Insti-
tute of Cost and Management Accountants, Renshall et al [1979]
for The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales and Gray and Maunders [1980] for The Association of
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Certified Accountants). At least one accountancy firm produced
a publication on the topic [Binder Hamlin and Fry and Co.,
1978]. With the exception of Cox [1979], who focused on the
internal use of the VA measure, there was much overlap in these
texts. They all provided practical assessments of the use of VA as
a measure of corporate performance to be reported externally by
accountants. Their main focus was on two aspects of VA. The
first was an identification of its main advantages and disadvan-
tages and the second covered the technical measurement issues
raised by its computation.
Morley’s [1978] comprehensive listing of the VAS’s benefits
was largely supported by the other accountancy institute stud-
ies. A summary of benefits is contained in Table 1. It mirrors
The Corporate Report advocacy and extends this by emphasizing
the value of the disclosure of VA distribution to individual stake-
holders and its worth as a corporate size indicator, a national
income measure and a foundation for productivity based incen-
tive schemes.
TABLE 1
Summary of the Advantages of the VAS
1. VA reflects a broader perspective on corporate performance than profit and
will therefore encourage a more co-operative outlook among stakeholders.
2. The facilitation of VA based incentive schemes to reward employees when
productivity (as measured by VA and VA based ratios) is improved.
3. Disclosure of employees’ share of VA that may combat belief in the exploita-
tion of labour.
4. Disclosure of government share of VA facilitates an assessment of the fair-
ness of taxation.
5. Disclosure of the share of VA for maintenance and expansion of investment
directs attention to managerial policy in this important area.
6. VA is a superior measure of company size. It avoids the disadvantages of
alternatives e.g. sales inflate size where there are many bought-in materials
and services, capital employed favours capital intensive firms and number of
employees favors labor intensive firms.
7. VA reports the individual firm’s contribution to national income and may
therefore play a role in the management of the national economy.
 Source: Based on Morley [1978, pp. 19-25].
While all four of the institute’s reports were predominantly
in favor of VASs and reflected the main positive expectations
held about VA at the time, it would be unfair to say that their
supportive views were expressed without reservation. It was rec-
ognized that VA and profit could result in contrasting indica-
tions of performance. For example, the former could have a
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positive value while the corresponding profit was negative due
to a distribution of more than the total VA generated to employ-
ees in remuneration. Moreover, the pursuit of VA as an objective
could lead to the sub-optimization of profit (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
Contrasting Profit and VA Maximization
 PROFIT VA QUANTITY
MAXIMIZING MAXIMIZING
OUTPUT OUTPUT
 VA maximization would mean a profit loss represented by triangle ABC.
£ B
MC
BOUGHT-IN
MATERIALS & SERVICES
A
C MR
VA measurement issues incorporated many of the existing
weaknesses of financial accounting, as the VAS was a derivative
of the existing profit and loss account. However, there were also
some specific measurement problems relating to VA. The most
significant of these was the treatment of depreciation. It could
be considered a distribution of VA and reported under the head-
ing, maintenance and expansion of investment. Alternatively it
could be viewed as a component of bought-in materials and
services (representing the cost of services obtained from bought-
in fixed assets). Thus depreciation could be treated as a distribu-
tion of VA or as a part of the computation of VA, depending
upon whether its accounting effect or its inherent nature was
given priority in coming to a decision on the manner of its
accommodation in the VAS. This flexibility gave rise to a dual
possibility in the measurement of VA as both gross VA (former
treatment) and net VA (latter treatment) could be calculated.
Other issues, likely to be less significant than depreciation,
were also identified. They included the option of computing VA
on either a sales or a production basis, the treatment of non-
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trading income (additional to VA as a source of stakeholder
rewards which could be treated as a deduction from the cost of
bought-in materials and services or as an add on to VA), minor-
ity interests (which could be shown as a distribution to investors
or as a part of retentions), extra-ordinary items (which could be
submerged in bought-in materials and services or divided under
different headings if say some portion of it were a labor cost and
therefore a distribution to employees), and the government dis-
tribution (which could be reserved for corporation tax alone or
incorporate road tax, national insurance, employee income tax
and local authority rates etc).
Professional journals in Britain reflected the contemporary
institutional attention given to the VAS. For example, the jour-
nal Accountancy included regular papers on the VAS between
1975 and the early 1980s. Initially, these provided guidance on
and examples of the preparation and presentation of VASs
[Lafferty and Neely, 1975; Pendrill, 1977; Roullier, 1978; Ruther-
ford, 1978]. Later they dealt with more varied issues including
modification of the VAS to a cash basis [Burns, 1978], issues in
its standardization [Smiddy, 1980; Purdy, 1981], how to take
account of inflation when preparing it [Burns, 1980; Rutherford,
1982], and its use in employee reporting [Burchell et al, 1981;
Hussey, 1981].
In parallel with the professional accounting interest in the
VAS the Labour government, 1974-1979 also signaled their sup-
port and encouragement for the accounting profession to pursue
its interest in VA. A consultative document issued for comment
by the Department of Trade in 1976 stated that priority should
be given to added value for further consideration as a candidate
for statutory disclosure. This proposal was reinforced one year
later when it became the basis for the government Green Paper
on The Future of Company Reports [Department of Trade, 1977a]
that contained a specific suggestion for the inclusion of a VAS.
Other user groups of accounting information confirmed
that the 1970s interest in VA was broad based. While Burchell et
al [1985] do provide evidence of its use in stockbrokers’ reports
the main demand for VA information was as information for
managers, other employees and trade unions. For these group-
ings VA received advocacy from employers, the TUC, academics
and from practicing accountants who incorporated it in their
employee reports. Exposure to the VA measure for these parties
came in the form of productivity schemes and incentive reward
schemes to which VA was central [Gilchrist, 1971; Smith, 1978;
Cox, 1979]. Woodmansay [1978] estimated that between 200
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and 300 UK companies were operating VA based schemes of this
type during the 1970s. While these did not necessarily require
the disclosure of a VAS in the annual report it is likely that their
existence stimulated interest in VA both among those operating
the schemes and those subject to them. The importance instilled
in the VA measure through these schemes underpinned its eco-
nomic significance for the firm and consequently the impor-
tance of its public disclosure.
Further employee familiarity with VA came through the
burgeoning 1970s’ practice of employee reporting in which VA
reports featured strongly [Goodlad, 1976; Parker, 1976; Hilton,
1978; Purdy, 1981; Lewis et al, 1984]. Once again the availability
of VA information to the workforce enhanced its importance
and hence the case for its wider dissemination. Burchell et al
[1985] suggest that the economic importance of VA could also
be attributed to its use by both trades unions and employers
trade associations although they present little evidence of its
active role in the process of collective bargaining. In 1974, the
TUC recommended that VA had a role to play in explaining
company performance to employees and one prominent employ-
ers’ association (the Engineering Employers’ Federation) sug-
gested that VA information could serve as a guide to manage-
ment in formulating wages policy.
Within accountancy education the VAS soon became an es-
tablished topic featuring in several leading texts (e.g. Lewis et al
[1981], Glautier and Underdown [1982], Fanning and Pendle-
bury [1984]). In addition to their major contribution to the pro-
fessional institutes’ assessments of the VAS academics had also
engaged in a range of research work on the topic. Rutherford
[1977] and McLeay compared the accounting concept of VA
proposed in The Corporate Report with economic approaches to
its measurement. Morley [1979] repeated much of his analysis
for the profession in a form suitable for an academic audience.
Gee [1977, pp. 72-73] advocated the use of VA based ratios in
directing divisional investment inside the firm. Foley and Maun-
ders [1977, pp. 168-170] outlined the role that VA could play in
collective bargaining as a ‘divisible fund’ of relevance to negotia-
tors. They argued that VA, in this role, could promote construc-
tive conflict by assisting in prompt information-derived settle-
ments accepted by both parties to a dispute as fair. Burchell et
al [1985] used the UK’s experience of VA to propose a model
explaining how accounting practice developments were suscep-
tible to influence by the society in which they occur. Their ideas
are reviewed more fully in the next section of the paper. How-
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ever, little systematic empirical research was carried out. One
exception was Rutherford [1980] who surveyed the VASs of
firms in The Times Top 250 published between 1975 and 1978.
He found considerable variety in their presentation, terminology
and measurement although the guidance proposed in The Cor-
porate Report was highly influential. Surprisingly, no studies of
the actual information contents of published VASs were under-
taken and this omission has restricted assessment of actual user
benefits obtained from this novel form of disclosure.
The interest in and enthusiasm for the VAS in the UK was
translated into practical action by a considerable number of
companies. Rutherford [1980] found 60 instances of the VAS in
the annual reports of companies in The Times Top 250 UK com-
panies for the year July 1977 to June 1978. A survey of the
companies in the FT All Share Index by Platt [1978] found 96
VAS disclosures. Burchell et al [1985] list the number of compa-
nies that were recorded in the contemporary surveys of UK pub-
lished accounts as reporting on VA. A peak of 90 occurred in
1979/80. Thus Morley’s [1978] assertion that around 20% of the
UK’s leading companies were disclosing a VAS is likely not to be
too far off the mark.
EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE VAS IN THE UK
Burchell et al’s [1985] historical analysis of the VAS in the
UK was a seminal contribution to the accounting research lit-
erature. In part its importance rests on the clarity of focus it
offered on a highly unique and specific change in accounting
practice i.e. the widespread interest in and prominence of VA in
the UK during the late 1970s. The practical accounting manifes-
tation of the VA phenomenon in the UK was particularly un-
usual. It is a rarity for companies to voluntarily disclose a novel
financial statement. In addition, Burchell et al’s study is distin-
guished by being one of the earliest analyses demonstrating ac-
counting as a social practice. Its significance is enhanced by the
absence of other histories of VA development in the UK, by the
recognition of its importance by accounting historians (see for
example, Parker and Yamey [1994, p. 9], who reproduce the
paper and describe it as having “brought into accounting history
concerns not previously considered”) and by its influence on
subsequent research including the development of the genea-
logical approach to historical research in accounting [Miller and
Napier, 1993].
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Burchell et al [1985] used both the popularity of VA in the
UK in the 1970s and its decline in the 1980s as empirical evi-
dence to illustrate and substantiate their ideas. They attributed
both the emergence of VA, its rapid development and its short
life to prevailing societal circumstances. The rise and fall of the
VAS was an exemplar of how aspects of the social environment
could interact with accounting at a technical and practical level.
The VAS provided an opportune example to explore the ne-
glected relationship between accounting and the society in
which it exists:
. . . the social can influence the technical practice of ac-
counting and that that in turn, can mobilise and change
the world of the social . . . little is known of how the
technical practices of accounting are tethered to the
social, of how wider social forces can impinge upon
and change accounting, and of how accounting itself
functions in the realm of the social, influencing as well
as reacting to it [Burchell et al, 1985, pp. 381-382].
The social factors, which Burchell et al [1985] associate
with the voluntary disclosure of the VAS by some UK compa-
nies, are represented as a conjunction of three arenas. Although
they are separately presented and described, they possessed in-
ter-connections that compounded their power to influence ac-
counting practice.
The first social factor concerned the situation of the ac-
counting profession. The 1970s found the profession in a
struggle over standardization and great efforts to avoid the
threat of government intervention and preserve its powers of
self-regulation. This followed the adverse publicity on the issue
of accounting flexibility that had been raised by the GEC/AEI
and Leasco-Pergamon takeovers [Stamp and Marley, 1970;
Leach and Stamp, 1981; Stamp, 1985]. The Accounting Stan-
dards Steering Committee, the body responsible for overseeing
the new accounting standards program, had commissioned The
Corporate Report as a discussion document. The profession was
keen to be seen as proactive in both regulating and developing
its discipline. The VAS represented an initiative which would
not only help achieve this but would also show the profession as
sensitive to developments in the other two relevant social arenas
of the time.
One of these was the nature of the prevailing system of
industrial relations. The period 1974-1979 saw a Labour govern-
ment promote the interests of the employee. Industrial democ-
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racy was given prominence as a solution to many of the UK’s
industrial ills [Department of Trade, 1977b]. Politically, it was
felt that redefining the balance of power between employer and
employee would lead to improved industrial relations and more
responsible collective bargaining. A key component in the
achievement of these aims was the provision of information to
employees and trades unions. In 1971, under a Conservative
government, statutory duties were laid upon management, for
the first time, to disclose information to workers [Industrial Re-
lations Act, 1971, s.56]. However, six years and a political
change occurred before a code of practice for this purpose was
produced [ACAS, 1977]. The VAS with its more neutral perspec-
tive on corporate performance was, in many ways, a perfect fit
to these developments.
The third societal arena influencing the progress of VA re-
porting also lay in the political realm and was related to the
management of the national economy. During the 1970s in-
comes policies were a prominent and recurring feature of the
political landscape [Behrend, 1973; 1978]. Norms for wage rise
were set on both voluntary and mandatory bases. However,
these incomes policies allowed wage rises in excess of the norm
where justified by productivity improvements. This fostered an
important role for VA as VA itself and VA based ratios provided
a convenient means of measuring productivity change. VA there-
fore assumed an importance for employee remuneration
schemes at the level of the firm and this reinforced the relevance
of the VAS to both the employee and employer.
These circumstances, so conducive to the VAS’s rise to
prominence, did not endure for long. In 1979 a right wing Con-
servative government was returned and the above professional,
political and economic elements of the societal contexts were
radically altered. The three arenas, which had offered a com-
bined support to VA reporting, were “ruptured and transformed”
[Burchell et al, 1985, p.405]. As a result of their absence during
the 1980s, the corporate voluntary disclosure of VASs rapidly
declined and the VAS eventually disappeared from the UK finan-
cial reporting scene.
In their analysis of the UK corporations’ flirtation with the
VAS, Burchell et al [1985] have quite overtly emphasized the
societal as the dominant influence on financial accounting
change. This explanation does much to address the actions
taken by those companies who voluntarily published a VAS dur-
ing the 1970s. However, it does not accommodate the distinc-
tion between these companies and the large majority of UK
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companies who did not disclose a VAS in their annual report.
Why did the same social pressures result in a change in account-
ing practice in some companies but not in others? Moreover, the
VAS did not reassume prominence when the social context
changed once again in 1997 with the return of a Labour govern-
ment. Although extended disclosure requirements in the late
1980s allowed the user to reconstruct the VAS (as we have done
in this study), the cessation of its explicit presentation in corpo-
rate reports has continued and its profile as an additional finan-
cial statement has remained low. The evidence suggests that
while social factors were important they did not compel VAS
disclosure. They were not the only factors implicated in either
the cross-sectional or longitudinal patterns of voluntary VAS
disclosure and non-disclosure by UK companies.
The Burchell et al [1985] study overcame the neglect of the
social apparent in the research literature until that time. How-
ever the evidence presented here will suggest that, through their
exclusive emphasis on the social, the significance of the techni-
cal aspects of accounting as a change-driver of VA reporting has
been largely ignored. There is an absence in their analysis of any
consideration of the information content delivered by the VAS
and its match to user expectations and needs. Accounting is a
social and technical discipline and the interaction of both of
these twin aspects is relevant to an explanation of change (or,
indeed, of no change) in accounting practice. Any analysis omit-
ting consideration of either of these aspects of the discipline’s
character may be viewed as partial.
This paper focuses on the impact of the information con-
tained in the VAS on corporate employee stakeholders, includ-
ing company directors who control its voluntary disclosure. The
possible effects of the VAS on employees are examined as a
factor influencing its demise. It is thus intended to supplement
the Burchell et al [1985] analysis by bringing the technical as-
pect of accounting information content more to the fore as an
explanatory factor in accounting change. In this way, the evi-
dence of differential action by companies and the non-reappear-
ance of the VAS can be more convincingly addressed. The analy-
sis is based on a premise that continuation or cessation of the
supply of the VAS, once begun, would be influenced by the
experiences of those in receipt of the information. Did the VAS
live up to expectations? Did it fulfill its expected purposes? Did
it prove to be of value to users? Without addressing these ques-
tions, explanation of the VAS’s disappearance is unlikely to be
complete. Burchell et al’s [1985] societal thesis is more convinc-
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ing when applied to the introduction of the VAS as, at the stage
of first introduction, it would have represented novel intelli-
gence for many information users. Its actual content would have
been an unknown to most employee recipients and therefore it
would have been less influential in the decision to disclose. After
exposure to the VAS, however, users’ attitudes to it and demand
for it would be colored by their actual experience of it. Conse-
quently, in addition to the broader societal influences prevailing,
explanation of the demise of the VAS merits specific consider-
ation of the content that it had actually offered to its users.
The additional outlay cost of supplying a VAS is small. All of
its contents are readily available and the statement itself adds
little to the size of the annual report. From a cost-benefit per-
spective, therefore, it would appear that the majority of compa-
nies had either anticipated few benefits or had identified hidden
costs associated with the new statement as they had decided not
to include a VAS in their annual report. Moreover, for those
companies who did publish a VAS, their prompt abandonment
of it indicated that few benefits were realized by its provision.
The examination of the contents of the statement can help to
explain the apparent lack of benefit attaching to its disclosure.
If VAS information did, in fact, prove useful to the em-
ployee recipients of accounting information then it is logical to
expect that this utility would be a powerful force for its reten-
tion and indeed its extension through making its provision man-
datory. Moreover, if a supply of useful information has been
stopped, then, even in the changed societal circumstances of the
1980s, some dissent by those affected would have been expected.
Unlike other financial accounting changes at this time such as
current cost accounting [Pong and Whittington, 1996], in the
case of the VAS, disappearance appears to have been both quick
and quiet [Burchell et al, 1985] and subsequently there has been
no apparent pressure in the UK for its reinstatement. For ex-
ample, scrutiny of key professional accounting journals (Ac-
countancy, Management Accounting and The Accountants’ Maga-
zine) for the period 1985-1990 reveals only one indexed
reference to VA [Report and Accounts, 1988]. This comprises a
short editorial piece commenting on the disappearance of the
VAS and attributing its decline to the changing political and
economic climate, the current prosperity of UK companies as
compared to the 1970s and the increasing bulkiness of company
reports. No reference is made to any great information loss from
its demise but it is suggested that a return to more difficult
economic conditions could revive interest in it. The manner of
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the VAS’s disappearance is therefore consistent with its content
lacking any enduring appeal to key potential users. To investi-
gate this possibility an empirical analysis of the information
content of UK corporate VASs is presented in the following sec-
tion.
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF THE VAS IN THE UK
Two sets of empirical data were gathered on the content of
VASs in the UK. The first relates to 1978 when the voluntary
disclosure of the VAS had become established. This analysis was
based on the VAS contents of half of the companies identified as
voluntary VAS disclosers by Platt [1978] in his survey of firms in
the 1978 FT All Share Index. The second relates to the period
1994-2003. This choice was possible and desirable for a number
of reasons. First, the Companies Act, 1985 (Schedule 4.56(4))
required companies to disclose the total annual remuneration
earned by employees for the first time. Access to this figure and
other annual report information enabled the VAS to be recon-
structed1 after this date. This period also allowed research ac-
cess to corporate databases (in this case Fame and Datastream)
1 This was achieved as follows:
VA is computed as, St - Bt = VAt
where,
St = Sales for the year t.
Bt = Bought-in materials and services for year t.
VAt =Value added for year t.
As B is not disclosed by companies, VA cannot be computed in this way.
However, as shown below VA is also equal to the summation of its distribution
to stakeholders.
VAt =Wt + Tt + Divt + It + Pt + Dept
where,
Wt = employee remuneration for year t.
Tt = taxation for year t.
Divt = dividend for year t.
It= Interest for year t.
Pt = profit retained for year t.
Dept = depreciation for year t.
As W, T, Div, I, P, and Dep are all required disclosures in the annual report,
VA can be computed from their summation and B is therefore identifiable as a
missing figure. Morley [1978, p. 50] suggests that this approach to VA measure-
ment was adopted by corporate VAS preparers, “. . . in practice the VAS is pre-
pared using bought-in items as the balancing figure”. Rutherford [1977] con-
firms this, describing bought-in items as a “sink” used by those reporting VA for
all the items difficult to classify elsewhere.
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that facilitated the gathering of the appropriate accounting vari-
ables for both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses. The pe-
riod chosen therefore permitted the VAS to be considered over a
period at the mid point of which a significant political change
occurred with the return of a Labour government in 1997. All
UK quoted companies (excluding investment trusts) who sur-
vived for the whole of this period are included. The following
data analysis is therefore based on 409 companies.
VAS Content, 1978: Table 2 reveals the average amount of VA
earned by the 48 companies studied and shows how the VA
created by them was distributed. The distribution categories
largely match those suggested in The Corporate Report (ASSC
[1975], see also Appendix 1) although minority interest is identi-
fied as a separate category and the company directors’ share is
distinguished from that of other employees. At just under 70%
on average (directors 0.5% and other employees 68.4%), the em-
ployees’ share was by far the largest. This confirms Morley’s
[Morley, 1978, p.21] opinion that, in the 1970s, employees typi-
cally obtained around 70% of their company’s VA. Other indi-
vidual stakeholders all received less than 10% of the VA gener-
ated.
VAS Content, 1994-2003: The results of reconstructing the VASs
of UK companies are summarized in Table 3. They reveal a
considerable growth in VA over the period. Although the two
sets of companies are not matched, the VA distribution is, in
many respects, similar to that of the companies studied in 1978.
The employee group has remained, with an average share of
almost 70% (directors 4.2% plus other employees 64.6%), the
major recipient of VA by quite some margin. In fact, they have
even made a small proportional gain over the period. Sharehold-
ers and lenders average 8.5% and 7.2% of VA respectively and in
both cases their shares have been reasonably stable. The ‘losers’
have been government and particularly the maintenance and
expansion category. The latter is despite a substantial increase
TABLE 2
Value Added Distribution in the UK, 1978
Year Average Directors Other Share- Lenders Minority Govt. Depre- Retained
Firm VA % Employees holders % % % ciation Profits
(£m) % % % %
1978 205.9 0.5 68.4 3.4 3.6 0.4 8.4 7.4 7.9
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TABLE 3
VA Distribution in the UK, 1994-2003
Year Average Directors Other Share- Lenders Minority Govt. Depre- Retained
Firm VA % Employees holders % % % ciation Profits
(£m) % % % %
1994 146.8 4.3 61.4 7.3 7.3 0.6 7.1 8.3 3.7
1995 166.0 4.2 61.8 8.2 8.3 0.4 7.4 8.7 1.0
1996 173.2 4.2 60.2 8.3 7.0 0.7 7.3 9.1 3.2
1997 195.2 5.4 68.5 8.4 9.7 0.6 5.8 11.3 (9.7)
1998 206.1 3.8 62.4 8.3 7.2 0.3 7.4 9.1 1.5
1999 231.7 3.9 63.3 10.1 6.6 0.3 6.8 10.3 (1.3)
2000 298.7 4.3 64.6 8.4 8.4 0.3 7.0 12.4 (5.4)
2001 274.9 3.8 59.9 8.3 4.6 0.5 6.1 11.5 5.8
2002 299.3 3.9 64.6 8.5 6.9 0.5 6.1 12.6 (3.0)
2003 320.6 4.7 74.5 8.3 7.7 0.5 4.3 15.2 (15.2)
Aver-
age 231.3 4.2 64.6 8.5 7.2 0.5 6.4 11.3 (2.7)
in depreciation that could not compensate for the marked dete-
rioration in retained profits.
EMPLOYEES AND THE VAS
The preceding literature review indicates that, within the
UK, one of the major objectives proposed for the VAS was to
provide a counter balance to the proprietary orientation of con-
ventional financial statements. Consequently, company employ-
ees were intended to be the prime beneficiary of the VAS. This
section assesses the extent to which the contents of the VAS
would support the economic interests of employees. It is based
on the presumption that there are two main purposes underly-
ing employee demand for accounting information of the type
contained in the VAS. These are (1) the evaluation of employ-
ment security and (2) the attainment of an acceptable level of
remuneration [ASSC, 1975; Maunders, 1984].
The first area of employee concern relates to the ongoing
financial viability of the company and its prospects for employ-
ment growth or downsizing. Like the other financial statements
in the annual report the contents of the VAS are historic in
nature and consequently are not designed to directly indicate
future performance. Moreover, it is profitability and liquidity
that are the financial characteristics most closely linked to cor-
porate survival and growth and it is the profit and loss account,
balance sheet and cash flow statement that contain information
most relevant to these dimensions of corporate performance.
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Indeed, a pre-occupation with the pursuit of VA may even com-
promise profitability (see Figure 1). In any case, the VAS adds
little information to that already available in the annual report.
In the 1970s it was only the segmentation of cost into bought-in
materials and services and employee remuneration that was new
information in the VAS. Since 1985 all of the components of the
VAS can be obtained from the annual report. New insights into
the future prospects of the company were therefore unlikely
from the VAS. Even the strong advocacy of the VAS in the 1970s
did not claim any suitability for this particular purpose.
It was the second area of employee information use that
was seen as particularly apposite by the advocates of VAS. How-
ever, this may be to take an optimistic view of the statement’s
worth for even during the 1970s when the advocacy of VA was at
its strongest, the main arguments used in collective bargaining
by trade union wage negotiators were based on the cost of living
and on comparability with others [Glendon et al, 1975]. Com-
pared to these factors, aspects of corporate financial perfor-
mance were not highly rated as a basis for obtaining wage rises.
In theory, employees can make use of the VA distribution to
assess the level of corporate benefits obtained and use this intel-
ligence to substantiate a bargaining case for increased remu-
neration. This can be done by comparing the employees’ share
of VA with those of other stakeholders and by monitoring, over
time, whether they are losing out in the share out of VA. If, for
example employees’ share of value added appeared low relative
to other stakeholders or was diminishing over time then this
information could be used to underpin their case for higher
wages.
The above data presented on VAS in the UK content shows
that employees obtained, on average, by far the largest portion
of VA. It may therefore be difficult to make a case for increased
wages on the basis of an unfair attribution of VA when around
70% is already being obtained. If the alternative net measure of
VA were to be used the employee percentage is raised to an
average of over 75% of VA. The dynamics of VA distribution
offer no additional support to the employee case for remunera-
tion enhancement either. If Morley’s [1978] claim that “In gen-
eral the employees’ share of VA of British companies has risen
steadily over the past three decades and is now at a much higher
level than in many competing nations, notably Japan” is true
then the high share of VA attributed to employees in the 1970s
was the culmination of a period of consistent increase [Morley,
1978, p. 21].
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Moreover, the recent 1994-2003 data reveals that employees
have maintained and, indeed, marginally enhanced their share
of VA. Taken at face value, the information content of the VAS
shows that employees, far from being disadvantaged or ex-
ploited, are the main winners in the VA share out. The content
of the VAS actually provides ammunition to the other stakehold-
ers for a re-distribution in their favor.
One further reason why the VAS is lacking in appeal to
employees as a bargaining tool lies in an important deficiency in
its content. In a period when share values have increased, the
employees’ return relative to that of shareholders can be exag-
gerated by the VAS to the detriment of the employees’ case for a
greater share. The VAS shows shareholders as benefiting only
from dividends. Their return in the form of the capital apprecia-
tion of their shares is excluded, as corporate accounting systems
do not incorporate capital gains on shares. This factor can be
significant enough to make a considerable impact on the com-
parative benefits enjoyed by employees and shareholders. For
the companies used in the 1994-2003 analysis the capital gains
obtained by shareholders were as shown in Table 4. Although
considerable variation is apparent, in all sectors capital gains
considerably exceeded the dividend return shown in the VAS.
Overall capital gains have a weighted average that is 3.6 times
that of dividends. Thus the main element of shareholder return
TABLE 4
Capital Returns to Shareholders, 1994-2003
USSIC Average of Average of Ratio of
Change in Dividend Capital Gains
Market Value Receipts To Dividends
(£m) (£m)
Agriculture, Forestry
And Fishing 12,757.50 6,869.72 1.86
Mining 419,290.00 165,201.27 2.54
Construction 280,311.20 76,485.04 3.66
Manufacturing 892,709.08 309,630.39 2.88
Transportation,
Communications
Electric, Gas and
Sanitary Services 3,055,200.94 667,689.71 4.58
Wholesale Trade 214,767.69 135,213.04 1.59
Retail Trade 812,648.21 417,504.44 1.95
Finance, Insurance
And Real Estate 285,599.02 94,192.36 3.03
Services 234,509.15 67,868.04 3.46
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has been omitted from the VAS and consequently, the statement
results in the employees appearing more favored in terms of the
relative benefits received by these two groups. Taking account of
capital gains on shares the average relative benefits of employ-
ees and shareholders in 1994-2003 would change from a VAS
based ratio of 8.1:1 to one of 1.8:1.2
It is a sub-set of the employee group, company directors,
who control the voluntary disclosure of corporate accounting
information. From an agency theory perspective [Jensen and
Meckling, 1976], their pursuit of self-interest creates a ‘moral
hazard’ for their shareholder principal. The information advan-
tage held by directors restricts the control that shareholders can
exercise over them. By facilitating improved monitoring of the
agent (e.g. through the publication of a VAS) this information
advantage can be diminished. Company directors are therefore
likely to be sensitive to disclosures that reduce their information
advantage. The resistance to the strong societal forces promot-
ing the VAS in the 1970s, evident in the 80% of UK companies
not disclosing a VAS, is indicative of this trait. In the UK, corpo-
rate sensitivity to disclosure has been heightened by the promi-
nent profile accorded to high levels of director remuneration
and corporate governance issues over the past decade. Criticism
on these issues has come from the investment community (e.g.
BBC [2002]), from trade unions (e.g. ePolitix.com, [2003]) and
from financial commentators (e.g. HRM [2004], Manifest
[2004]). Typical of the strength of feeling aroused by the issue of
director remuneration are the following comments from promi-
nent trade union leaders:
Fat cat directors have shown no ability to self restraint
so far . . . shareholders, the public and the government
have all expressed their disgust at the current excess
[Kevin Curran, GMB General Secretary, ePolitix.com
03.06.03].
There has to be some link to the pay of workers gener-
ally within the company. Pleading for cost restraint,
increasing unachievable targets, paring staff numbers
to the bone, cutting back on benefits and increasing
2 The average shares of VA of employees and shareholders, in the period
1994-2003, were 68.8% and 8.5% respectively (see Figure 4). This represents a
ratio of 8.1:1. When the capital appreciation on shares (which is, on average, 3.6
times the level of dividend return) is also treated as a part of the value created by
the companies studied then the relative shares are 52.7% (employees) and 29.9%
(shareholders). This represents a ratio of 1.8:1.
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hours are not acceptable when balanced against 20/30
per cent pay increases, increased pension provision and
guaranteed bonuses for executives [Dai Davis, Director
of Communications for UNIFI, ePolitix.com 03.06.03].
Table 5 shows that, in the companies studied from 1994-
2003, this issue is particularly pertinent as director remunera-
tion increased by a substantially larger amount than the wage of
the average employee and the rate of general inflation.
TABLE 5
Relative Rates of Increase in Employees’ and
Directors’ Remuneration, 1994-2003
Year Average % Rate of Average Board % Rate of % Rate of
Employee Increase Renumeration Increase Annual
Wage (£) (£) Inflation
1994 20,207 – 856,683 – –
1995 21,897 8.4 949,715 10.9 3.4
1996 23,134 5.6 1,045,141 10.0 2.4
1997 24,146 4.4 1,124,467 7.6 3.1
1998 24,821 2.8 1,154,803 2.7 3.4
1999 27,155 9.4 1,328,258 15.0 1.6
2000 29,541 5.1 1,446,066 8.9 2.9
2001 30,303 2.6 1,483,808 2.6 1.8
2002 31,377 3.5 1,536,934 3.6 1.6
2003 32,607 3.9 1,556,697 1.3 2.9
Overall 61.4 81.7
The impression given by the VAS of the employee group
being the main corporate beneficiary from value created is un-
likely to be one that the directors want to convey to company
owners. Combined with the poor level of provision for mainte-
nance and expansion of investment from the retained profits
source, the VAS does not reflect well on the directors’ perfor-
mance in corporate governance. Finally, the emphasis on stake-
holders’ relative shares created by the VAS leads to the likeli-
hood that the share of VA obtained by company directors will be
scrutinized. Table 5 reveals that although this is a fairly small,
but variable, percentage of VA it does represent, on average, a
very substantial proportion (63.5%) of the dividend return to
shareholders. Again, the absence in the VAS of the capital gains
accrued to shareholders exaggerates this comparative percent-
age to the detriment of the directors. It is also noticeable that
the directors’ share of VA in the voluntary VAS disclosures in
1978 was less than one-eighth of the share obtained on average
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in the companies studied from 1994-2003. This may be indica-
tive of voluntary disclosure occurring in those companies where
further analysis of the contents of the VAS was relatively more
favorable to the directors’ position.
We claim, therefore, that analysis of the contents of the VAS
can contribute substantially to a possible explanation for its ini-
tial voluntary adoption by a minority of companies, why it was
soon dropped and why there has been no enthusiasm for its
return. The information in the statement does not serve well the
needs of the employee group that it was designed to serve and,
far from acting as a mechanic to engender co-operation between
stakeholders, it may well encourage competition and disagree-
ment among them over the relative levels of reward that they
obtain.
CONCLUSION
Accounting change can be complex in nature. Much of this
complexity derives from the great range of, often interacting,
socio-technical factors that influence its occurrence. The diver-
sity of accounting research on change reflects this complexity
with diffusion theory, contingency theory, information systems
theory, institutional theory, positive theory and various social
and philosophical theories all having been applied in pursuit of
explanations of accounting change in both historical and con-
temporary contexts. This work has, among other factors, impli-
cated fashion following, mimicry, legitimacy, labor exploitation,
economic self interest, political advantage, power relations,
market dynamics, social circumstances, warfare and technologi-
cal development in the accounting change process. It is thus
unlikely that any individual study will identify all of the issues
and influences that impinge on a particular accounting change.
Over time, therefore, research on specific change involves the
gradual process of individual studies adding incrementally to
the explanation and understanding of it.
This study’s contribution is of this type. It involved intro-
ducing some factors, relating to the accounting content of the
VAS, which can be used to supplement an already existing
socio-contextual explanation [Burchell et al, 1985] of the rise
and fall of the statement as a practical proposition in the UK. It
has shown that information on the distribution of VA among
stakeholders can be used to enhance the explication of this tem-
porary accounting change. In comparison with Burchell et al’s
[1985] study of VA in the UK, the paper suggests that different
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factors are likely to play different roles in the change process.
Information content will be a consideration influencing both the
supply of and demand for information on VA. At the level of the
individual firm, information content affects directly those who
take decisions on voluntary disclosure policies and it is an im-
portant determinant of the utility of the information to those
creating the demand for it. Thus, this factor specifically contrib-
utes to an understanding of the partial (among companies) and
temporary nature of the change.
Changes in financial accounting are made by those involved
in its production and its use. However, its development does not
involve recourse to an immutable body of theory or set of gov-
erning principles. Historically, the human influence on account-
ing has been described as driven by the clash of vested interests
where winners determine the justifying theories in vogue and
the practices found in the real world [Watts and Zimmerman,
1979]. The selection of accounting methods to be applied in
practice therefore takes place in a transient “market for ex-
cuses”. Societal circumstances influence the views and actions
of groups with vested interests in accounting but this will be
tempered by the content of accounting and its perceived impact
on the self-interests of the parties involved. The contents of the
VAS in the UK did not provide the enduring attraction required
to maintain support either from those voluntarily supplying
VASs (company directors) or those expected to be its major
source of demand (other employees and their trades union rep-
resentatives). This key absence of support is likely to have con-
tributed significantly to the VAS’s disappearance.
In contrast, the role of the three societal arenas referenced
by Burchell et al [1985] appears to have been more significant in
profiling the VAS as an issue of the time and placing it on the
agenda of those who made corporate disclosure decisions, as
opposed to directly driving a universal change in practice. Soci-
etal factors raised the matter of VAS disclosure as an issue for
corporate consideration but did not act as an inevitable determi-
nant of companies’ ultimate disclosure practice on VA. Account-
ing change is dependent on factors, both external and internal to
the firm. Investigating how their combination leads to different
outcomes will help to elucidate the process of development in
the accounting discipline.
The actuality of the VAS in the UK contrasted with its advo-
cacy, which, on reflection, can be considered somewhat idealis-
tic. The information contents of the VAS did not suggest that it
was a mechanism suitable for resolving the disputatious nature
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of collective bargaining. From an examination of relative shares
of VA, employees generally appeared to be the favored stake-
holder and this neither helped the case of trades union negotia-
tors nor would it have reflected well on management when held
to account for VA distribution by company owners. The disclo-
sure of how VA was distributed was not necessarily a basis for
stimulating stakeholder co-operation. It had the propensity to
foster competition among self-seeking stakeholders by revealing
their relative shares in VA and how these were changing over
time. The relevance of VA information to employees can also be
questioned by the low emphasis given by trade union negotia-
tors to specific company performance intelligence as an element
in their arguments for greater benefits. In addition, in practice
the VAS suffered from measurement and presentational varia-
tion that may have led to user suspicions about its susceptibility
to manipulation. The VAS also omitted major stakeholder ben-
efits (capital gains on shares and share option awards) that lim-
ited its suitability for its intended purposes. It is also the case
that by the second half of the 1980s, although explicit disclosure
of the VAS had ceased, the annual report contained all of the
information required to reconstruct a VAS. Given that the user
could then access VA information as required, the VAS could be
viewed as technically redundant. Many of those factors run
counter to the positive social pressures of the 1970s in the UK
for VAS disclosure. They are all, therefore, likely contributors to
the relatively low level of the voluntary adoption of the VAS by
UK companies and to its prompt demise and non-return.
This study also indicates some avenues for future research.
First, it appears that UK companies differed in the way in which
they dealt with the issue of voluntary disclosure. It would there-
fore be insightful to identify why the social forces of the 1970s,
identified by Burchell et al [1985], to which all companies were
exposed, proved to have more practical impact on some than on
others. Although all companies eventually dropped the VAS,
some decided to assess the change by experimentation through
adoption while others opted for a non-adoption decision based
on some form of a priori reasoning. Neither this study nor that
of Burchell et al [1985] was designed to conduct an in-depth
inquiry into the detail of how the internal disclosure decisions
were taken. Who took the decision to disclose? What factors do
decision makers claim were influential? How was the decision
to cease explicit disclosure of the VAS taken? Can disclosers and
non-disclosers be differentiated in any systematic way? Case
studies, designed to capture the first hand experiences of key
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personnel in both VAS adopters and non-adopters would enrich
understanding of the issues raised by these questions and shed
more light on the roles and relative importance of both societal
factors and VAS information content in VAS disclosure policies.
The topic is one where oral histories could still be obtained.
Second, the VAS provides an opportunity for researchers to
pursue the idea of comparative international accounting history
proposed by Carnegie and Napier [1996, 2002]. While the UK’s
experience with the VAS was short-lived and voluntary in na-
ture, in other countries events have unfolded differently. In con-
tinental Europe there is evidence of a more enduring incorpora-
tion of the VAS in financial reporting [Maitre, 1978; Jaggi, 1980;
Dijksma and Van der Wal, 1984; Rundfeldt, 1985]. In the USA,
despite some advocacy for the VAS [Meek and Gray, 1988] it has
not emerged as a prominent practical feature. Studies of the
synchronic, parallel and diffusion types [Carnegie and Napier,
2002] would all be possible on the VAS and would enhance
explanation of the significance of both societal circumstances
and information content in the historical development of finan-
cial reporting.
Third, a more analytical study of the market relevance of
UK corporate VA information may repay further investigation.
No market based analytical work has been done on VA in the
UK but the same is not so of the USA [Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996].
While the voluntary disclosure of the VAS had not been a signifi-
cant feature of financial reporting in the USA, it is possible to
reconstruct the information in much the same way as data was
produced in this paper. The results of VA based research of this
type in the US have shown that:
. . . a value added-based model has a better association
with stock returns than an accounting profit-based
model . . . market return is better explained by value
added than either earnings or cash flows . . . value
added accounting information can supply considerable
explanatory power of market risk beyond that provided
by earnings or cash flow measure, especially at the indi-
vidual firm level . . . [Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996, pp. viii-ix].
Similar analyses would now be possible using VA for the
UK data reconstructed from corporate annual reports in the
manner adopted in this paper for the period 1994-2003. If the
measure proves to have significant predictive worth then it may
be that users will renew their interest in the explicit disclosure
of the VAS and a new chapter will open on the history of the
VAS in the UK.
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APPENDIX 1
The Value Added Statement
£ £
Sales x
Bought-in materials and services  (x)
Value added available for distribution x
Applied in the following way
To pay Employees
Wages and related employers’ costs x
To pay Providers of Capital
Interest on Loans x
Dividends to Shareholders x
x
To pay Government
Corporation Tax x
To Provide for Maintenance and Expansion of Assets
Depreciation x
Retained Profits x
x
Value Added x
Source: Based on the format illustrated in The Corporate Report [ASSC, 1975]. A
gross basis of VA computation is used.
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Abstract: The paper describes the nature and role of accounting dur-
ing apprenticeship – the transition period from slavery to waged labor
in the British West Indies. Planters, colonial legislators, and Parlia-
mentary leaders all feared that freed slaves would flee to open lands
unless they were bound to plantations. Thus, rather than relying en-
tirely on economic incentives to maintain viable plantations, the Abo-
lition Act and subsequent local ordinances embodied a complex syn-
thesis of paternalism, categorization, penalties, punishments, and
social controls that were collectively intended to create a class of
willing waged laborers. The primary role of accounting within this
structure was to police work arrangements rather than to induce ap-
prentices to become willing workers. This post-emancipation, pre-
industrial formalization of punishment, valuation, and task systems
furnish powerful insights into the extent of accountancy’s role in sus-
taining Caribbean slave regimes.
INTRODUCTION
The paper describes the nature and role of accounting dur-
ing the so called period of “apprenticeship” in the British West
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Indies when the British government attempted to convert the
slave labor force into waged labor. Britain’s involvement in sla-
very dated from the 17th century, and was closely linked to the
rise of sugar production in the Caribbean. From the outset, the
demand for labor on sugar plantations far outstripped the sup-
ply of European immigrants, with slaves from Africa filling the
void. Britain had become the world’s leading exporter of slaves
from Africa by the mid-18th century, carrying some 1.6 million
slaves between 1760 and the abolition of the trade in 1807. Pro-
duction in the fields and sugar mills was organized on a quasi-
industrial scale, with a “tightly coordinated” labor force engaged
in “coerced, intensive and continuous” activity [Blackburn,
1988, p. 8]. The survival rate of slaves was low, partly because of
their concentration in the disease-ridden tropical lowlands, but
also due to neglect and overwork. The disproportionate number
of slaves in the Caribbean compared to Europeans resulted in
the retention of aspects of African culture, which gave the slaves
a sense of communal identity in the face of oppression
[Blackburn, 1988, pp. 5-8, 12, 21; Walvin, 1992, pp. 24-26].
The ascendancy of the planters was, however, relatively
short-lived. The focus of Britain’s economic interests shifted in
the early 19th century with the increase in domestic consump-
tion and the rise of new colonial markets. Slaveholding came to
represent “only a tiny fraction of total imperial wealth”
[Blackburn, 1988, p. 521], and the British government could
afford to compensate planters on emancipation without placing
great strain on the Treasury. From the late 18th century on-
wards, the planters faced concerted opposition from an evan-
gelical alliance which orchestrated arguably the most successful
popularist campaign of the 19th century. New imports of slaves
from Africa were outlawed in 1807, with abolition of slavery
following in 1834 [Blackburn, 1988, pp. 138-141, 302; Turley,
1991, pp. 3, 7, 11-14; Walvin, 1992, pp. 96-98].
The Abolition Act of 1833 established a four-to-six year ap-
prenticeship period following emancipation in the British
Crown Colonies during which time the liberated slaves, now
termed “apprentices,” were obliged to continue working for
their former masters. The very notion of Caribbean apprentice-
ship corresponded to British master and servant law. Appren-
tices were bound to their masters in Britain by an indenture for
a fixed period of time, usually seven years. Although an ap-
prentice was not paid wages, his master was obliged to provide
for his material needs and to train him in a craft. The master
also had legal rights, “entitling him to control his apprentice’s
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person.” Runaways could be punished with imprisonment; neg-
ligent or disobedient apprentices were to have their malfea-
sances “corrected” [Steinfeld, 1991, pp. 25-26].1 The precedents
under British law legitimized the continued “enslavement” of
plantation workers in the West Indies after emancipation by
providing an alternative form of binding and social control that
was traditionally accepted at home.
On March 27, 1834, some four months before slaves in the
colonies were emancipated and their apprenticeship as waged
workers began, E.G. Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colo-
nial Department, wrote with some trepidation about this “great
national experiment . . . the success of which the country looks
forward to with much anxiety” [CO 318/118/55]. A few months
later on Christmas day, William Tharp, who was managing his
family’s sugar plantations in Jamaica, expressed the view that “if
God grants me help, I will see out this awful experiment and
keep things right as long as I can” [Furness, 1980, p. 11]. He had
just given evidence to the Jamaican House of Assembly, which
was investigating how emancipation was working. The point is,
emancipation was an experiment and contemporaries did not
know how it was going to turn out.
The Abolition Act also established a £20 million fund dis-
tributable to former slaveholders, but only if a colony’s legisla-
ture passed ordinances detailing work rules and punishment
schemes by August 1, 1834 when the Abolition Act would take
effect. A fund was seen as legitimate compensation for planters
who were forced to give up their property rights in human capi-
tal, although the apprentices were required to live on plantation
lands and do the same work as they had done as slaves. Planters
and local legislatures had virulently opposed ending slavery, but
their objectives generally aligned with the British government
once the Abolition Act was passed – to preserve plantation
economies and maintain an industrious and stable work force in
advance of full freedom. Holt [1992, p. 44] summarized the chal-
lenge faced by the British government and colonial legislatures:
“It was necessary that industrious habits be inculcated in some
manner; work discipline must be internalized by the freedmen
without the normal spur of necessity or desire. The problem was
to overcome the legacy of slavery”.
1 Steinfeld [2001, p. 6] argued that the use of criminal sanctions (e.g., im-
prisonment or corporal punishment) against British workers for breaking labor
agreements remained common practice in the 19th century and was not limited
to apprentices.
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Planters, colonial legislators, and Parliamentary leaders
alike feared that workers would flee plantations to open lands
and would work for former masters only under compulsion.
Thus, instead of providing economic incentives in the form of
market wages, output sharing, or land ownership, the Abolition
Act and subsequent local ordinances embodied a complex syn-
thesis of paternalism, categorization, penalties, punishments,
and social controls, underlain by accounting to ensure compli-
ance.
Clearly, apprenticeship was seen as an imperfect solution by
both slaves and planters. Slaves sought complete freedom, while
planters “resented their loss of arbitrary power [and] feared the
disintegration of a social and economic system which had pro-
vided them the highest rank and authority” [Green, 1976, p.
131]. Apprenticeship represented an attempt to sustain colonial
plantation economies by getting the freedmen accustomed to
work for wages, to accept the practice as normal, and to become
willing waged workers. Ultimately, the experiment failed and
apprenticeship was abandoned early. In the larger colonies,
former slaves retreated into the bush and became peasant farm-
ers. For them, plantation work became an occasional and
supplementary source of income. Planters had to import inden-
tured workers to fill the void. As profits declined, major British
investors chose to place their money elsewhere and divested
themselves of their plantations. The Caribbean sugar trade col-
lapsed and did not recover until the 20th century [Adamson,
1975, pp. 461-464; Hall, 1978; Paton, 2004, p. 9]. However, that
was all for the future. In 1833, the British government was de-
termined to make emancipation work, and employed the pano-
ply of social tools at its disposal to create a controlled environ-
ment through apprenticeship that was carefully designed to turn
slaves into a willing, waged work force.
Undoubtedly, the main rationale behind apprenticeship was
economic – to maintain production in the short-term by coer-
cion, to maintain tight control over labor costs, and to create a
class of willing waged laborers through education and indoctri-
nation in the longer term. Even transferring the right to issue
punishments from overseers to magistrates was arguably as
much about making the population willing to work through
regularizing relationships within the workplace as protecting
them from indiscriminate brutality.
However, there were major social implications as well. As
Holt [1992, p. 37] observed:
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The same Parliament that debated and approved the
abolition of slavery and entertained proposals for uni-
versal education enacted legislation to reform prisons,
poor relief, and the police. There were striking similari-
ties in the governance and discipline that they estab-
lished in penitentiaries, mental hospitals, workhouses,
schools, and reformatories.
Turley [1991, p. 108] described the interactions between aboli-
tion and the other reform initiatives as “multiple layers of inter-
locking activity.” For example, apprenticeship was connected
with the free-trade movement. Free traders argued that appren-
tices would only become truly free if plantations were exposed
to the competition of a free market. Otherwise, the price of
sugar would remain artificially high, and planters would have
no incentive to change “their old oppressive ways” [ibid., p.
126].
Similarly, the anti-vagrancy provisions of the Abolition Act
and local ordinances were fully consistent with the drive to out-
law vagrancy in Britain that saw 28 new acts between 1700 and
1824 [Wiener, 1990, p. 150; Rogers, 1994, p. 104].2 Accounting,
in fact, played a central role in the government initiative to
control the poor in Britain and to make the administration of
poor relief more efficient [Walker, 2004]. The system of labor
control that was employed on plantations prior to emancipation
also contained many features exhibited by the later scientific
management movement in industry [Aufhauser, 1973; Cooke,
2003]. The campaign for labor discipline exercised the minds of
abolitionists and industrialists alike. At home, inculcating the
labor force with regular working habits and a sense of “disci-
plined time” was regarded as a major problem [Thompson,
1967, pp. 81-84]. Factory masters like Richard Arkwright and
Josiah Wedgwood followed Bentham’s ideal of creating “Houses
of Industry” modeled on principles “of surveillance, regimenta-
tion and division of labor” [Davis, 1975, p. 456]. Abolitionists
like William Wilberforce lent their support to the promotion of
industrial discipline, “cushioned by a benevolent paternalism” in
Britain [ibid., p. 460]. The emphasis on “duty and subordina-
tion” during the crucial period of transition from slave to volun-
tary labor was only to be expected therefore [Davis, 1975, p.
465].
2 Davis [1975, p. 466] similarly described how the rise of antislavery senti-
ment in Britain coincided with the “urgent domestic problem” of imposing labor
discipline on an “immense, uprooted rural labor force.”
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Finally, the infliction of pain on ex-slaves as the penalty for
shirking work was entirely consistent with British home policy.
As Wiener [1990, p. 111] observed, the belief “that pain was
required for reformation was rarely questioned” in Britain. If
the prime purpose of the penal system at home was to inculcate
social deviants with work habits, and inflicting pain through
corporal punishment, physical deprivation, hard labor, or the
treadmill was a necessary part of the process, the same was
bound to be true in the colonies.
It is certainly possible to view apprenticeship through a
Marxist lens – that plantation accounting was not “modern” and
British capitalists, being fed up with subsidizing slavery, sought
to abolish it without establishing the crucial conditions for turn-
ing apprentices into wage workers.3 Thus, the system of labor
control depended on physical coercion rather than the economic
coercion of the market. Completely lacking was a system of in-
centives supported by accounting measures that would persuade
the apprentices that they would be better off working on the
plantations than subsisting as peasant farmers. However, the
principal motive behind apprenticeship was to enforce labor
turnout and maintain productivity within the confines of an
entrenched social structure that was both in decline and under
siege; and in this respect, economic rationalism provides a good
explanation of the accounting system that was adopted.
The paper proceeds by describing the rules of apprentice-
ship and considers accounting in conjunction with apprentice-
ship as linked elements of social control and economic rational
behavior. Subsequently, the role of accounting during appren-
ticeship is examined in the context of the mid-19th century cam-
paign in Britain to instill labor discipline and to create a willing
class of waged workers to service the nation’s industries.
RULES OF APPRENTICESHIP
The Abolition Act of 1833 embodied a comprehensive
framework for the transition from slavery to waged labor. It
3 As one reviewer noted, Marxist theorists might see apprenticeship as main-
taining the feudal/slave owners’ focus on use-values and that accounting’s role
was to allow the former slave owners to continue with their previous labor
practices. In other words, the accounting system reflected the planters’ preoccu-
pation with controlling the use-value of labor rather than the capitalists’ preoc-
cupation with its economic value. We find merit in this perspective, but feel that
economic rationalism helps explain apprenticeship and the nature of accounting
therein and is, therefore, an equally compelling framework.
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served as a template for each colony’s unique set of rules and
regulations.4 The Abolition Act included specific measures as
well as guiding principles, but it left the mass of detail regarding
work behavior, task-rate levels, and punishment schemes,
amongst a host of other issues, to be hammered out by the
colonial legislatures [Green, 1976, p. 122]. For example, the
Abolition Act specified that apprentices would work no more
than 45 hours each week in return for food, housing, clothing,
and medical care, but each colony was to specify the length of
the workday, the specific allotment of food rations, and the
quantity of task work that could be substituted if mutually
agreed upon by master and apprentice. Finally, each colony’s
particular ordinances had to be approved by the Colonial Office
before its slave owners received any compensation.
It was widely believed that once the daily threat of flogging
was removed, former slaves would work on the plantations only
if an extensive network of rules, regulations, adjudication proce-
dures, paternalistic persuasion, education, policing, prison, and
punishment schemes were employed. As a result, the Abolition
Act included a complex set of legal and social controls to regu-
late the behavior of apprentices. James Carmichael Smyth, the
Governor of British Guiana, alluded to this point in a proclama-
tion to the slave population when he assumed office in June
1833. At that time, slaves were keenly aware that emancipation
was coming, although the specific rules for apprenticeship still
needed to be developed. Smyth’s remarks reveal the determina-
tion of the authorities to enforce standards of behavior during
the transition:
I wish to warn you, however, against all impatience,
disobedience to your masters, absence from your du-
ties, insubordination, rioting, or illegally assembling.
The peace and tranquility of the country must be main-
tained; and if you adopt any other conduct than that
which becomes peaceable and obedient subjects, you
will compel me, however unwillingly, to employ force
to uphold the existing laws… Every man in this world is
required to work in some way or other; and by the
command of the Almighty Father of us all, we must all
and each of us acquire our bread with the sweat of our
brow [Enclosure in Despatch 87, 29 July 1833, Smyth
to Stanley, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 240].
4 See CAP. 73 [pp. 666-691] in The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, 3 & 4 William IV, 1833 for the complete act.
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Three months later Smyth issued another proclamation con-
gratulating the apprentices for following his “advice” [Enclosure
in Despatch 92, 2 October 1833, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 252].
It certainly appears that slaves in British Guiana and
throughout the colonies expected many more liberties than they
were given by the Abolition Act or local ordinances. In early
August 1834, immediately after the Abolition Act took effect,
Smyth noted that, “The Honourable Mr. Bean has written to me
recommending the proclaiming of martial law within certain
districts” [Enclosure in Despatch 114, 9 August 1834, Smyth to
Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 287]. Although Smyth did not
support Bean’s request, he did review the process for handling
apprentice complaints. The office of “slave protector” had served
as the official mechanism for complaints, but this office expired
with the Abolition Act’s passage. In its stead, Smyth proposed
that apprentices would refer all of their complaints to the “high
sheriff,” who would record details in a book that would be for-
warded to the special magistrate of the district and in summary
to Smyth. An Office of Special Magistrate was created by the
Abolition Act and will be discussed subsequently within the con-
text of the entire judicial superstructure.
The Abolition Act, 1833 distinguished between praedial ap-
prentices, who worked in agriculture and produce, and non-
praedials, who chiefly served as domestics. Praedials were lim-
ited to 45 hours of required work and were to gain full freedom
in 1840 after a six-year apprenticeship; non-praedials worked
longer hours and were to be freed two years earlier. It appears
that many planters attempted to classify their apprentices as
praedials in order to gain the additional two years of captive
service. For example, one of Smyth’s special magistrates re-
ported that:
Numerous cases having been submitted to me by ap-
prenticed labourers, complaining of their employers
having ordered them to do praedial work, to which
many of them had never in their lives been subjected
. . . [I] have found them, on the admission of their em-
ployers, to be substantially correct [Enclosure B in Des-
patch 250, 13 November 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP,
1836, Vol. 83, p. 101].
The formation by the Abolition Act of a group of adjudica-
tors called Special Magistrates proved of major significance.
These men would play the key role in implementing the Aboli-
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tion Act by “combining the roles of judge, teacher, and taskmas-
ter” [Holt, 1992, p. 57]. The range of their responsibilities was
immense – they listened to complaints, adjudicated cases, speci-
fied punishments, participated in appraisals, assessed fines, filed
regular reports, and administered floggings for violations of the
Abolition Act and their local ordinances. They were charged
with enforcing the Abolition Act, ensuring that the apprentices
put in the requisite number of labor hours, while protecting
them from overwork, abuse, or mistreatment.
The ability of the judiciary to act impartially was question-
able, however. In the case of British Guiana, the colony was to
be divided into 12 judicial districts (later increased to 15), each
with its own special magistrate. But by the Abolition Act’s effec-
tive date, only four special magistrates had arrived from Britain.
Smyth, therefore, promoted eight local justices to the position of
special justice to fill the gap, all of whom had ties with the local
plantocracy. Of the 67 local magistrates who either were serving
or had served as special justices in British Guiana through
March 1835, only four were noted as “Unconnected with Colo-
nial Property.” The remainder were described as “Planter,”
“Planter and Attorney,” “Attorney,” or “Attorney and Merchant”
[Slavery Abolition Proceedings, 12 March 1835, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, pp. 1087-1090]. George Lowenfeld, a typical appointee, de-
scribed himself as “one of the Representatives of the Estates of
the late Woffert Katz; three of these are coffee estates – the one
named Gebroeden is under my particular charge” [CO 111/151,
p. 281]. It was only to be expected that with such connections to
land owners, the adjudications of local justices would be heavily
biased in favor of planter interests [Turner, 1999].
In the hopes of achieving impartiality, the 1833 Abolition
Act specified that only the special magistrates and special jus-
tices appointed by the British government could try apprentices
or planters for breaches of the Abolition Act. Locally appointed
justices in British Guiana were deprived of that power in August
1835 [Enclosure in Despatch 162, 9 January 1838, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, II, p. 205]. However, apprentices
rarely brought cases against planters, and when they did, it was
usually the planters’ views that were upheld [Paton, 2004, pp.
75-77]. It also appears that the majority of planters were dis-
tressed by any decisions that were rendered against them, espe-
cially if the outcome reduced the domination they had exercised
over workers under the slavery regime. The comments of
Spring-Rice, Secretary for War and the Colonies, are pertinent.
He advised Smyth:
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. . . to adopt a course as may secure for you the confi-
dence and support of the white population of the
Colony, when this can be done without a sacrifice in
principle. When the magnitude of the change effected,
and the difficulty which the best men feel in surrender-
ing power, is taken into account, many allowances
should be made for the proprietors of West India prop-
erty [Despatch 116, 7 November 1834, Spring Rice to
Smyth, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 287-288].
The difficulties experienced in making the system work, es-
pecially during the early months of apprenticeship, were not
only explained by inherent bias or planter resistance, but also by
the apprentices’ understandable reluctance to comply with the
legislation. They were required to live and work on the planta-
tion; they could not occupy vacant lands or subsist solely on
provision-ground output.5 They were penalized, either through
imprisonment, extra work hours, or with a specified number of
“stripes,” for failing to follow strict rules of attendance, for being
insubordinate, for refusing to work, for being more than five
miles from their plantation without a written pass, or for not
working up to a standard of “assiduous and steady industry”
[CO 111/142, Caput (CAP) IV, Section 2, British Guiana Ordi-
nance].6 Apprentices were also precluded from purchasing land,
seeking other types of employment, or moving to another colony
without a passport issued only with the written consent of the
master. A detailed system of fines, extra work-hour require-
ments, and floggings was stipulated in the colonial ordinances
to enforce these rules. The only real change from their prior life
as slaves was that apprentices would receive wages, but only for
work done in excess of 45 hours per week when food rations
were provided, or for work exceeding 401⁄2 hours if apprentices
tended provision grounds in lieu of receiving rations.
ACCOUNTING AS A CONSTRUCT OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Accounting and accountability played a crucial role in bol-
stering the apprenticeship system. Work attendance, acts of in-
subordination, sub-scale work performance, and medical re-
ports all had to be recorded in a prescribed fashion in particular
journals so that when the special magistrates or justices made
5 Provision grounds were lands earmarked for the personal use of slaves on
the majority of larger Caribbean plantations.
6 According to Burn [1937, p. 179], stealing, malingering, and carelessness
with property were commonplace.
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regular visits or conducted special hearings, planters would be
able to document their complaints. Thus, while the apprentice-
ship system depended on the force of law, it was supported and
sustained by accounting evidence. In essence, accounting’s dual
roles were to maintain control over labor as well as to measure
the economic performance of labor. However, it was not just the
workers who were affected by accounting. The success of the
apprenticeship system as a transition to willing waged laborers
depended on the effectiveness of the judiciary, which was also
held accountable through regular reports to the Colonial Office
in London. The Colonial Office, attempting to regulate the
whole process, demanded a range of other data, including lists
of appraisements and public sales to ensure that the Abolition
Act and local ordinances were properly applied.
Although each colony’s regulations varied to a degree, they
all addressed the same set of issues outlined in the 1833 Act.
Uniformity enabled local officials to compare the performance
of apprentices and special magistrates and justices in different
districts, and it enabled the Colonial Office to make inter-colony
comparisons based on the regular reports they received. In Oc-
tober 1835, for example, Smyth furnished the Colonial Office
with data concerning the declining number of punishments in
British Guiana during each of the previous four months [Des-
patch 242, 28 October 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, p. 70].
It followed that the colonial ordinances differed in detail
rather than substance, as in the level of punishments (e.g., fines,
floggings, terms of imprisonment) that were authorized [Burn,
1937, p. 204]. The regulations relating to British Guiana were
typical. The July 26, 1834 issue of the Royal Gazette of British
Guiana contained the final version passed by the local assem-
bly.7 Several sections of this colony’s provisions had a direct
impact on accounting for and valuing labor as discussed below.
Enforcing Ownership Rights over Labor: The overall aim, ensur-
ing that the apprenticed laborers put in the requisite amount of
time on the plantations, could not have been accomplished with-
out accounting data to track it. This synergy was acknowledged
in CAP. I of the Ordinance relating to British Guiana where the
rationales underlying the detailed provisions that followed were
7 The document is entitled “An Ordinance for the Government and Regula-
tion of Apprenticed Labourers” and is reproduced in CO 111/142.
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listed. It acknowledged that the prime aim of Section 16 of the
Abolition Act [CO 111/142; CAP. 73, p. 672] was:
. . . ensuring the punctual discharge of the services due
by them [the apprentices] to their respective employers,
and . . . the prevention and punishment of indolence, or
the neglect or improper performance of work . . . secur-
ing exactness in the computation of the time during
which such Praedial Apprentices Labourers were
thereby required to labour in the service of such their
respective employers.
Labor control was achieved in British Guiana through the
appointment of a committee of “seven or eight of the most re-
spected planters” to develop a “reasonable tariff of the amount
of work each Negro ought to perform” [Despatch 102, 25 Febru-
ary 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 262]. Accord-
ing to Burn [1937, p. 194], Smyth was the first governor in the
West Indies to call for the development of labor standards. The
committee, chaired by Charles Bean, prepared scales of task-
work for cane, plantain, coffee, cotton cultivation, and wood
cutting, based on what might be expected from an “effective
labourer” and “average weather and soils.” If apprentices did not
fully complete their prescribed tasks, they could be required to
work extra hours or be punished as specified in other sections of
the Ordinance. However, it was important that the apprentices
felt that the scales were reasonable to avoid civil unrest:
All attempts to impose upon the Negro, or to exact from
him more than a fair proportion of work, must be as
sedulously guarded against on the one side, as any act
of insubordination on the other; either would equally
lead to the interruption of peace of the province [Des-
patch 108, 2 July 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 274].
Partial scales for cane cultivation and wood cutting are repro-
duced in Table 1.
The underlying obligations of the apprentices to the planta-
tions were themselves carefully detailed, as documented in CAP.
V, Section 4 of the Ordinance:
. . . that every contract between the employer and the
praedial apprenticed labourer, for the performance of
any specified work as a task, and in lieu of the pre-
scribed daily labour, or for the performance of any
labour in extra hours, shall by such employer, be re-
duced into writing and entered into a book to be kept
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for that purpose on the plantation; which book it shall
be the duty of the Chairman or senior Special Justice of
the district to inspect as often as he shall, in the manner
aforesaid, repair to the several plantations within his
district.9
Plantations kept daily productivity accounts collectively for the
various work gangs. Accounts of the daily pickings, pulping, and
TABLE 1
Scales of Task-work in the Colony of British Guiana
Description of Work Work now Work to be
performed performed
in 9 hours in 71⁄2 hours
Cane Cultivation:
Digging new navigable canals,
12 feet wide and five feet deep,
and throwing the ground on both sides 600 cubic feet 500 cubic feet
Throwing back a six foot parapet from
the above, and levelling the ground 72 feet in length 60 feet in length
Digging new punt trenches as above,
where the ground is thrown on one side 480 cubic feet 400 cubic feet
Throwing back six feet parapets from
above 48 feet in length 40 feet in length
Digging new small drains 2 x 2 land
cleared 18 roeds8 15 roeds
Throwing out small drains one shovel
deep 50 roeds 42 roeds
Holing or banking land 21⁄2 x 21⁄2 36 roeds  30 roeds
Shovel ploughing new holed land a
shovel deep, and rounding beds 72 roeds 60 roeds
Wood Cutting – Squaring Timber:
Felling trees and squaring them for saw
 logs 25 cubic feet 21 cubic feet
Ditto, ditto for framing timber 18 ditto 15 ditto
Making wallaba shingles and carrying 200 each 175 each
them to a water carriage labourer labourer
Making staves, and heading and
carrying them as above 100 ditto 87 ditto
Cutting and cording hardwood for fuel 6 labourers 6 labourers
to four cords to three cords
Source: CO 318/128, West Indian Miscellaneous, 1837, Vol. 1.
8 The “roed” mentioned in the foregoing tariff is the Rhynland roed, equal to
12 feet and 4 inches nearly.
9 Establishing legal accountability through written contracts with accounts
to monitor compliance was also a feature of estate-management practice in
Britain [Oldroyd, 1999, pp. 186-187].
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milling on the Balcarres coffee plantations in Jamaica, for ex-
ample, have survived for the first four years of the apprentice-
ship period [Crawford Papers, 25/11/652-655].
A system of regular medical examinations was established
in order to prevent apprentices from avoiding work by feigning
illness. These examinations were again carefully documented for
possible later action in the courts. CAP. III, Section Six of Brit-
ish Guiana’s Ordinance described the responsibilities of the
medical examiner and his reporting requirements. If the illness
or injury was genuine, the key question then became, when
would the apprentice be fit enough to resume work?
And be it further enacted, that every person in this
colony having under his or her management forty ap-
prenticed labourers or upwards, shall, and is hereby
required, to engage a medical practitioner to visit such
apprenticed labourers once at least in every week; and
it shall be the duty of such medical practitioner, and he
is hereby authorised and required to keep a Journal,
and to enter the name of each apprenticed labourer
then labouring under sickness or disease, distinguish-
ing such apprenticed labourers as are thereby disquali-
fied for labour, and such as are disqualified for the
ordinary amount of labour, and prescribing such medi-
cines or articles of diet as may in his judgement be
necessary for the restoration of the patient; and such
journal shall be placed under the care of the employer
or manager of such apprenticed labourers.
Prior to apprenticeship, slaves customarily worked six 9-
hour days per week – a total of 54 hours. The Abolition Act
limited the number of hours apprentices worked for masters to
45, a reduction of one-sixth from the previous norm, but it al-
lowed each colony to determine the number of days over which
these hours would be spread. The apprentices in British Guiana
generally preferred working five 9-hour days rather than six 71⁄2-
hour days if given the choice [CO 111/132, p. 290]. Scales were
adjusted to convert 9-hour to 71⁄2-hour days by a fairly consistent
percent reduction to achieve the same level of performance on
an hourly basis. In either case, Sunday belonged to the appren-
tice. However, it was enforced “as a day of uninterrupted rest”
from any work, such as tending provision grounds, which in
Jamaica might lie as far as ten miles away [Burn, 1937, p. 177],
to ensure that the apprentices were fully rested by Monday
morning when they worked for the masters instead of them-
selves.
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Section 2 of British Guiana’s Ordinance converted the con-
cept of “assiduous and steady industry” into specific work-level
expectations. The scales were informational for masters and
overseers as well as for apprentices, and were developed, in part,
to deter masters and overseers from requiring inordinate levels
of output and effort. The Abolition Act, 1833 did not specify
whether an apprentice’s free time was contingent on his or her
demeanor or meeting scale targets. Bean’s summation, however,
revealed the planters’ intention to link them:
The committee recommend that this apportionment
shall be by giving five days’ labour or 45 hours to the
master, and one day, which they recommend to be Sat-
urday, to the apprenticed labourer; provided that in all
cases the consolidation of the daily time of one hour
and a half of the labourer into the Saturday of each
week shall only take place on the due and proper per-
formance of the daily task, and be consequent upon the
good, orderly and industrious conduct of the labourer,
and not otherwise [Enclosure in Despatch 111, 29 July
1834, Appendix B, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, p. 282].
Smyth forwarded a copy of the special justice’s work in-
structions to Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, in order to demon-
strate the impartiality that special justices were expected to pur-
sue. In Section 6 of the document, Smyth described how
task-rate scales should be used to adjudicate complaints about
the “diligence or idleness of the labourers” [Enclosure in Des-
patch 111, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 277-279].
However, the scales alone were inadequate for this purpose, ow-
ing to the vagaries of “the weather and other circumstances”
affecting productivity. Ultimately, performance evaluation came
down to the judgment of the magistrate. It is unlikely that the
special magistrates or justices were completely impartial when
applying Smyth’s recommendations in the field since their adju-
dications must have been influenced by their experience, atti-
tude towards abolition, and attachment to local planter inter-
ests. The following sworn report by the aforementioned
plantation manager Lowenfeld, who also served as a local jus-
tice, illustrates the subjectivity inherent in adjudication proceed-
ings:
I have read over the evidence of Mustick, foreman on
Lonsdale; he states, what I knew to be the truth, that in
weeding three persons are put to each bed; the bed is
from 65 to 70 roeds; each person taking a row of coffee
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trees. This is the amount of work given on coffee estates
generally, and which is performed very frequently in
less than five hours; under any circumstance this is a
task which could easily be performed in less than 71⁄2
hours. Weeding to be with the hoe. On Gebroeden the
women often do the same quantity of work in 41⁄2
hours. In assorting coffee, 80 lbs is an easy task; the
women on coffee estates earn extra wages for clearing a
further quantity [CO 111/151, p. 281].
Edward Hicks, the other “unbiased” examiner in this case, had
himself been a coffee planter for 18 years [Enclosure in Des-
patch 367, 14 August 1837, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol.
85, II, p. 96].
Regulating Sales and Valuations of Apprentices: CAP. X of British
Guiana’s Ordinance allowed planters to continue selling, leasing,
or otherwise disposing of apprentices just as they had done with
slaves prior to the Abolition Act. The only exception provided
that “no such apprenticed labourer shall be publicly exhibited or
compelled to attend at the place of sale, as was the custom with
respect to slaves.” Again, the process was regulated through
careful documentation of the transactions. Sales of the “services
of apprenticed labourers” were recorded in a Vendue Sales Book
that was kept in a designated Vendue Office. Information re-
corded in the book included the date of sale, name of seller,
name and age of laborer, classification (praedial or non-prae-
dial), and price [Document A in Enclosure to Despatch 242, 28
October 1835, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 70].
One of the areas reserved by the Abolition Act for local
legislative action related to “how the necessary Appraisement of
the future Value of such [apprenticeship] services shall be
made” [CO 111/142, CAP 73, p. 672]. Valuations of the human
“livestock” had been a traditional feature of plantation record
keeping under slavery for a variety of reasons including probat-
ing wills, providing collateral for bank loans, buying and selling
slaves, hiring slaves in and out, or monitoring the performance
of agents by absentee owners [Fleischman et al., 2004].
The main reason for such appraisals envisioned by the Brit-
ish government during apprenticeship, however, was to enable
apprentices to buy their own freedom. In these instances, it was
in the planters’ interests to inflate the valuation. According to
Green [1976, p. 133], “biased decisions were the rule,” as the
appraisement tribunals normally comprised two planters com-
pared to one independent judge. One of the two appraisers
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would be appointed by the employer, the other by the judiciary
(typically a special justice), with a judge acting as “umpire” in
the absence of agreement between the first two referees. The
planter bias is evident from the government returns for British
Guiana for the period April to December 1837. Of 136 valuations
taking place, there were 56 instances where the employer’s valu-
ation exceeded that of the special justice, compared to only one
that was lower. The remaining 79 valuations were the same,
doubtlessly the result of collusion. Furthermore, in most cases
the umpires favored the planters. In 34 out of the 56 valuations
where there was a difference in favor of the planter, the verdict
of the umpire was either the same as that of the employer’s
appraiser or closer to it than to the special justice’s valuation
[Enclosure in Despatch 134, 26 July 1837, Smyth to Glenelg,
BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp. 152-153; Enclosure in Despatch 137,
27 November 1837, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp.
156-157; Enclosure in Despatch 138, 19 January 1838, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp. 157-159].
The Colonial Office knew about the bias associated with the
valuation practice [Despatch 250, 13 November 1835, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, pp. 99-100]. Indeed, Smyth tried to
remedy the situation in British Guiana by requiring full details
to be published of the name, age, and sex of the apprentice,
amount of appraisement, identity of the appraisers, and approv-
ing judge. It was hoped that this policy of full disclosure would
act “as a check upon exorbitant and unfair appraisements” [Des-
patch 259, 11 March 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83,
p. 148]. However, the relatively small number of apprentices
who were able to afford to buy their release in the first three
months of 1836 suggests the strategy did not work [Enclosure in
Despatch 266, 6 May 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, pp. 178-179]. It may also be concluded that a number of
valuation procedures resulted from the buying and selling of
plantations or the rental of apprentice labor.
The continuation of valuations during the apprenticeship
period reflected the workers’ ongoing lack of freedom. They re-
mained economic commodities with a market value, albeit one
that was in decline as full emancipation approached. The de-
crease in value can be seen from the annual series of valuations
of the Marshall’s Pen and Martin’s Hill plantation in Jamaica.
The average value of the slaves in the years prior to the Aboli-
tion Act was around £100 [Crawford Papers, 23/14/8]. In 1834, it
fell to £25, with the Abolition Act about to come into force
[Crawford Papers, 25/11/653]. On the Lowther plantations in
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Barbados, the reduction was from £75 to £50 [Lowther Planta-
tions, 43507/7-25]. In 1838, the last year of apprenticeship, the
figure for Marshall’s Pen and Martin’s Hill dropped to £11/6/8
[Crawford Papers, 25/11/656]. From 1839, the annual valuations
of livestock continued there, but they were now confined to
horned stock and mules. Linked to the annual valuations were
the schedules of the increases and decreases occurring during
the year in the numbers of slaves/apprentices. These reports
were intended to encourage plantation managers to preserve the
human capital by rendering them accountable to the owners for
any deaths [Roughley, 1823, p. 28]. Again we see this practice
continuing during the apprenticeship period until it was aban-
doned when the owners lost control of the work force [Lowther
Plantations, 43507/27-30; Crawford Papers, 25/11/647, 656].
From 1839, the “Negroes” had become “daily labourers,” and
weekly pay lists started to appear [Crawford Papers, 25/11/647].
Regulating the Penal System and the Judiciary: The law reflected
the apprentices’ newly found status as freedmen by taking pun-
ishments out of the hands of the plantation overseers and regu-
lating the severity of penalties that could be inflicted. One of the
Abolition Act’s key provisions was to forbid masters from flog-
ging apprentice workers. Corporal punishment did not end,
however, either officially or unofficially. Unofficially there were
many cases of illegal beatings on plantations [Paton, 2004, p.
69]; officially that particular task was given to the special magis-
trates or justices to administer. Women, however, were now
exempt. The figures for British Guiana show that from August 1,
1834 to July 31, 1835, a total of 8,152 punishments were admin-
istered, of which 2,177 (26.7%) were corporal punishments [En-
closure 2 in Despatch 236, 19 September 1835, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 55]. In the case of British Guiana,
special justices were restricted to 15 lashes when acting alone
[Enclosure B in Despatch 117, 13 October 1834, Smyth to
Spring Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 291], compared to the maxi-
mum of 30 allowed in the colony’s Ordinance [CO 111/142, CAP.
IV, Section 6]. CAP. II, Section 3 of the same document pre-
scribed the full range of punishments available to special jus-
tices:
And be it further enacted, that every Special Justice
shall be and he is hereby empowered and authorized, in
respect of apprenticed labourers convicted of offences
before him, to award any one of the following punish-
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ments: - 1. Confinement with or without hard labour on
the Tread Mill, or otherwise, for a period not exceeding
fourteen successive days; 2. Extra labour at the rate of
fifteen hours per week in the service of his or her em-
ployer, with or without confinement at night, for a pe-
riod not exceeding fourteen days; 3. Fifteen stripes for
every male labourer. And in respect of an employer, or
person acting for him, when convicted of any violation
of the present law, a penalty not exceeding Five Pounds
sterling, or in the case of protraction of labour of an
apprenticed labourer by force or fraud, a fine of One
Shilling per hour.
Each colony was required to maintain detailed records on
the quantity and nature of fines, imprisonments, and corporal
punishment to enable the Colonial Office to monitor compliance
with the regulations. Burn [1937, p. 207] noted, for example,
that whenever a Jamaican special magistrate imposed flogging
as punishment, “the number of lashes to be given must be en-
tered in the Estate Book.” A summary of punishments for the
first 22 months of apprenticeship in four of the colonies, which
is reproduced in Table 2, was compiled from these records by
TABLE 2
Summary of Punishments Inflicted on the
Apprenticed Laborers in the British Colonies
1 August 1834 to 31 May 1836
Total for Jamaica, Barbados, British Guiana, a Grenada, and St. Lucia
(British Guiana figures in parentheses):
Number of Apprenticed Labourers 433,000 (72,000)
Number punished
Males 56,938 (7,691)
Females 42,502 (8,539)
Total 99,440 (16,230)
By Flogging 17,050 (2,668)
Average Number of Stripes 141⁄2 - 221⁄2 (20)
Total Amount of Lashes 353,601 (53,360)
Other Punishments b 82,390 (13,562)
a “Many offences committed by Apprenticed Labourers of a petty character,
instead of being adjudicated by Special Justices, are sent before the inferior
Criminal Court, where the almost invariable punishment ordered to be in-
flicted is flogging. These do not appear in the flogging table.
b Includes hard labour – in penal gangs, and worked in chains; extra labour;
tread mill, stocks, dark cells, imprisonment, solitary confinement, fines, etc.
Source: Enclosure in Despatch 108, 2 July 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 274.
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the anti-slavery campaigner, John Scoble, in August 1837 [CO
318/128, West India Miscellaneous, 1837, Vol. 1].10
Smyth refuted many of the incidents Scoble cited during his
stay in British Guiana [Despatch 300, 7 April 1837, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol. 84, II, p. 77]. However, Scoble’s
involvement shows the potential of accounting to act as an
emancipating force in society once data become publicly avail-
able, which has been observed in other 19th century venues
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003; Brackenborough, 2003]. Indeed,
the culpability of accounting in the practice of slavery is not a
one-sided issue. The pressure exerted by the British government
on the colonial authorities to keep proper accounts of punish-
ments arguably protected the apprentices against the worse
treatment they would otherwise have received had no records
been kept.11
The judiciary was itself held accountable to the Colonial
Office through the regular filing of reports. CAP. II, Section 6 of
British Guiana’s Ordinance, for example, specified the particular
data that should be recorded regularly by the SJs:
 Every Special Justice and every District Session of Spe-
cial Justices shall keep a journal of all the cases brought
before him or them, in which shall be entered – 1st, the
date of the complaint; 2nd, the name of the complainant;
3rd, the name of the accused; 4th, the substance of the
complaint; 5th, the names of the witnesses adduced on
either side; 6th, the substance of the evidence; 7th, the
decision on the case; 8th, whether the decision has been
carried into effect; and to every case shall be added any
general remarks which may be thought advisable; and
all such journals shall be kept in one uniform manner,
to be prescribed for that purpose by the Governor and
Court of Policy.
In summary, the special justices were accountable to the special
magistrates, who were responsible for overseeing their work in
the district. The special magistrates, in turn, were obliged to
submit a monthly summary report to the Colonial Office in ad-
10 Green [1983, p. 103] described Scoble as “the indefatigable abolitionist.”
Scoble toured British Guiana in 1839 and reported “damningly” on the condi-
tion of indentured Indian laborers that were recruited to address the labor short-
ages on plantations. Green noted that Scoble’s report was published in 1840,
entitled ”Hill Coolies, A Brief Exposition of the Deplorable Condition of the Hill
Coolies in British Guiana and Mauritius.”
11 We gratefully acknowledge Barry Higman for making this point in his
helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
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dition to internal reports, the nature and frequency of which
varied from colony to colony. In Jamaica, for example, Governor
Sligo required his special magistrates to file a weekly report as
well as to provide immediate notice of every valuation they con-
ducted [Burn, 1937, p. 207]. In British Guiana, there was a
monthly reporting interval.12
Although the content of the reports varied, the two repro-
duced in Figures 1 and 2 are generally representative [Enclosure
A in Despatch 119, 16 December 1834, Smyth to Spring Rice,
BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 293-294].
12 Similar, albeit less frequent, reports of judicial proceedings had been re-
quired of the Slave Protector in British Guiana in the period prior to apprentice-
ship [BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 55].
FIGURE 1
Monthly Special Justice Report
District B
Sir, Vryheid’s Lust, 30 Nov. 1834.
I have the honour to transmit a monthly report, agreeable to the request of
his Excellency the Lieut.-governor.
1st. The apprenticed labourers in District B. are contented, cheerful and
civil, with the exception of the following estates: plantations Paradise and
Bachelor’s Adventure.
2d. They have not performed their work with alacrity and good will, on the
above two estates. On the other plantations the work has been well done.
3d. There has been no instance of resisting authority by force. Insubordina-
tion has been general on the two above-mentioned plantations.
4th. Those that are disposed to neglect their work, are frequently rude and
insolent to those in authority over them. Such misconduct has not been general,
and I do not attribute it to any combination or conspiracy. It is only with respect
to a few idle disorderly apprentices that any complaints are made.
5th. The attendance of the apprentices at church and at school has been
regular during the preceding month, and to the full extent of the accommoda-
tion afforded. The attendance of the young at the Sunday school, the same as the
preceding month.
6th. As an individual magistrate I have been under the necessity of punish-
ing three with whipping. There have been four delinquents punished with whip-
ping, by order of the court, during the preceding month.
I have, &c.
Henry Gloster, Esq. A.M. Lyons, S.J.P., Chairman District B.
Gov. Secretary
Source: Enclosure A. in Despatch No. 119, 16 December 1834, Smyth to Spring-
Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 293-294.
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FIGURE 2
Monthly Special Justice Report
District C
Office of Special Justices, George Town
Sir, 17 Dec. 1834.
In obedience to his Excellency the Lieut.-governor’s confidential order of the
23rd of September last, I have the honour to state for his information, in answer
to –
Query 1st. That the apprenticed labourers of this district, during this month
(November), have certainly exhibited a better feeling than in the last, on very
many properties. That within the Town district, incivility and rudeness towards
their employers and those in authority under them, have not disappeared.
Query 2d. That during this month (November), the work on various estates
has been performed in a manner leading me to suppose that the misunderstand-
ing previously existing is wearing away. But it is not to be expected that, until
they fully understand the benefits accruing to them, and something like a fixed
rate of wages is fallen into for their extra hours, that alacrity and good will may
be expected.
Query 3d. The instances of insubordination and unlawful combination have
decreased considerably this month; nor have there been any attempts to resist
authority by force, except in one or two instances of persons in a state of
intoxication.
Query 4th. The cases which have been manifested in this month (November),
of combination to neglect their work, and to disobey lawful orders, have de-
creased more than one half.
Query 5th. The attendance of the apprenticed labourers at church and at
school are proceeding in an increased ratio.
Query 6th. I have individually as a magistrate, and the district courts under
my charge have, still found it necessary to punish by flogging; but the instances
have decreased during this month (November), to 37 instead of 72, of which the
greatest number was inflicted on persons who had run away since the months of
August and September as follows:
Running away --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
In subordination, and not doing a sufficient quantity of work,
Disobedience and insolence ----------------------------------------------------- 3
Carelessly, indolently and negligently doing their work --------------------- 3
Drunkenness, &c. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
Absenting from duty -------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Unlawful combination not to do a sufficient quantity of work,
And to resist lawful orders ----------------------------------------------------- 11
I have, &c.
S.W. Gordon, Chairman District C.
Source: Enclosure A. in Despatch N. 119, Smyth to Spring-Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, pp. 293-294.
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Most noteworthy were the range of social issues that Smyth
asked special magistrates to report and his overriding concern
for peace and stability within the colony. Detailed economic
data were also collected over a wide range of issues and passed
back to London regularly via the governor-generals [e.g., Des-
patch 126, 6 July 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol. 84,
pp. 305-306; Enclosure D in Despatch 140, 21 June 1835, Sligo
to Glenelg, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 352-399].
DISCUSSION
Apprenticeship was not an isolated experiment but rather
one element of a wider, inter-connected dialogue of social and
behavioral reforms in the 1820s and 1830s. Thus, economic ra-
tionalism, based on our understanding of modern labor rela-
tions, only provides a partial explanation of the system of labor
control and accounting adopted during apprenticeship. For ex-
ample, the plantation wage records of the Tharp plantations of
Jamaica in the post-emancipation period suggest that appren-
tices were paid on a piece rate basis over the various plantation
tasks, but it is interesting that specific piece rates and output
levels were not noted in the books [Tharp Papers, R55/7/127/1/
1]. Unlike contemporary British factory workers, apprentices liv-
ing in larger colonies with vacant lands could pursue peasant
farming and were generally disinclined to increase their pay
through added effort. In Britain, the creation of free and willing
wage labor was the result of a “long process of revolution in the
social relations of production, particularly enclosures that de-
prived workers of the means of subsistence.”13 Arguably, such a
change in attitudes and opportunities could not be imposed sud-
denly [Thompson, 1967, pp. 80-81, 90], as was the attempt with
apprenticeship.
Clearly much work lies ahead in exploring the accounting
implications of these issues. In this respect, some of the most
influential work to date concerns applying the ideas of Michel
Foucault relating prison discipline to discipline of the industrial
work force [Armstrong, 1994]. Foucault’s [1991] conclusions
were based on the contrast between traditional and reformed
penal regimes. Here in the West Indies in the 1830s, we find
some of the earliest scientific prisons expressly designed to re-
form the behavior of the “inmates” by making them law-abiding,
13 We acknowledge a reviewer for this comment on the historical develop-
ment of British labor.
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compliant workers.14 Other non- Foucauldian studies have con-
sidered the formation of the state in relation to government
control of company law [e.g., Edwards et al., 1997]. Again, gov-
ernment intervention in society during apprenticeship took
place on an unprecedented scale in the British Empire, regulat-
ing the actions of landowners as well as workers, and “heralding
future change” [Paton, 2004, p. 66].
Another contemporary determinant of the call for greater
work discipline is the role played by Quakers in the abolition
movement in Britain and the U.S. [Cooke, 2003]. Central to the
Quaker ethic of “responsibility” was the notion of the “self-disci-
plined worker,” which also impinged on prison reform. The aim
of modern prisons was to transform deviants into “dependable
and willing workers” through subjecting them to a “habit-shap-
ing regimen” of regular work and strict social control. In this
respect, apprenticeship provided a test case for Quakers, for if
former slaves in the Caribbean could be inculcated with a sense
of work discipline, the same could be achieved at home “with
vagabonds, whores, felons, and deviants of every kind” [Davis,
1992, pp. 52-53].
The powers granted to West Indian magistrates is an addi-
tional factor relating to work discipline that should be noted.
The Orders in Council of 1824 and 1830 reflect the British
government’s intent to regulate corporal punishment and limit
the discretionary powers of magistrates during the apprentice-
ship period [Orders in Council, 10 March 1824, BPP, 1825, Vol.
26, pp. 124-138; Orders in Council, 1 May 1830, BPP, 1830-31,
Vol. 16, pp. 93-138]. These acts specified the nature and quantity
of corporal punishments that could be administered and mir-
rored the “push for uniformity” that was “perhaps the most per-
sistent motor” driving the new scientific approach to penal
policy in Britain at that time [Wiener, 1990, pp. 103-107]. The
installation of treadmills in parishes throughout the West Indies
during apprenticeship also typified the shift from corporal to
self discipline and was intended to painfully promote an inner
ethic to work willingly and cooperatively. Originally invented in
1818 and introduced into British prisons in the 1820s, the great
attraction of the treadmill was that its “mechanical operation
14 Cooke [2003] presents the interesting example of a 150 foot tall watch
tower on a Cuban plantation in 1835 that provided a 360 degree panoptical view
of slaves at work. The ability to monitor slaves in such a manner lends support
to a Foucauldian view of management history.
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meant that it supposedly required the same labor from all who
worked on it” [Paton, 2004, p. 88].15
It is important to be clear about the role of accounting
during apprenticeship because of the wider implications dis-
cussed above. As we have seen, accounting was integral to a
social system which was built on a hierarchy of accountability.
First, the workers were held accountable for putting in a reason-
able effort on the plantations through the imposition of work
standards and accounting returns which monitored output. Sec-
ond, the planters were held accountable for complying with the
regulations relating to the treatment of their workers through
regular inspections by the justices and magistrates. The ultimate
means of redress was prosecution under the law, with fines for
recalcitrant planters and floggings or incarceration for the work-
ers. Finally, the judiciary was itself held accountable to the Colo-
nial Office in London through regular reports. In short, the role
of accounting was coercive.
The complicity of accounting in the reformed prison re-
gimes of the West Indies and indeed elsewhere awaits research,
but as far as external reporting is concerned, accounting during
apprenticeship was intended to coerce the various parties into
submission rather than to encourage them to provide their labor
services willingly through bonuses, time off, or other incentives.
Socially “engineering” an ethic to work was left to other initia-
tives and institutions that included the establishment of schools,
religious education, reforming prisons, etc. Accounting returns
that were submitted to London included quantified measures of
the success of these initiatives, such as “the number of commu-
nicants who have received the Holy Sacrament during the last
quarter, the marriages which have taken place, and the numbers
15 At the beginning of apprenticeship, the treadmill was considered an ideal
punishment. It was especially useful as a substitute for the flogging of women,
now prohibited under the Abolition Act. The punishment fell into disrepute
through misuse, however. Captain J.W. Pringle, in a report to Parliament in
1838, described how treadmills were used in Jamaican prisons: “On many of the
wheels the prisoners are strapped by their wrists to the rail, so that, if they do
not tread, they must hang, the steps hitting their shins. This I witnessed in
several instances with both men and women. They appeared to hang in this
manner purely from obstinacy, and that they could have stepped had they tried
to do so. As the wheels were not revolving rapidly, their shins were only slightly
hurt. At Kingston and Vere, however, cats were regularly hung up under the
wheel; and at the former place the supervisor admitted that it was used by his
authority when the prisoners would not step properly. The supervisor and the
mayor of Kingston prevented my examining the prisoners themselves . . . ” [CO
318/136, p. 8].
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who attended either daily, afternoon, or Sunday schools” [Des-
patch 193, 23 July 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol.
84, p. 458]. Other schemes for social improvement included the
distribution of Bibles [CO 318/118/384], providing separate
schools for females to enable them be “instructed in those arts
of useful industry which belong exclusively” to them [CO 318/
118/406], and presenting medals for good behavior. As to this
later point, Governor Smyth wrote: “I periodically visit the dif-
ferent churches and chapels, as well as the parish and other
schools, and distribute medals amongst the most attentive and
best behaved of the scholars of both sexes” [Despatch 253, 12
December 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 106].
Smyth’s criteria for awarding medals were set out in a gov-
ernment notice reproduced in Figure 3 [Enclosure in Despatch
272, 1 June 1836, Glenelg to Smyth, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 196].
FIGURE 3
Government Notice
Major-general Sir James Carmichael Smyth hereby offers, and will present
in the month of January 1837, in the name of His Majesty, the following honor-
ary medals:
1. A gold medal, of value of five guineas, to the manager of that estate in the
district of Demerary on which, in comparison with the number of appren-
ticed labourers attached to such estate, the greatest happiness, industry
and contentment shall have prevailed during the year 1836. The high sher-
iff and two special justices will form the committee to select the manager.
2. Ditto for the District of Essequebo. The sheriff of Essequebo, and two of
the special justices of the Essequebo district to form the committee.
3. Ditto for the District of Berbice. The sheriff of Berbice, and two of the
special justices of the Berbice district to form the committee.
4. A gold medal, of the value of five guineas, to the manager of that estate in
the district of Demerary on which, with reference to the number of ap-
prenticed labourers attached to such estate, there shall have been the
greatest number of clean healthy children attending school, during the
year 1836.
5. The same for the district of Essequebo.
6. The same for the district of Berbice.
Candidates for the above medals are requested to have the goodness to
send in their names as early in the month of January as may be conve-
nient, in order that their respective claims may be referred to the commit-
tee with as little delay as possible.
The rectors or ministers of the several parishes (as the case may be)
will be requested to join the committee in selecting the individuals to
whom the three last-named medals are to be presented.
By Order of his Excellency the Lieutenant-governor,
Guiana Public Buildings Henry John Baird,
26 May 1836 Assist. Gov. Sec.
Source: Enclosures with Despatch No. 272, Glenelg to Smyth, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, p. 196.
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Accounting’s lack of direct involvement in social engineer-
ing does not imply that the system of governance and underly-
ing reporting practices adopted did not change people’s atti-
tudes and beliefs. Paton [2004, pp. 78-81], for example,
described an incident of apprentice resistance in 1834 that cul-
minated in the removal of a special magistrate from his posi-
tion. The episode demonstrated the awareness among a gang of
apprentices in Jamaica of their rights and obligations under the
newly found legislation and a belief in its efficacy for seeking
redress. Adamson [1975, p. 463] documented a similar event
occurring in British Guiana in 1842. Another possible example
of shifts in attitude concerns the use of scale-rates as a means of
defining reasonable work effort during apprenticeship. These
were akin to the task-rates that became increasingly popular on
some plantations after 1807, and resulted in a discourse be-
tween managers and laborers not dissimilar to the later one
surrounding the use of standard costing in industry [Tyson et
al., 2004]. The readiness with which scale-rates were devised
under apprenticeship suggests that tasking was well known in
the British West Indies as a means of organizational control in
the slavery era even within the context of supervised gangs.
The fundamental nature of accounting as an instrument of
coercion during apprenticeship is illustrated by the fact that
corporal punishment meted out on the basis of accounting evi-
dence remained the ultimate deterrent for non-compliant work-
ers. It has been suggested that the Foucauldian distinction be-
tween pre-modern and modern prison regimes, the one based on
physical punishment and public spectacles, the other on mental
control behind closed walls, was not entirely clear-cut in prac-
tice [Wiener, 1990, p. 101; Arnold, 1992]. This was certainly the
case in the West Indies, and indeed Great Britain through to the
20th century, with pain still being inflicted on the prisoner’s
body [Paton, 2004, pp. 10, 105-106]. This kind of blurring was
also true of accounting during apprenticeship. Accounting
formed part of a strikingly modern social apparatus that sought
to inculcate former slaves with a sense of work discipline that
would hold good after apprenticeship had ended and they be-
came free laborers. But to a large extent, accounting itself re-
tained its traditional role of enforcing rights and obligations
rather than enacting behavioral change.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has described the multiple roles of accounting
during the apprenticeship period in the British West Indies. Un-
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der slavery, planters maintained complete control by physically
compelling slaves to perform tasks, and they were legally sanc-
tioned to flog them for failing to perform to expectations. Dur-
ing apprenticeship, planters were precluded from using the lash
to compel work effort, but rather than providing sufficient in-
ducements for workers to exchange their labor power willingly,
planters, colonial legislatures, and Parliamentary leaders be-
lieved that former slaves would only work on plantations under
enforced compulsion. These power holders colluded to establish
a complex system of rules, regulations, and prescribed behaviors
that would “replace the slave-owners’ authority and secure the
workers’ new contract terms” [Turner, 1999, p. 19].
While accounting practices did not drive apprenticeship,
they played an important role in sustaining its complex social-
control mechanisms. Absent the ability to use indiscriminate
floggings to ensure work obedience, detailed records were kept
to document absences, work effort, and contract violations, all
of which were used to maintain the plantocracy’s dominance
over labor. The planters and judiciary were in turn held ac-
countable by a reporting network feeding into the Colonial Of-
fice in London.
The information that was regularly submitted to the Colo-
nial Office was both detailed and profuse, and served to illumi-
nate not just the practices under apprenticeship, but also during
the earlier slave era. It cast light on the punishment regime
during slavery, and helps answer the contentious question posed
by planters and abolitionists alike of whether slaves were better
or worse off than British factory workers. Wilberforce himself
observed:
The difference, then, between the free-born Englishman
and the negro seems to be this, that one is compelled to
labour while he is able by the pinching of hunger, the
shivering of cold, or the horrors of a jail; and the other
is forced to it when he is well fed and clothed, and in
sound health, by the terrors of the cart whip [Knox,
1789, p. 15].
In point of fact, apprenticed workers may not have been treated
uniquely – the British laboring classes also faced physical pun-
ishments through the penal system if they refused to comply.
However, the difference in severity is difficult to ascertain be-
cause the abolitionists had a vested interest in popularizing a
picture of unremitting cruelty on plantations, whereas the con-
verse was true of planters [Knox, 1789, pp. 41-43, 64; Roughley,
1823, p. 75].
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Apprenticeship may be seen as one element within a wider
scientific movement to instill a sense of work discipline into the
poorer elements of British society, including factories, work-
houses, prisons, as well as plantations [e.g. Thompson, 1967;
Walker, 2004]. While accounting was used to monitor the eco-
nomic performance of an entity, its primary purpose in the Car-
ibbean was to sustain a complex, racially-based, social regime
by policing workplace relationships and arrangements. There is
little evidence to suggest that accounting was used to create
incentives or effect behavioral change whereby workers would
more willingly provide labor services or accumulate a surplus.
Once accounting is perceived as a social apparatus that is
used to bolster or maintain the dominance of one group over
another, a number of historical situations present themselves
for further study. Comparisons of accounting practices in the
United States and the Caribbean during their respective transi-
tions from slavery, as well as of accounting practices in appren-
tice plantations and concurrent British factories, are two possi-
bilities. Further research is also needed to understand
accounting’s role in the mid-late 19th century drive to develop
willing and productive workers that were essential to meet the
demands of expanding industrialized economies.
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ACCOUNTING IN HISTORY
Abstract: Recent studies of publication patterns in accounting history
portray a myopic and introspective discipline. Analyses reveal the
production and dissemination of accounting history knowledge which
focus predominantly on Anglo-American settings and the age of mo-
dernity. Limited opportunities exist for contributions from scholars
working in languages other than English. Many of the practitioners of
accounting history are also shown to be substantially disconnected
from the wider community of historians. It is argued in the current
paper that interdisciplinary history has the potential to enhance theo-
retical and methodological creativity and greater inclusivity in the
accounting history academy. A practical requirement for this venture
is the identification of points of connectedness between accounting
and other historians. An analysis of publications with accounting con-
tent in Historical Abstracts reveals increasing interest among histori-
ans in the history of accounting. This substantial literature incorpo-
rates sites largely unfamiliar to accounting historians, such as
Eastern and Central Europe and Central and South America. Histori-
ans also communicate their findings on accounting in a variety of
languages. Subjects particularly deserving of interdisciplinary re-
search engaging accounting and other historians include accounting
in agricultural economies, the institutions of pre-industrial rural soci-
eties and diverse systems of government.
INTRODUCTION
The turn of the 21st century has witnessed the appearance
of a number of papers reflecting on the flourishing state of ac-
counting history and impediments to its future progress. The
empirical base for these commentaries is the analysis of publica-
tion outputs. While a cynical observer might comprehend this
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tendency to introspection as indicative of intellectual exhaustion
in a hitherto vibrant field, a number of important findings have
emerged from such studies which pose challenges to the ac-
counting history community. In particular, the findings of re-
cent papers on publishing patterns illustrate the need for ac-
counting historians to practice greater inclusivity.
Based on an admittedly limited population of English lan-
guage papers appearing from 1996 to 1999 in the specialist ac-
counting history journals, Carnegie and Potter concluded that
their analysis indicates “the existence of a relatively insular in-
ternational accounting history research community dominated
by a small number of institutions and authors” [2000]. Carnegie
and Potter contended that accounting history authors seldom
engage in cross-border collaborative research and display a lim-
ited tendency to venture beyond core themes and the modern
period. A subsequent study of the sex distribution of authors in
the same journals revealed, unsurprisingly, that authorship and
editorial board membership in accounting history is male-domi-
nated [Carnegie et al, 2003]. Edwards’ [2004] broader review of
the accounting history literature identified concerns about areas
of fading interest, publication media and the dissemination of
research findings. Fleischman and Radcliffe’s celebration of the
advance of accounting history during ‘the roaring nineties’ is
tempered by fears of its quiet demise in the United States
[2005].
In his study of the contents of the first ten volumes of Ac-
counting, Business & Financial History Anderson [2002] identi-
fied a predominance of UK, US and Australian authors and sub-
jects, a concentration on the 19th and 20th centuries and a
dearth of citations by accounting historians to published mate-
rial outside of accounting and business. Anderson [2002] con-
cluded that “ABFH authors have relied upon a very narrow lit-
erature, with almost 50 per cent of all citations deriving from
ten leading accounting and accounting/business history jour-
nals”. Such findings are confirmatory of Parker’s observation
almost a decade earlier [1993] that “accounting history is in-
creasingly dominated by writers in English discussing private-
sector accounting in English-speaking countries of the 19th and
20th centuries”.
A comprehensive study of accounting history publications
in both the specialist and general accounting journals has been
conducted by Carmona [2003]. With a focus on diffusion this
research is particularly enlightening in its confirmation of the
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introspective tendencies of most accounting historians.
Carmona’s analysis of knowledge transfer between accounting
history and related disciplines shows that only 7% of citations in
accounting history articles published between 1990 and 1999
were to papers in history journals [also Badua, 2003]. The study
also reveals that accounting history authors are decidedly ‘local’
in their use of literature and primary sources, Anglo-American
authors being especially reluctant to access pertinent work in
other languages. Carmona’s [2004] study of accounting history
papers in international (English language) journals and confer-
ences during the 1990s reveals that 91% of authors were ‘Anglo-
Saxon’, publications focused on Anglo-American settings and
72% of papers related to the period 1850-1945.
Analyzing publication outputs in accounting history is valu-
able where the object is to identify threats, opportunities, ex-
cluded academic communities and new research arenas and ap-
proaches. The recent upsurge in ‘navel gazing’ has been
accompanied by calls for expansive agendas (such as compara-
tive international accounting history [Carnegie and Napier,
2002]), consideration of future research directions and method-
ologies [Funnell, 1998; Parker, 1999] and exhortations for the
greater inclusivity of scholars operating in non-‘Anglo-Saxon’
contexts. Carmona [2004] concluded that embracing non-Anglo-
Saxon scholars and subject matter was the “most important
challenge” for accounting historians.
As well as calling for the greater collaboration of accounting
historians across geographical and cultural space, the findings
reported in studies of publication patterns indicate the desirabil-
ity of greater engagement across disciplines. It is this challenge
to the accounting history research community which is the fo-
cus of the present paper. In contrast to most recent analyses of
the content of specialist accounting history journals, the current
contribution seeks to look outwardly to the wider discipline of
history, of accounting in history as opposed to accounting his-
tory in accounting. The study is partly a response to Miller et al’s
[1991] important contention that accounting history would be
advanced by “examining the work of historians in fields other
than accounting, and assessing the extent to which they enable
new questions to be posed or existing research agendas to be
refined or modified”.
The following section reviews the nature of interdisci-
plinarity, particularly as it relates to the production of knowl-
edge in history. It is suggested that adherence to a holistic con-
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cept of interdisciplinarity may have a regenerative impact on
research agendas, offers a palliative to the insularity of account-
ing history and has the potential to challenge the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
hegemony. Identifying points of connectedness between ac-
counting and other historians is suggested as a starting point for
the encouragement of greater interdisciplinary practice in ac-
counting history research. Hence, the subsequent section reveals
the results of an analysis of a major bibliographical database,
Historical Abstracts, with the aim of exploring the presence of
accounting in history publications over the past half century.
INTERDISCIPLINARY ACCOUNTING HISTORY
Accounting historians have long been conscious of the po-
tential importance of accessing other disciplines, not least be-
cause the work of historians, sociologists and philosophers in
particular, has been instrumental in generating research ques-
tions and igniting debates in the field. The pluralization of
methodologies and interdisciplinarity were key tenets of the re-
generative ‘new accounting history’ espoused by Miller et al
[1991]. The publication of papers in their special issue, drawn
from Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conferences,
led Miller et al [1991] to conclude rather optimistically that “the
interdisciplinary study of accounting history is an accomplish-
ment rather than a promise”.
Subsequently, critical scholars continued to iterate the ad-
vances in historical knowledge which accrued from a greater
receptivity to interpreting events through alternative theoretical
lenses [Merino, 1998] and broadening the subject matter,
sources and frameworks employed in accounting history re-
search [Gaffikin, 1998]. Cross-disciplinary potentialities have
been explored at the interface between accounting and its close
neighbor, business history [Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Mathias,
1993; Parker, 1997, Ville and Fleming, 1999/2000]. Parker [1997,
1999] has revealed the opportunities for accounting history re-
search which emerge from further engagement with manage-
ment and social history. One of the important themes to emerge
from the Academy of Accounting Historians Consortium on
Comparative International Accounting History in 1999 [see The
Accounting Historians Notebook, 1999, No. 2] was the need to
nurture mutually beneficial connections between accounting
historians and historians. The ‘interfaces’ section of The Ac-
counting Historians Journal, inaugurated in 2001, was a re-
sponse to this. In a recent contribution to this section, Zan
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[2004] reiterated a demand for greater plurality in accounting
historiography made by Carmona and Zan [2002]. The ongoing
character of such calls for diversity, combined with the results
of studies of publishing patterns, confirm the essential
intradisciplinary character of most accounting history. The time
appears ripe for revisiting the arguments for greater inter-
disciplinarity.
Interdisciplinarity is taken here to refer to “any form of
dialogue or interaction between two or more disciplines” with a
view to “producing new forms of knowledge” [Moran, 2002, p.
16]. Interdisciplinarity is one of three principal types of
supradisciplinarity [Balsiger, 2004]. Multidisciplinarity involves
drawing on knowledge from two or more disciplines without
collaboration or the cross fertilization of research outcomes.
The voguish transdisciplinarity concerns research orientated to-
wards seeking solutions to societal problems and a heteroge-
neous approach to knowledge production which transcends aca-
demic disciplinary structures. It has been suggested that
whereas interdisciplinarity involves a ‘mixing’ of disciplines,
transdisciplinarity involves their fusion [Lawrence and Després,
2004; Klein, 2004].
Interdisciplinary approaches are widely lauded for their po-
tential to relieve methodological bottlenecks and arrest theoreti-
cal stagnation within a single discipline. The importation of in-
sights borrowed from other disciplines can inspire creativity and
regeneration. Outsiders or ‘immigrants’ may bring fresh per-
spectives to a discipline or identify ‘crossdisciplinary oversights’.
An interdisciplinary stance may also reveal issues which exist
beyond disciplinary borders and encourage integrated ap-
proaches to solving complex problems [Nissani, 1997]. Since the
1960s, the advocates of interdisciplinary history in particular
have argued that the cross-fertilization of theories and methods
from other humanities and social sciences has the potential to
pose new research questions and introduce alternative tech-
niques for addressing them [Rotberg and Rabb, 1970]. Although
it remains the case that interdisciplinarity has “deeply affected
the thinking and scholarly output of only a minority of histori-
ans”, it is firmly established at the highest level of scholarship.
The question “whether or not the historian should use the ideas
and methods of other fields is no longer at issue” [Horn and
Ritter, 1986].
Interdisciplinarity also implies a democratic approach to
knowledge production, one which has the potential to challenge
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the vested interests, intellectual orthodoxies, conventions and
exclusivity which can emerge from the institutionalization of
single disciplines [Moran, 2002, pp. 3, 14]. Indeed, critics of the
current ‘Anglo-Saxon’ hegemony in accounting history might
perceive the organizations which represent the field, the dis-
course surrounding its practice, and the research traditions, au-
thors and languages which dominate its journals, as illustrative
of the institutional structures of an intradiscipline. These prob-
lems might be assuaged by greater interdisciplinarity.
The broader notion of democratized plurality in inter-
disciplinarity is epitomized by one of its most tangible manifes-
tations in the field of history - the establishment of The Journal
of Interdisciplinary History in 1970. This journal continues to
pursue familiarity with, and integration of, “a variety of topics
without limit to geographical area or chronological period” and
has produced special issues in a variety of languages. Interdisci-
plinary approaches (and transdisciplinary approaches even
more so) recognize that borrowings from other territories may
be cultural and lingual as well as theoretical and methodologi-
cal. The reasons for this were iterated by Lovejoy as early as
1940 [pp. 3-4]:
The history of political events and social movements, of
economic changes, of religion, of philosophy, of sci-
ence, of literature and the other arts, of education, have
been investigated by distinct groups of specialists,
many of them little acquainted with the subjects and
the researchers of the others. The specialization which
– the limitations of the individual mind being what they
are – had this as its natural consequence was indispens-
able for the progress of historical knowledge; yet the
consequence proved also, in the end, an impediment to
such progress. For the departmentalization - whether
by subjects, periods, nationalities, or languages - of the
study of the history of thought corresponds, for the
most part, to no real cleavages among the phenomena
studied. The processes of the human mind, in the indi-
vidual or the group, which manifest themselves in his-
tory, do not run in enclosed channels corresponding to
the officially established divisions of university facul-
ties. . . . Historiography, in short, for excellent practical
reasons, is divided, but the historical process is not; and
this discrepancy between the procedure and the sub-
ject-matter has tended, at best, to produce serious lacu-
nae in the study if the history of man, and at worst,
sheer errors and distortions.
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Other potential advantages of interdisciplinary approaches
for accounting historians include the scope they offer for im-
proving the contextualization of the phenomena studied (an at-
tribute increasingly sought by journal reviewers) and the in-
creased opportunity for research funding in nations where
agencies actively encourage project proposals which straddle
subject boundaries.
The benefits of interdisciplinarity have been well rehearsed.
Yet, the approach is not without its critics. Interdisciplinarity
has been described as “the most seriously underthought critical,
pedagogical and institutional concept in the modern academy”
[Liu, 1989, quoted in Moran, 2002, p. 1]. Detractors note that if
pursued to the exclusion of mono-disciplinarity, inter-
disciplinarity can result in excessive eclecticism, historical re-
ductionism and the stultification of advances in the produc-
tion of depth knowledge. Further, the practitioners of
interdisciplinary research suffer the burden of mastering more
than one body of knowledge, loss of identity in their academic
‘home’ and may suffer the consequences of operating in contexts
where the institutions which measure research and teaching
performance remain structured around traditional disciplinary
boundaries.
Critics also note that calls for interdisciplinarity in histori-
cal research frequently offer ‘banal exhortations’ of its virtues as
opposed to producing works which reveal its utility. Proponents
of interdisciplinarity often fail to address the undoubted com-
plexities of its practical implementation [Hunt, 1994]. Horn and
Ritter [1986] contended that “Even today, there is doubtless
more talk about the need for interdisciplinary history than ac-
tual production of interdisciplinary work”. Of particular impor-
tance to the practice of interdisciplinary research is encouraging
dialogue between the practitioners of different disciplines. Also
desirable is the assumption of an outward-looking as opposed to
an introspective stance - receptiveness to the insights to be
gained from researchers operating in various geographical and
disciplinary territories. Among the impediments to fostering
communication and co-operation across boundaries is lack of
knowledge about points of connectedness and potential engage-
ment [Rotberg and Rabb, 1970]. It is in relation to this practical
impediment to interdisciplinary endeavor (as it relates to poten-
tial interfaces between accounting historians and historians)
that the paper now turns.
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SOURCES AND METHODS
Accounting historians have long benefited from a regular
supply of bibliographical data. During the 1970s and 1980s,
R.H. Parker recognized the importance of compiling biblio-
graphical sources to assist researchers in the developing disci-
pline [1980, 1988; Pryce Jones, 1974]. Parker and Graves’ [1989]
bibliography of historiography was testament to the need for
methodological and epistemological advance in accounting his-
tory. The Accounting Historians Notebook has a regular ‘History
in Print’ section which identifies “accounting history research
which may be of interest and use by the Academy membership”.
Readers are encouraged to notify the Notebook of publications
“in an effort to provide the broadest coverage and recognition of
accounting history research”. ‘History in Print’ has enumerated
items in a variety of accounting and business journals, and on
occasion the listing has extended beyond publications in the
English language [see, for example, October 1998]. The recently
compiled taxonomic classification of papers in the Accounting
Historians Journal contained in the Accounting Research Data-
base is also a useful bibliographic research tool [Badua et al,
2003].
Anderson has provided a similarly valuable service in com-
piling an annual listing of ‘Accounting History Publications’ for
Accounting, Business & Financial History. This details material
written in English on accounting history broadly defined and is
drawn primarily but not exclusively from accounting and related
journals. Anderson’s compilation excludes business history
which is separately reviewed on an annual basis in Business
History. Accounting History has also published an annual publi-
cations list. This too is confined to material written in English
and is substantially compiled from accounting and accounting
history journals. The Accounting History list is not intended to
be exhaustive. Rather, it seeks to indicate types of research con-
ducted over the relevant period.
The current study draws its data from a bibliographical
source which is not confined to accounting and business his-
tory. According to its managing editor, Historical Abstracts “has
long been recognized as the leading bibliography for historical
study in the world” [http://serials.abc-clio.com/aboutha.html].
Historical Abstracts commenced in 1954 and represents a biblio-
graphical database of history articles, doctoral theses, and books
reviewed in journals. Material on the period from 1450 to the
present day is included in the database. Publications on pre-
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medieval subjects are not. Historical Abstracts includes papers
culled from more than 2,000 outlets, comprising “the key his-
torical journals from virtually every major country”, as well as
other journals of interest to historians in the humanities and
social sciences [ibid]. Publications are not confined to those
written in English, though the abstracts are translated or pre-
pared in that language. Publications on US and Canadian sub-
jects are covered by a separate database America: History and
Life. Historical Abstracts currently contains over 600,000 entries
and 20,000 new citations are added annually. The database is
updated monthly.
As available on the Internet, Historical Abstracts permits
simple and advanced keyword searches by subject, author, title,
language, journal name, document type, publication date and
period. For the purposes of this study, searches were made of
the following keywords: accounting, accountancy, bookkeeping,
audit, auditing, accountant, accountants. At the end of August
2003, these produced the following numbers of items: ‘account-
ing’ (819), ‘accountancy’ (29), ‘bookkeeping’ (105), ‘audit’ (57),
‘auditing’ (44), ‘accountant’ (39), and ‘accountants’ (48). The ab-
stracts were downloaded and reviewed. A number of items were
then removed from the population studied. These represented
publications which appeared in one of the three specialist ac-
counting history journals (Accounting Historians Journal; Ac-
counting, Business & Financial History; Accounting History) or
Business History (which, as stated earlier, has its own annual
review of the literature). Articles on historical subjects published
in general accounting journals do not feature in Historical Ab-
stracts. A small number of articles on US subjects published in
the 1950s and 1960s were also excluded as more appropriately
belonging to the database on America: History and Life.
Items where the abstract included a keyword such as ‘ac-
counting’ but no apparent accounting content were also re-
moved. Most of the latter instances used the word ‘accounting’
to mean the giving of reasons or offering explanations, as in
‘Accounting for Taste: Export Bananas, Mass Markets and
Panama Disease’; or, as an assessment of a life, as in ‘Ernst
Kantovowicz: An Accounting’. As a result of this selection pro-
cess the number of abstracts in the population was reduced
from 1,141 to 521. Given the numbers involved, references to
individual publications are not provided in this paper. However,
it is hoped that sufficient information is offered about particular
articles to enable keyword searches of Historical Abstracts. It
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should also be emphasized that the full articles and theses were
not read and the extent of the accounting content of the publica-
tions has not been ascertained. The latter is likely to vary con-
siderably. However, it is hoped that the findings reported will
identify potential areas of research for accounting historians
and convergences of interest with mainstream historians.
The next section provides a statistical summary of the char-
acteristics of publications in history journals and theses which
relate to accounting. This is followed by a more detailed survey
of the accounting content of items featuring in Historical Ab-
stracts.
PROFILE OF PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS
WHICH RELATE TO ACCOUNTING
Year of Publication: The data in Table 1 indicates an increasing
number of publications in the history literature on accounting-
related subjects. This mirrors the advancing interest in history
in accounting academe. In 1954-1969, the average number of
accounting-related history publications contained in Historical
Abstracts was 3.9 per annum. During the 1980s and 1990s, this
increased to 16.7 per annum.
TABLE 1
Year of Publication
Year of Publication N %
1954-59 17 3
1960-69 45 9
1970-79 102 20
1980-89 164 31
1990-99 170 33
2000-02 23 4
TOTAL 521 100
Language: Table 2 shows the principal languages in which publi-
cations contained in the database were written. Although the
dominant language was English, 66% of publications were pre-
pared in 24 other languages. These ranged from Afrikaans to
Swedish. This finding indicates the existence of a significant
history literature relating to accounting outside of the English
language.
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TABLE 2
Language of Publications Included in the Database
(where n ≥10)
Language N %
English 227 44
Spanish 61 12
French 54 10
German 36 7
Italian 27 5
Russian 27 5
Japanese 14 3
Polish 13 2
Other (n=17) 62 12
TOTAL 521 100
Period Studied: Table 3 reveals that 61% of the items contained
in the database concerned the modern period. This finding ac-
cords with the temporal focus of most accounting historians.
TABLE 3
Period Studied
Century N %
15th 18 3
16th 42 8
17th 38 7
18th 65 13
19th 121 23
20th 196 38
Various/non-temporal 41 8
TOTAL 521 100
Geographical Location Studied: Table 4 reveals that most of the
publications in the dataset concerned European countries. The
accounting subject matter examined in historical studies in the
principal locations is now explored.
SUBJECT MATTER
Great Britain: There were more publications relating to account-
ing in Britain in Historical Abstracts than any other single coun-
try. In part, this reflects the journals included in Historical Ab-
stracts and the fact that established accounting historians have
achieved publications in economic history journals and there-
fore appear in the database for this study. Contributors such as
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Boyns, Fleischman and Tyson, reveal the findings of recent
scholarship on core subjects addressed in earlier works by eco-
nomic historians such as Pollard on capital accounting in the
industrial revolution and McKendrick on cost accounting at
Wedgwood during the 18th century.
The most significant subject-interface between accounting
and British history concerns the state and public administra-
tion. Again we may identify work by accounting historians in
the database, such as doctoral theses by Jones on accounting
and local government since the 19th century and Haslam on the
state, accounting and accounting publicity in the early-19th cen-
tury. Miller and Rose’s work on governmentality also features in
Historical Abstracts. Beyond these more familiar works lay a
variety of themes pursued by historians with more vigor than
TABLE 4
Geographical Location Studied
(where n ≥10)
LOCATION N N %
Europe
Great Britain 89
USSR 38
France 36
Germany 36
Italy 30
Spain 26
Poland 15
Austria 13
Czechoslovakia 11
Other (n=13 countries) 59
Total 353 68
Asia
China 22
Japan 16
Other (n=10 countries) 27
Total 65 13
Africa 15 3
Australasia 10 2
Central and South America
Peru 11
Other (n=15 countries) 44
Total 55 10
Non-specific 23 4
TOTAL 521 100
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their colleagues in accounting. These include: the history of the
Scottish Exchequer and accounting and audit of royal revenue
in Scotland from the 13th century; the office of The Comptroller
in 15th-century Scotland; accounting and audit in the reform of
public finances under Henry VII; accounting for the court revels
of Henry VIII and shifts from narrative to documentary ac-
countability; the work of the Court of Audit in the early 16th
century; accounting procedures in the royal household during
the 17th century; the importance of the Commissioners of Pub-
lic Accounts of the 1690s in English party politics; the work of
the Commissioners for Examining Public Accounts during the
1780s as a component of an administrative revolution; and the
deficiencies of central government accounting and financial
control since 1866. In relation to more recent times, subjects
include computerized accounting for Value Added Tax; debates
over the National Audit Act, 1983, and auditing in the Ministry
of Defence during the 1980s.
Similarly, there are a small but increasing number of stud-
ies of accounting in British military history. Subjects include
accounting controls to prevent fraud in procuring supplies for
the navy during the 1770s and 1780s; Samuel Bentham’s system
of accounting and accountability in naval dockyards, 1797-1811;
accounting reforms in naval dockyards in the second half of the
19th century; and cost accounting in the army during the early-
20th century.
The most significant subject of historical works on account-
ing beyond the state and public administration in Britain is the
accountancy profession. Again, this is partly attributable to the
inclusion in Historical Abstracts of publications by accounting
historians. Doctoral theses on the profession in Scotland by
Kedslie and Walker feature, as do articles on Scottish accoun-
tants in the sociological literature. The work of Anderson,
Edwards and Matthews on accountants in British management
has also been published in journals of economic and business
history. Jones’ history of Ernst and Whinney is also included in
the database. Less familiar studies also feature. These concern,
for example: an accountant who was influential in the formation
of North Wales Quarryman’s Union; biographies of a pacifist
Quaker accountant; an accountant’s family as an example of
middle class life after World War II; firms of Manchester ac-
countants in 1950-1980; and research on the development of the
expectations gap during 1980s.
The significance and use of accounting records as a source
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in business history is the subject of several British studies, pri-
marily authored by archivists. Business and economic historians
have utilized such material to investigate subjects such as:
smuggling by Bristol merchants during the 16th century; pub-
lishing history during the late-17th century; the profitability of
the 18th-century slave trade; Covent Garden theatre in the
1730s; Welsh industry from 1700 to 1830; and the financial per-
formance of various companies from the late-Victorian to the
interwar periods.
Accounting practice as opposed to accounting records fea-
ture more explicitly in studies of the following: 16th-century
ironworks; the Hudson Bay Company in the late-17th century;
mercantile bookkeeping manuals of the 17th and 18th centuries;
absentee landed estates in the 17th century; trading families in
the 18th century; large corporations during the interwar period;
the introduction of computerized processing in the Lyons food
company in 1947; and studies of corporate culture since World
War II. Accounting concepts also emerge in studies of national
income accounting from the 17th century onwards, social ac-
counting models in macro-economic analyses of the 1930s, and
Keynesian double entry formats in national accounting.
Another significant interface is between accounting and
transport history. Again, this partly represents the contributions
of accounting historians such as Arnold in journals of transport
and maritime history. Papers explore accounting fraud in 19th-
century railway companies; railway accounting during the 1930s
to 1950s; pricing and financial accounting in tramway compa-
nies during the second half of the 19th century; bookkeeping in
local shipping firms during the 1750s; the use of accounting
records to assess the performance of shipping companies during
the 19th century; financial reporting by shipping companies in
late-19th and early-20th centuries; secret reserve accounting and
reporting by shipping companies during World War I and the
post-war period.
A small number of publications on British social and medi-
cal history engage with accounting. These include studies of
charity and poor relief in 16th and 17th-century Exeter; ac-
counting and vocational education in Lowland Scotland during
the 18th century; accounting and audit in voluntary hospitals
during the mid-18th century; the history of medical audit from
the mid-19th century; and insights to the Primitive Methodist
Church through bookkeeping records. Some potentially fasci-
nating studies with accounting content have been undertaken in
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literary history. These include Samuel Pepys’ diary (1660-1669)
as an accounting for the self; bookkeeping arithmetic in John
Graunt’s Natural and Political Observations (1662); accounting
for acquisitive individualism in Alexander Pope’s The Dunciad
(1728); and the concept of accounting and quantification in
Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1772).
USSR: Perhaps one of the most surprising findings of this study
is the number of abstracts relating to accounting in the coun-
tries comprising the former Soviet Union. Before the dissolution
of the USSR in 1991, most history publications on Russia with
an accounting content concerned the development of account-
ing in the Communist state. Particular attention was devoted to
accounting under the New Economic Policy of 1921. Authors
frequently refer to the gestation and implementation of Lenin’s
ideas on accounting in the planned economy and the function-
ing of costing in state industry and collective farms. ‘Self ac-
counting’ in workers co-operatives 1920-1980, accounting in the
First Five-Year Plan for the steel industry from 1928, and ac-
counting on collective and state farms from the 1950s also fea-
ture. Studies also examine attempts to introduce mechanized
accounting in the Soviet economy from 1928 and in the Latvian
Soviet Socialist Republic during the 1970s. Studies of the Great
Patriotic War (1941-1945) discuss state agencies such as the
work of the ‘Committee for Accounting’ on the distribution of
labor while critiques of ‘fascist bookkeeping’ concern accounting
for Soviet prisoners of war and the number of military casual-
ties. Studies of the post-war USSR also refer to accounting in
economic planning, assess the accounting systems used in in-
dustrial complexes in Siberia, the problems of ascertaining costs
on Soviet farms, and the accounting consequences of the
gradual introduction of market economics during the 1980s.
During the Cold War, authors outside the USSR also critiqued
the accounting methods behind disclosures of Soviet military
spending and macro-economic performance.
Publications on auditing refer to the audit function of the
Workers and Peasants Inspectorate and its significance for
implementing state policy at the local level during the 1920s.
Also considered is the work of the Central Auditing Commission
of the Communist Party from 1917 to 1933. Articles relating to
pre-revolutionary Russia include studies of the accountability of
monasteries to the state during the 17th and 18th centuries;
accounting practices in the 19th-century fur trade, company law
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on accounting, 1836-1917; and accounting practices on rural
estates during the 18th century. Accounting records have
formed the raw material for assessments of the standard of liv-
ing of the Latvian peasantry in the 18th century and the produc-
tivity of mines in the Urals during the 1860s.
France: Advancing interest in accounting history in France is
demonstrated by the annual research conference, established in
1995, and the appearance of special issues on French account-
ing history in Accounting, Business and Financial History in
1997 and 2001. The editorial introductions to the latter suggest
that an originating concern among scholars in France with ac-
counting and the management of enterprises [Parker et al, 1997]
has been recently supplemented by a more interdisciplinary fo-
cus [Boyns and Nikitin, 2001]. The accounting citations in His-
torical Abstracts on French subjects are suggestive of a plurality
of interests of a longer duration. Studies on accounting in indus-
try focus on: major concerns such as Schneider and the Société
Générale d’Entreprises; a cloth factory during the 18th century;
shipping firms in 18th-century Nantes; the iron industry during
the 1830s; intermediate accounting in public works firms during
the interwar period; and Emile Rimailho’s work on cost ac-
counting for the French Commission on Scientific Management
during the interwar years. There are also studies on the relation-
ship between accounting methods and the social sources of
capital in 18th-century companies and the development of con-
cepts of commercial capital. Articles address the problems of
accounting for slaves in the French West Indies during the 18th
century; issues in the development and regulation of corporate
reporting; the audit function of the Cour des Comptes from
1807; and accounting and business fraud since the 1950s. As in
Britain, the work of accounting historians (such as Lemarchand
and Nikitin) feature among the citations.
Studies of pre-industrial businesses in France include mer-
chants in 16th-century Bordeaux and Toulouse. Historical Ab-
stracts also contains studies which consider accounting in agri-
culture and rural society. In relation to the 18th century, these
studies include accounting for land, the advocacy of agricultural
accounting by the Physiocrats, and auditing communal ac-
counts in Eastern Gascony. Research on the 19th century has
focused on agricultural accounting in the Pas-de-Calais, ac-
counting on cattle farms in Normandy and the books of a wine
grower in Medoc. Accounting records have been used in re-
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search to evaluate agricultural revenue and production in vari-
ous periods, taxation, and economic activity in local communi-
ties.
Studies of socio-religious subjects in France concern the use
of accounting records to analyze the consumption patterns of
patients in a Paris hospital during the 15th century; language
and trade between French and German bailiwicks in the 15th
century; the circulation of money in the Burgundian church
during the late-15th century; the activities of a charitable broth-
erhood in Toulouse from the 1490s to the 1540s; religious perse-
cution and politics in a local community during the 17th cen-
tury; secularization in a local parish during the 17th and 18th
centuries; and the Portuguese Jewish Community in Paris dur-
ing the late-18th century. One paper refers to the teaching of
accounting in advanced schools of commerce during the 19th
century.
Germany: German historians have referred to accounting in a
wide variety of contexts. Papers discuss the importance of teach-
ing cost accounting to those educated for business management
and the accounting taught to tradesmen. Accounting records are
extolled for the insights they offer to subjects ranging from peas-
ant life in the 19th and 20th centuries to understanding the
operations of companies trading overseas. One paper urges the
importance of tax (as opposed to corporate) balance sheets as a
source for the analysis of industrial concerns.
Studies of the pre-industrial period focus on accounting and
audit in local and provincial government and church adminis-
tration. This focus reflects the existence of disparate principali-
ties and states before the emergence of a unified Germany in the
19th century. Publications discuss accounting and bankruptcy
in Augsburg during the 16th and 17th centuries, the role of
annual financial reporting by local communities to the central
authority under enlightened absolutism in 18th-century Baden,
and the accounting procedures used in concerns operated by the
princes of Thurn in the 19th century. Particularly intriguing is
the application of Goethe’s concept of ‘natural’ budgets while
administrator of the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenback in the
late 18th century.
Cost accounting and bookkeeping in German heavy indus-
tries features in business histories of major concerns such as
Krupp. One paper discusses accounting information in the fam-
ily firm of Freidrich Engels. An organization which has received
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particular attention from historians is the German National
Railway Company. This was founded in 1924 in the wake of the
Dawes Plan for the scheduling of German payment of post-war
reparations. The modernization of the railways included a new
costing system. The origins of the system and opposition to its
implementation have featured in studies of the German Na-
tional Railway Company during the interwar period. Other stud-
ies track the limited application of Bedaux’s system of rational
industrial management (including accounting and cost control).
There are two doctoral dissertations on accounting for inflation
(one by Graves) during the 1920s and histories of the statutory
corporate audit from the 1870s to the 1930s.
Research on German subjects is not confined to business
organizations. Studies have been published on Frederick I’s au-
dit of the finances of the Jewish community in Berlin in 1717;
discussion of energy accounting, agricultural economics and
Marxism during the 1880s; the accounts of Prussian universities
during the late-19th and early-20th centuries; accounting and
cost control in hospitals during the 20th century; administrative
bookkeeping, criminal statistics and social control during the
19th century; and the role of accounting in ensuring democratic
control over the West German military after World War II.
Italy: Studies on Italian subjects include and extend beyond the
emergence and use of double-entry bookkeeping in financial and
mercantile institutions and the work of historians, such as
Federigo Melis, on tracing the origins of the technique. Studies
of accounting in the state and public administration concern the
work of the Corte dei Conti (Court of Accounts) established in
1862; accounting methods in public works during the 19th and
early-20th centuries; uniform accounting in French-controlled
Tuscany during the Napoleonic Wars; and fascism and the pro-
fessional class (including accountants) during the 1920s and
1930s. Studies of the Catholic Church include the accounting
techniques applied on the estates of the clergy during the 17th
and 18th centuries, the use of accounting records to trace the
role of the church as a source of credit in the same period, and
the accounting reforms in Vatican finances introduced by Pius
X at the start of the 20th century. With the exception of a study
of the armaments sector during the early-20th century, indus-
trial accounting in Italy does not feature significantly in the
database. Research on accounting and land ownership, estate
management and relationships in aristocratic families in various
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periods are more common. One paper examines accounting and
estate management by Farm Workers’ Councils in 1919-1920.
Another theme is accounting education in Italy. Publica-
tions refer to surviving school notebooks to reveal the teaching
of bookkeeping in Umbria in 1480; teaching accounting as part
of instruction on estate management at an agricultural institute
in Meleto, 1834; and how the secondary education of girls in
Turin included accounting as preparation for managing house-
holds and family businesses. Other work has examined the im-
portance of personal bookkeeping to the upper class in late-15th
century Florence, the impact of accounting for imaginary
money on inflation during the 16th and 17th centuries; the ac-
counting system of the postal service in Mantua; and a treatise
by Giovanni Bianchini, an accountant, on algebra for astrono-
mers.
Spain: Boyns and Carmona [2002] identified and analyzed 135
research pieces and two doctoral dissertations on Spanish ac-
counting history, 1996-2001. Accounting-related publications on
Spain contained in Historical Abstracts are much fewer in num-
ber. The work of Hernández Esteve features in the citations. A
distinguishing feature is the limited number of Spanish studies
on manufacturing contexts and the presence of work relating to
the rural economy, religious institutions, the public sector and
colonial administration. In relation to the first of these, account-
ing records have been used to study the productivity of Navarre
viticulture during the 19th century, the economic strategies on
landed estates in the 19th century, and the cattle industry from
the 16th century. Studies relating to religious institutions con-
cern accounting for estate property by convents in 18th-century
Madrid, the finances of chapters in the Cathedrals of Murcia
and Segorbe, and the importance of accounting for Episcopal
revenues from the 16th century to the development of account-
ing principles in Spain.
Publications concerning the state and public administration
relate to: the ledgers of the royal accountant and financing the
Spanish crown, 1495-1504; improvements to the bookkeeping
system of the royal exchequer and the Council of Finances in
Castile during the early-16th century; the introduction of double
entry to the royal treasury of Castile in 1592; accounting in the
Valencian bailiwick during the 17th and 18th centuries; ac-
counting procedures and tax collection during the 18th century;
the history of financial accounting in the navy from the 16th
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century; debates over the introduction of double-entry book-
keeping in accounting for colonies in South America during the
1780s and 1790s; accounting in the Province of Guipuzcoa dur-
ing the 19th century; and Treasury accounting following re-
forms instituted in 1911. Studies relating to accounting func-
tionaries refer to the determination of a ‘just’ rate of interest by
Philip II’s accountants following financial crisis in the 1570s;
biographical studies of a Basque accountant and an accountant
of the Royal Treasury; and accountants in the Catalan textile
industry from the 19th century. Accounting in the 16th-century
Segovian slave trade and bookkeeping education in academies
established by the Chamber of Commerce in the Canary Islands
during the 19th century also feature.
Poland: Perhaps another unexpected finding of this study is the
number of articles contained in Historical Abstracts on Polish
subjects with an accounting content. These articles relate prima-
rily to economic and social history research which utilized ac-
counting records. Accounting sources have been the basis of
investigations into the financial management of churches, mon-
asteries, Jewish Consistories and guilds in periods ranging from
the 15th to the 19th centuries. Accounting records have also
been used to trace the administration of landed estates during
the 18th and 19th centuries, the profitability of river transport
and the structure of the grain market in the 18th century. Stud-
ies also cover debates about moral accounting in Polish Jewry
during the 19th century; the employment of foreign accountants
in farm modernization programs during the early-20th century;
accounting for reparations between Poland and Germany fol-
lowing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919; accounting and eco-
nomic reform during the 1970s; and the work of the Central
Auditing Board of the Polish United Workers’ Party in the early
1980s.
Austria: Biographical studies relate to Josef Schlegal, Governor
of Upper Austria, 1927-1933 and later President of the Austrian
Accounting Office; Gustav Tauschek, inventor of bookkeeping
and calculating machines, and; an attendee of the School for
Merchants in Vienna at courses in accounting and auditing dur-
ing the late-18th century. There is also reference in one publica-
tion to the founding of a Chair of Accountancy in the Philo-
sophical Academy, Brno as early as 1846. A variety of other
accounting subjects are also referred to in Austrian studies.
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These include the customary use of tallies and decimal counters
for bookkeeping before the 19th century; accounting and public
finance in Vienna and Austrian towns in the 15th and 16th cen-
turies; the insights offered by 656 payment ledgers (1542-1825)
in the Imperial Archive to public finance and the court of the
Habsburg Dynasty; the performance of accounting functions by
women in family trading concerns in 18th-century Salzburg;
and the history of corporate accounting in Austria during the
20th century.
Czechoslovakia: Accounting in history in the former Czechoslo-
vakia also reflects the major presence of rural-agricultural sub-
jects in East European studies. Articles concern the use of estate
accounts to trace consumption patterns among the landed elite
during the 17th century; using accounts to investigate farm
management, the standard of living of farmers and the history
of forestry; bookkeeping systems employed on estates from the
17th century to the elimination of private property in 1948; and
the role of the accounting section of the Ministry of Agriculture
in the modernization of Czech farming during the interwar pe-
riod. Other topics include false accounting to Berlin on the con-
dition of Bohemia and Moravia during the Nazi occupation; cost
accounting in the post-war socialist economy; and the establish-
ment of a commercial bookkeeping school for Russian refugees
to Czechoslovakia following the 1917 Revolution.
China: In a recent thematic issue of Accounting, Business & Fi-
nancial History, Lu and Aiken [2003] suggested the centrality of
Chinese developments to the history of accounting. They
charted the reasons why accounting history in China has at-
tracted limited attention in the past and pointed to an increasing
interest in recent years. Themes emerging from entries in His-
torical Abstracts, which discuss accounting in China, include the
relationship between indigenous accounting, economic develop-
ment and westernization. The role of accounting in public ad-
ministration, economic planning and state control, particularly
in the Communist era, also appears. A number of studies discuss
the manner in which economic development and reforms have
been frustrated by traditional Chinese accounting practices.
This features in discussion of budgeting and accounting in a
mid-19th century naval yard, the insufficiency of cost account-
ing in programs of industrial growth during the 1960s, and eco-
nomic reforms during the 1980s. One paper relates the role of
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the Australian Audit Office in training the Chinese in modern
audit techniques.
Studies on China also discuss problematic accounting and
management in public granaries from the mid-17th century to
the Revolution of 1911 and deficient accounting in provincial
administration during the late-19th century. There are also gen-
eral histories of accounting from 200 B.C. to the 20th century
and particular studies of accounting in Chinese businesses dur-
ing the 19th to early-20th centuries. One paper utilizes business
accounting records from late Qing China and Weberian theory
to explore the relationship between bookkeeping and capitalism.
Another discusses the accounting records of the British firm,
Jardine, Matheson & Co, which operated in China from the late-
18th century.
Intriguing research has been conducted on the role of
zhangjiu (accounting shops) on the development of Chinese
banking from the 18th century; accounting prescriptions con-
tained in inter-family contracts for economic co-operation dur-
ing the 19th century; accounting in rural cooperatives during
the 1920s and 1930s; and the auditing organizations established
following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Population
accounting under the oppressive regimes of the Manchu Dy-
nasty and the ordering of annual audits of magistrate activities
during the 18th century offer potentially interesting insights to
accounting and governance.
Japan: As well as an increasing presence in the western account-
ing history literature [Chiba and Cooke, 2001], papers on ac-
counting appear in Japanese journals of business and socio-
economic history. Studies of accounting in particular businesses
concern the Dutch East India Company’s factories at Deshima
and Hirado during the mid-17th century; the House of Mitsui, a
multidivisional firm, 1673-1872; Shengtai Hao Company in
Nagasaki; and depreciation accounting in the Onoda Cement Co
during the late-19th and early-20th centuries. Studies of finan-
cial reporting and auditing relate debates about the use of the
British or continental forms of balance sheet during the 19th
century, the establishment of a Board of Audit during the late-
19th century, and the regulation of corporate financial account-
ing during World War II. There are also studies of tax and ac-
counting during the 17th to 19th centuries and the system of
colonial accounting implemented when Japan gained control of
Taiwan in 1897, Sakhalin in 1905 and Korea in 1910. One paper
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explores accounting methods in Japan during the early-20th
century, as revealed in the letters of an English architect.
Among the studies of other Asian countries are a number
relating to India. These reveal the role of accounting in public
administration in the Kingdom of Golconda during the 16th and
17th centuries, state formation in pre-colonial India, estate man-
agement in late-18th century Bengal, and the modernization of
finance and budgeting in colonial government during the mid-
19th century. This emphasis on public administration is also
revealed by a study of accounting procedures introduced by the
Governor of Uttar Pradesh during the 1920s and 1930s. Contri-
butions also exist on the teaching of accounting in Bengal
schools during the 19th century, and peasant accounting in a
North Indian village during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Peru: The single most significant location of studies on Central
and South American subjects contained in the database is Peru.
Accounting in histories of Peru relate to two principal themes.
The first of these is ethnographic and anthropological studies of
record keeping, counting and taxation by the Incas. The second
concerns accounting under Spanish colonial rule from the
1530s. Studies examine the Royal Court of Accounts in Peru
following the Spanish conquest; the chief accountants of Peru;
accounting for tributes extracted from Indians to finance Span-
ish rule; the accounting system of the Tribute Department fol-
lowing administrative reforms during the mid-18th century; the
audit of Treasury accounts under Spanish rule during the 16th
century; and biographies of accountants involved in colonial ad-
ministration during the 17th and 18th centuries. The audit of
municipal finances in Lima during the 18th century also fea-
tures.
Studies relating to other Central and South American loca-
tions tend to concern accounting under Spanish colonial admin-
istration, particularly during the 18th century. The problems of
establishing government accounting procedures in post colonial
states have also been investigated. Accounting practices on haci-
endas in Venezuela and Mexico offer insights to estate manage-
ment and rural society. Some potentially insightful work has
been published on the following: accounting and labor control
in a 17th-century textile factory in Ecuador; the bookkeeping
practices of Jesuit missionaries in 17th-century Brazil; account-
ing in Mexican mining during the 18th century; accounting for
tithe collection in the Archbishopric of Mexico during the 19th
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century; and cost accounting in the Cuban five-year plan of
1976-1980. Another study refers to the contents of 8,000 vol-
umes of the Main Accounting Office in Chile, 1579-1896.
Africa and Australasia: As Table 4 illustrates, there are compara-
tively few studies in Historical Abstracts which relate to account-
ing history in Africa. A number of abstracts refer to research on
South African subjects such as accounting and accountants in
the Dutch East India Company and accounting practices in
Cape Colony during the 1830s. There are even fewer studies on
Australasian subjects and those cited include examples of ac-
counting historians venturing into history journals (such as
Carnegie and Potter and Craig and Jenkins), and doctoral theses
by Funnell on state auditing and Poullaos on the accountancy
profession.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this study indicate the existence of a sub-
stantial literature on the history of accounting which has re-
ceived limited attention from accounting historians. The analy-
sis also reveals that increased interest in the history of
accounting has not been confined to accounting historians. Like
accounting historians, historians with an interest in accounting
have tended to focus on the modern period and on European
subjects (though the latter finding is biased by the scope and
coverage of the data source for this project). The study reveals
the existence of a considerable amount of work of potential rel-
evance to accounting historians published in languages other
than English. Significant numbers of mainstream historians
pursue research which interfaces with accounting in countries
which have remained outside the international accounting his-
tory community. Historians with an interest in accounting in
Eastern and Central Europe, and Central and South America are
seldom found among the membership lists of the Academy of
Accounting Historians. There also remain territories, civiliza-
tions and cultures in the African, Asian and South American
continents which have received little attention from any histori-
ans with an interest in accounting. While a number of account-
ing historians have successfully crossed the boundary into the
history literature, scope clearly exists for further movement in
the opposite direction.
The analysis of Historical Abstracts reveals a number of ac-
counting-related subjects which have been researched by histo-
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rians. In addition to the conventional interface between ac-
counting and business history, we may add educational, mili-
tary, transport, medical and social history. However two par-
ticular subject areas, which emerge from this study, deserve
particular synergetic development between accounting and
other historians. Firstly, the accounting history literature has
tended to be dominated by research on western industrial
economies and modernity. Historians working outside this tra-
dition reveal the potential importance of exploring accounting
in agricultural economies, pre-industrial rural societies and the
dominant institutions thereof, such as the church. Secondly, in
almost all the countries referred to, historians have explored the
role of accounting in governance and public administration.
Studies range from accounting in Communist totalitarian states
to accounting and the administration of overseas colonies and
accounting in provincial and local government.
The foregoing indicates that while greater inclusiveness in
accounting history may be advanced by internationally oriented
research agendas, adherence to supradisciplinary approaches to
knowledge production are also desirable. In addition to pursu-
ing the undoubted research opportunities for advancing knowl-
edge within the specialist home field, receptivity to insights
from other disciplines offers scope for not only challenging the
‘Anglo-Saxon’ hegemony in accounting history, but doing so in
ways which transcends the potential for the replacement of one
form of spatial-cultural dominance by another. Inter-
disciplinarity also presents opportunities to arrest any recent
tendency in accounting history to navel gazing, introspection
and exhaustion by encouraging the import of regenerative theo-
retical and methodological insights. Moreover it also offers the
prospect of exporting accounting history knowledge to other dis-
ciplines where its contribution remains to be fully recognized.
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December 2005
NOTICEBOARD
EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT:
SUBMISSIONS
Please note that article submissions should be
sent to the incoming editor:
Professor Richard K. Fleischman
Boler School of Business
John Carroll University
University Heights
OH 44118
USA
Email: fleischman@jcu.edu
The outgoing editor would like to thank all connected
with AHJ for their support and encouragement over
the past five years
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AVAILABLE ON-LINE
The early volumes of the Accounting Historians Journal (1974-
1992) have been digitized and indexed. Articles are available as
part of the University of Mississippi’s
DIGITAL ACCOUNTING COLLECTION
http://umiss.lib.olemiss.edu:82/screens/dacopac.html
The journal has been scanned from cover to cover including
prefatory matter and end matter. The journal may be browsed
issue by issue. Each article has both a word searchable PDF file
and a PDF page image file. The collection may also be searched
by title, author and subject. While the Optical Character Recog-
nition Program used has created highly accurate texts that were
hand checked for errors, whenever the researcher may doubt the
accuracy of the transcription, the image file is available for im-
mediate verification. The collection currently contains over 450
articles and sections of AHJ.
The Digital Accounting Collection also features:
• Over 120 AICPA Exposure Drafts (non-current), 1968-
2004.
• A collection of photographs and illustrations taken from
the AICPA archive featuring frontispieces of early ac-
counting texts, cartoons, illustrations, logos, mastheads,
and early photographs of accounting pioneers and orga-
nization meetings.
• A searchable collection of pamphlets from the library of
the AICPA (items relate to the period 1905 to 1924).
The Digital Accounting Collection project was funded by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services and permission to
digitize materials was obtained from the Academy of Account-
ing Historians and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
THE ACCOUNTING
HISTORIANS JOURNAL,
1974-1992
Praeterita
Illuminant
Postera
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD, 2006
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established an annual
manuscript award to encourage academic scholars new to the field to
pursue historical research. An historical manuscript on any aspect of
the field of accounting, broadly defined, is appropriate for submission.
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES
FOR SUBMISSIONS
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appointment
and who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven years previous
to the date of submission, is eligible to be considered for this award.
Coauthored manuscripts will be considered (if at least one coauthor
received his/her master/doctorate within the last seven years). Manu-
scripts must conform to the style requirements of the Accounting Histo-
rians Journal. Previously published manuscripts or manuscripts under
review are not eligible for consideration.
Each manuscript should be submitted by June 15, 2006 in a Word file
as an e-mail attachment to the chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript
Award Committee, Professor Thomas Tyson (ttyson@sjfc.edu).
A cover letter, indicating the author’s mailing address, date masters/
doctoral degree awarded, and a statement that the manuscript has not
been published or is not currently being considered for publication
should be included in the submission packet.
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD
In addition to the chair, the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Com-
mittee includes the following members:
Salvador Carmona
Garry Carnegie
Richard Fleischman
David Oldroyd
The committee will evaluate submitted manuscripts on a blind-review
basis and select one recipient each year. The author will receive a
$1,000 (U.S.) stipend and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding
achievement in historical research. In the case of coauthored manu-
scripts, only the junior faculty member(s) will receive prizes. The win-
ning manuscript will be published in the Accounting Historians Journal
after an appropriate review. The award will be given annually unless
the Manuscript Award Committee determines that no submission war-
rants recognition as an outstanding manuscript.
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YEARBOOK OF THE ACCOUNTING
HISTORY ASSOCIATION
(Accounting History Association, Japan)
ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS
VOLUME 23 (2004)
Leonardo Pisano’s “Liber Abaci” and its Contributions to
the Progress of Accounting
Toshiya Hashimoto
It has often been pointed out that the introduction of Arabic
numerals into Europe made a great contribution to the progress
of accounting. It was Leonardo Pisano who introduced them
with his book Liber Abaci, published in 1202. In this book
Pisano explained how to apply the new numerals to commercial
practice. The book enabled Europeans to handle numbers with
ease, and urged them to grasp commercial activities through
numbers. It is concluded that Liber Abaci can be regarded as the
origin of “accounting thought” in Europe.
A Study of Eugen Schmalenbach: From the
Viewpoint of Activity-Based Costing
Kazuyoshi Morimoto
The aim of this paper is to examine an article by Schmalenbach
in 1899 and to show the present-day significance of his studies.
In order to achieve this aim, a comparative study of
Schamalenbach’s thesis and Activity-Based Costing was con-
ducted. Both Schamalenbach’s thesis and Activity-Based Costing
supported full absorption costing based on the separation of
cost into variable costs and fixed costs. It is intended to reveal
the present-day significance of studies by Schamalenbach by
showing many similarities between the two approaches to cost-
ing.
The Formative Period of the Industrial Accounting System
Nobuko Takahashi
The purpose of this study is to clarify the system which first put
accounting regulations into practice in Japan. In some indus-
tries in Japan corporate accounting is regulated by the indus-
trial code. This industrial accounting was originated in banking
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regulations of the Meiji era. At that time, industrial organiza-
tions and related ministries worked together to establish and
propagate effective accounting practices for industry.
The Origin of Accounting Standards for R&D Costs in Japan
Tsunehiko Nakamura
Accounting standards for R&D costs in Japan legally authorized
asset capitalization during WWII. Accounting standards for
R&D during WWII were established under conditions of ‘total
war’. Experimental research and development costs were estab-
lished for the “encouragement of airplane development” and
“fostering subcontractors”. The accounting standards for R&D
costs established during WWII continued through the postwar
period under the so-called “1940 System”.
The Significance of Historical Factory Financial Statements
of Oji Paper and Non Monetary Accounting
Fujio Yamaguchi
In Oji Paper Co. Ltd., performance was measured using both
financial data such as product cost and profits, and material
data such as input-output amount and defect rate, described
here as non-monetary accounting. Material calculation tables
were peculiar to the place of business. Today, material energy
flow cost accounting, one of the environmental management
accounting techniques, the measurement of intangible assets,
and the measurement of service effect are examples of non-
monetary accounting.
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Eleventh World Congress of
Accounting Historians
NANTES (France) 19 - 22 July 2006
Call for Papers
Six years after the Madrid Congress in 2000, the WCAH will return to
Europe, after stops in Melbourne in 2002 and St-Louis in 2004. In fact
in July 2006, the Eleventh World Congress of Accounting Historians
will take place in Nantes, and France will welcome this gathering for
the first time.
Ideally situated, Nantes is only two hours from Paris by TGV (the high
speed train with 20 round trips daily) and approximately two hours by
plane from the majority of European Capitals. Gateway to Brittany and
its ports, it is equally very close to a number of major tourist sites, such
as Mont Saint-Michel, le Puy du Fou, the Futuroscope, and the “Cha-
teaux of the Loire”.
Settled over two millennia ago on the banks of the Loire, fifty
kilometres from the Atlantic Ocean, Nantes was, during the middle
ages, the capital of the Duchy of Bretagne. In the eighteenth century,
the city became the great merchant port of the French crown, opening
commercial and maritime routes of the Americas and Africa. The lead-
ing industrial shipyards of the western half of France from the nine-
teenth century, noted for its naval engineering and its canning industry,
Nantes and the Loire estuary have developed into a leading metropolis
for the service and high technology sectors. Economic capital of west-
ern France and the major French city in terms of its rate of demo-
graphic growth, Nantes draws interest not only for its economic
achievements but also for its quality of life and its environment.
The Congress will take place on the campus of the University of Nantes,
a few steps from the historic centre of the city and from the majority of
the hotels likely to lodge congress attendees. In 1995, the Journées
d’histoire de la Comptabilité et du Management, which takes place in
France in March of each year, was organized for the first time in
Nantes. The same year, the University of Nantes made a major acquisi-
tion of a collection of works dealing with accounting and its history,
amassed by the Belgian Accounting Historian Ernest Stevelinck. De-
ceased in 2001, Ernest Stevelinck was the initiator and organiser of the
first World Congress of Accounting Historians, which took place in
Brussels in 1970. Holding the eleventh Congress in Nantes will there-
fore possess symbolic value and will be an opportunity to recognise his
legacy.
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Call for Papers
Conference submissions can examine any aspect of the history of ac-
counting, but the history of Nantes, the presence of the Stevelinck Col-
lection, and the experience with the Journées d’Histoire de la
Comptabilité et du Management motivates us to encourage papers deal-
ing with the following themes:
• Accounting and Ocean Routes: maritime trade, major commercial
companies, colonialisation
• 1970-2006: 36 years of accounting-history research: thematics, au-
thors, methodologies, prospective approaches
• Accounting writers: biographies, works, influence… privileging new
research approaches and new issues
• Accounting in relation to other management disciplines: strategy,
management, human resources management, marketing, finance
• Interdisciplinary approaches to accounting history
Manuscripts must be submitted in English, and will be reviewed by the
members of the Scientific Committee. Submissions by electronic mail
are acceptable.
Submission of Proposals:
The deadline for proposed manuscripts is January 15, 2006 and
should be sent to:
Yannick Lemarchand
Congress Convenor
Centre de Recherches en Gestion Nantes-Atlantique CRGNA
Faculté des Sciences économiques et de gestion
Université de Nantes
BP 52331
44322 Nantes Cedex
FRANCE
Email: wcah@sc-eco.univ-nantes.fr
Authors of accepted papers will be advised at the latest by March 15,
2006.
Further information about the Eleventh WCAH will be available
progressively on the Congress website: www.iae.univ-nantes.fr/
11wcah
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THE EIGHTH
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
ON ACCOUNTING CONFERENCE
Cardiff Business School
Cardiff University
10-12th July 2006
CALL FOR PAPERS
The IPA conference is an established forum for research into the social,
political and organizational aspects of accounting theory and practice.
The organizers of the Eighth Conference invite researchers from all
areas of the social sciences to contribute papers.
The conference will respond to the concerns of an evolving research
community. The organizers aim to highlight emerging intellectual is-
sues and encourage new agendas, as well as stimulate debate within
and between established paradigms, by arranging a variety of work-
shops, panel discussions and plenary debates. Major themes in the past
have included: accounting, finance and organizational controls; mar-
kets, institutions and social order; accountability, identity and gender;
the changing organization of the accounting profession; globalization,
regulation, and technology; public and environmental policy; and ac-
counting methodology, knowledge and practice. Three copies of com-
pleted papers or the paper in Word should be sent to the organiz-
ers no later than 15 February 2006.
A distinctive feature of the IPA is the thorough review that each paper
receives. In addition, papers are presented at the conference by a dis-
cussant with a response from the author. Reviewers and discussants are
central to the continuing success of this conference and we encourage
wide participation in the conference through the review process.
EMERGING SCHOLARS’ COLLOQUIUM
IPA2006 will host a forum specifically for post-graduates and new Fac-
ulty, which will be held immediately prior to the conference.
If you would like to register for the conference, submit a paper, attend the
emerging scholars’ colloquium, be a reviewer and/or discussant, details of
what to do next can be found at our website.
ALL ENQUIRIES AND FURTHER INFORMATION:
IPAWebsite: http://www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/conferences/ipa/home.html
E-Mail: RobertsJA1@cardiff.ac.uk
Conference secretary:
Julie Roberts
Conference organizers:
Mahmoud Ezzamel (Cardiff University), Trevor Hopper (University of
Manchester), Paolo Quattrone (University of Oxford), Keith Robson
(Cardiff University), Stephen Walker (Cardiff University).
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CALL FOR PAPERS
ACCOUNTING, BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL HISTORY
SPECIAL ISSUE
2007
Volume 17 (3)
Studies of Irish Accounting History
Guest editor: Ciarán Ó hÓgartaigh, Dublin City University
Accounting, Business & Financial History is an international, peer-
reviewed journal which covers the areas of accounting history, business
history and financial history. The journal provides contributors with an
opportunity to publish the results of their research into mainstream
aspects of accounting, business, and financial history, and also explores
the interface between these three disciplines. A particular feature of the
journal is its country-based special issues which are acknowledged as
having played an important part in internationalising the study of ac-
counting history.
This special issue invites contributions that explore the nature and
context of Irish accounting, business and financial history. Irish
accounting history is relatively under-explored but, as a cultural, politi-
cal and economic setting, is a potentially rich seam of accounting his-
tory research. In that context, the special issue intends to broaden the
canvass on which Irish accounting history is traced and also add colour
and context to research in the area.
Submissions which reflect the social, political, economic and geo-
graphical context of Irish accounting history are particularly welcome.
For example, the implications of Irish accounting history in areas such
as the accounting profession, the practice of accounting and account-
ing education as well as the historical interactions between accounting
and other social institutions are of interest. Similarly, much knowledge
may be gained through studies of the influence of accounting in par-
ticular historical settings, such as in state institutions, the public ser-
vice and in corporate settings. Further, studies which locate Irish ac-
counting history in an international context, including the contribution
of Irish accountants and accounting to accounting, business and finan-
cial change in other countries, are encouraged.
Potential contributors are encouraged to contact the guest editor at
their earliest convenience. All submissions will be subject to the usual
editorial policies of the journal. Instructions for authors can be viewed
at:
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/rabfauth.asp
Papers should be submitted electronically to Ciarán Ó hÓgartaigh
(ciaran.ohogartaigh@dcu.ie) by 30 November 2006. Early submission
is encouraged.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
ACCOUNTING FORUM
Financial Accounting: Past, Present and Future
GUEST EDITORS:
Mike Jones
Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU
Email: JonesM12@Cardiff.ac.uk
David Oldroyd
Newcastle Business School, Armstrong Building,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE1 7RU
Email: David.Oldroyd@ncl.ac.uk
This special temporally-orientated issue of Accounting Forum looks at the
development of Financial Accounting through time, the current situation
and likely future developments. It takes the view that studying the past
helps to understand the present and predict the future. There should be an
attempt to develop themes over time. Papers linking past historical re-
search, current issues and future policy recommendations are particularly
welcome. The editors are happy to receive papers across a wide spectrum
of topics. The following topics can be used for guidance, but are not meant
to be exclusive. Thus, potential topics could include:
❖ The form, nature and presentation of financial statements over time
e.g., charge and discharge statements, balance sheets, income state-
ments, funds flow/cash flow statements, value added statements.
❖ The historical development of measurement and valuation of assets,
liabilities and equity.
❖ The historical development of disclosure of assets, liabilities and eq-
uity.
❖ The historical evolution of guidelines, rules and regulations over time.
❖ The historical development of objectives, stakeholders and users.
❖ The persistence of the behavioural aspects of accounting behaviour
over time, including creative accounting.
❖ The development of governance regulations within a financial report-
ing framework over time.
❖ The effectiveness and development of financial accounting as a com-
municational mechanism over time.
❖ International comparisons of the comparative evolution of financial
accounting and reporting practices.
❖ Development of accounting policies over time such as depreciation,
goodwill, stock valuation, foreign currency transactions.
Authors should in the first instance send their manuscripts to Mike Jones.
Papers should be drawn up in the Accounting Forum’s Guide for Authors
found in a past issue of the Journal. Journal submission date should by
30th June 2006. The Special Issue is scheduled for 2008.
Accounting Forum is published by Elsevier. The General Editors are Glen
Lehman and Tony Tinker.
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
APPLICATION FOR 2005 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership: $45.00
Student Membership: $10.00
Name:  (please print)
Mailing Address:
City: State:
Zip Code: Country:
Accounting History Area of Interest:
Phone: Fax:
E-mail:
 ____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
 ____  ____
/___/ Mastercard /___/ VISA
Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Signature:
Mail to: Mrs. Kathy H. Rice
The Academy of Accounting Historians
The University of Alabama
Box 870220
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
USA
The Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 32, Number 1
December 2005
2005 OFFICERS
2005 TRUSTEES
Esteban Hernández-Esteve, Chairman
Eugene H. Flegm (Bonita Springs, FL), Honorary Trustee, Emeritus
Garry D. Carnegie (Melbourne University Private), 2004-2006
Edward N. Coffman (Virginia Commonwealth University), 2004-2006
Joann Noe Cross (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), 2003-2005
Richard K. Fleischman (John Carroll University), 2005-2007
Dale L. Flesher (University of Mississippi), 2004-2006
Warwick Funnell (University of Wollongong), 2005-2007
Esteban Hernández-Esteve (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid), 2005-2007
Sarah A. Holmes (Texas A&M University), 2004-2006
Cheryl S. McWatters (University of Alberta), 2003-2005
Barbara Merino (University of North Texas), 2003-2005
Gary J. Previts (Case Western Reserve University), 2004-2006
William D. Samson (The University of Alabama), 2003-2005
Mary S. Stone (The University of Alabama), Corporate Agent
In addition to publishing the Accounting Historians Journal, the Academy pub-
lishes The Accounting Historians Notebook, Monographs, and reprints of Ac-
counting History Classics. Annual membership dues, including subscriptions
to the Accounting Historians Journal and The Accounting Historians Notebook,
are $45 (U.S.) for individuals, $75 (U.S.) for institutions and libraries and $10
for students. Inquiries concerning membership, publications, and other mat-
ters relating to the Academy (other than submission of manuscripts to the
Accounting Historians Journal) should be addressed to Kathy H. Rice, The
Academy of Accounting Historians, The University of Alabama, Box 870220,
Tuscaloosa, AL, USA 35487.
Vice-President - Partnerships
John T. Rigsby
Mississippi State University
PH: (662) 325-1635
FAX (662) 325-1646
email: jrigsby@cobilan.msstate.edu
Secretary
Sandra Welch
University of Texas at San Antonio
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Treasurer
Jennifer Reynolds-Moehrle
University of Missouri-St. Louis
PH: (314) 516-6764
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email: jreynolds.moehrle@umsl.edu
President
Daniel L. Jensen
Ohio State University
PH: (614) 292-2529
FAX: 292-2118
email: jensen.7@osu.edu
President-Elect
Salvador Carmona
Insitute De Empresa, Spain
PH: 34 91 568 96 20
email: scarmona@profesor.ie.edu
Vice-President - Communication
Michael Gaffikin
University of Wollongong
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email: gaffikin@uuow.educ.au
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